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ABSTRACT
Pay communication is an important yet complex organizational practice that 
assists organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely 
and Bierman 2003). However, the management literature has neglected the pay 
communication concept, resulting in a scarce and undeveloped knowledge base on pay 
secrecy and pay openness. Given this opportunity, this dissertation focuses on pay 
communication and its influence on employee behaviors.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the pay communication literature in the 
management discipline. A broader analysis of pay secrecy practices is provided since it is 
the practice primarily focused on in the pay communication literature, including details 
about pay secrecy’s legality, benefits, and costs. Additionally, prior research is 
summarized.
Chapter 3 involves the development and validation of a pay communication 
measure with pay secrecy and pay openness representing the extremes. Three multistage 
studies were conducted to validate the pay communication scale. The first study consisted 
of generating a pool of items that together represent pay communication and initiating the 
refinement process of the items. The second study further refined the items by analyzing 
the inter-item correlations, variances, and factor loadings of each item in an exploratory 
factor analysis. In the third study, the proposed scale and dimensionality of the remaining
items was confirmed by using confirmatory factor analysis and construct validation was 
determined.
Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. 
This study utilizes the pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale 
developed in Chapter 3. Specifically, pay secrecy is expected to positively influence 
workplace deviance. Additionally, the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship is 
expected to be mediated by distributed justice, procedural justice, informational justice, 
interpersonal justice, organizational trust, and managerial trust. Continuance commitment 
is also proposed to moderate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace 
deviance.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. This chapter provides a summary of the 
overall research efforts conducted in Chapters 3 and 4. A brief review of the overall 
contributions of this dissertation to the pay communication literature and management 
discipline is also provided.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Pay communication is an important yet complex organizational practice that 
assists organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely 
and Bierman 2003). However, the management literature has neglected the pay 
communication concept, resulting in a scarce and undeveloped knowledge base on pay 
secrecy and pay openness. The utilization of certain pay communication practices in the 
workplace (e.g., pay secrecy and pay openness) should be further analyzed to identify the 
impact each distinct type of pay communication has on employee’s attitudes and 
behaviors since compensation is an important factor for employees (e.g., Gerhart and 
Rynes 2003) and organizations (e.g., to achieve a competitive advantage; (Gerhart 
2000)).
Given this research gap, this dissertation explicitly focuses on pay communication 
and the impact pay secrecy and/or pay openness has on employee’s attitudes and 
behaviors. Pay communication consists of two main aspects. First, pay communication 
refers to the compensation practice that determines when, how, and which pay 
information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay levels, pay 
processes, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees 
and possibly to outsiders. This aspect is called organizational restrictions. The second 
aspect of pay communication, called employee restrictions, refers to whether discussions
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involving pay information are permitted amongst employees and also with outsiders. Pay 
communication resides along a continuum as organizations vary in the amount and type 
of pay information they provide to employees. Pay secrecy and pay openness are the two 
anchors of the pay communication continuum. Generally, pay openness is a 
compensation practice that allows employees to discuss their pay information amongst 
each other (and possibly outsiders) while the organization distributes most, if not all, pay 
information to employees on a regular basis or upon request; whereas, pay secrecy 
involves prohibiting the distribution and communication of most, if not all, pay 
information to employees (and possibly outsiders). Each of the following chapters is 
dedicated to advancing knowledge about pay communication and complements the 
existing pay secrecy and pay openness research.
Chapter 2 provides a thorough analysis of the pay communication literature in the 
management discipline. Based on prior literature, a definitive description of pay 
communication is provided. A broader analysis of pay secrecy (opposed to pay openness) 
practices is given since it is the practice primarily focused on in the pay communication 
literature. Specifically, an overview of pay secrecy’s legality and benefits and costs are 
discussed. Prior research is summarized to provide an overview of the previously- 
analyzed employee and organizational outcomes affected by pay secrecy and/or pay 
openness practices. Future directions are offered to extend and further develop the pay 
communication literature.
Chapter 3 focuses on the development and validation of a pay communication 
measure with pay secrecy and pay openness representing the extremes. This assessment 
is necessary to determine the extent to which an organization’s pay communication
3
resembles pay secrecy or pay openness and to advance the literature by investigating the 
impact pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices have on different organizational 
outcomes and employee attitudes and behaviors. Three multistage studies were conducted 
to substantiate the pay communication scale. The first study consisted of generating a 
pool of items that encompassed the entire domain of pay communication and having 
management academicians review and assess these items for refinement. The second 
study further refined the items by analyzing the inter-item correlations, variances, and 
factor loadings of each item in an exploratory factor analysis. In the third study, the 
proposed scale and dimensionality of the remaining items was confirmed by using 
confirmatory factor analysis and construct validation was determined.
Chapter 4 attempts to identify ways pay communication (specifically, pay 
secrecy) impacts different employee attitudes and behaviors. This study utilizes the pay 
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale developed in Chapter 3. Following 
equity theory (Adams 1965), uncertainty management theory (Lind and van den Bos 
2002; van den Bos and Lind 2002), and reactance theory (Brehm 1966), pay secrecy is 
expected to positively influence workplace deviance. Additionally, the pay secrecy- 
workplace deviance relationship was expected to be mediated by several variables. 
Specifically, distributive justice (based on equity theory; (Adams 1965)), procedural 
justice (based on fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), informational justice (based on 
fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), interpersonal justice (based on fairness heuristic 
theory; (Lind 2001)), managerial trust and organizational trust (based on social exchange 
theory; (Blau 1964)) were hypothesized to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy 
and workplace deviance. Based on power dependence theory (Emerson 1972; Molm
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2003), continuance commitment is also proposed to moderate the relationship between 
pay secrecy and workplace deviance such that the relationship between pay secrecy and 
workplace deviance will be mitigated, if not eliminated.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. This chapter provides a summary of the 
overall research efforts conducted in Chapters 3 and 4. A brief review of the overall 
contributions of this dissertation to the pay communication literature and management 
discipline is also provided.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF PAY COMMUNICATION (PAY 
SECRECY AND PAY OPENNESS) WITHIN 
THE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
The management literature has overlooked the organizational practice involving 
pay communication causing the overall pay secrecy and pay openness research to be 
limited and underdeveloped. Because compensation is an important factor for employees, 
the usage of certain pay communication practices should be investigated to identify the 
impact pay secrecy and/or pay openness has on employee’s attitudes and behaviors, as 
well as organizational outcomes.
This chapter provides a thorough analysis of the pay communication literature in 
the management discipline. Since the majority of the pay communication literature 
focuses on pay secrecy (rather than pay openness) practices, a broader analysis of this 
concept is provided. Specifically, a definitive description of pay secrecy, based on the 
prior literature, is developed. Additionally, an overview of pay secrecy’s legality, benefits 
and costs, multiple forms, and preferential usage by different entities are provided. Prior 
research is summarized to provide an overview of the previously-analyzed employee and 
organizational outcomes affected by pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices. Future 
directions are offered to extend and further develop the pay communication literature.
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Compensation Systems 
Organizations employ valuable human resource practices and policies (such as an 
effective compensation system) to improve organizational productivity along with profits 
and to create a competitive advantage (Guest 2011; Gerhart 2000). One of the most 
prominent human resource structures involves the compensation (pay) system. A 
compensation system entails not only the administration of pay itself, but also the 
development of procedures and policies used to remunerate employees. The main 
purpose of an organization’s compensation system is to attract, motivate, and retain 
employees (Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, and Dyer 1989; Weiner 1980). The 
compensation system is a critical element in determining the overall effectiveness of the 
organization.
Compensation has been indicated as an important job factor by employees 
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Opsahl and Dunnette 1966); thus, it may influence employee 
behavior which, in turn, can affect organizational effectiveness (Beer and Gery 1972; 
deCarufel 1986; Lawler 1981). Additionally, employee compensation is a complex notion 
since it represents an exchange for work performed (Andersson-Straberg, Sverke, and 
Hellgren 2007) or for individual human capital (Lawler 2000), as well as an achievement 
or form of recognition (Ackley 1993; Goodman 1974; Lawler 1966,1971; Lawler and 
Porter 1963), an indication of organizational value (Lawler 1966,1971), a determinant of 
social status (Andersson-Straberg et al. 2007), a motivator (Ackley 1993), performance- 
related reward (Ackley 1993), an aspect of performance feedback (Lawler 1965b, 1966), 
and a self-esteem booster (Goodman 1974), among other things. Generally, an 
employee’s pay is a sensitive issue (especially since it signifies many different things to
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employees) and discussions relating to it are usually avoided altogether. Furthermore, 
employee compensation tends to be a considerable, if not the biggest, expense for the 
majority of organizations (Ackley 1993; Wallace and Fay 1983). Therefore, a substantial 
amount of effort is exerted by organizations in generating the best possible compensation 
system, with some organizations seeking advice from compensation consultants 
(Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 2002).
Compensation systems are usually organization-wide structures, rather than only 
involving certain departments or divisions, and they evolve over time (Lawler 1981). 
Unfortunately, their progression is normally linked to organizational traditions and other 
administrative factors rather than changing organizationally and employee desired 
outcomes, such as higher performance (Beer and Gery 1972). However, not all aspects of 
a compensation system change over time. A subset of the compensation system that tends 
to remain unchanged once implemented involves the practices or strategies regarding pay 
communication, otherwise known as pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices and 
policies.
Pay Communication 
Pay communication is the organizational practice that determines when, how, and 
which pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay 
levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees and 
possibly outsiders. There are two main forms of pay communication: pay secrecy and pay 
openness. Generally, both pay communication practices consist of two aspects: 
organizational restrictions and employee restrictions. Pay openness is a compensation 
practice that (1) allows employees to discuss their pay information amongst each other
8
and possibly with outsiders (employee restrictions) while (2) the organization distributes 
most, if not all, pay information to employees on a regular basis (usually at specific time 
intervals such as yearly) or upon request (organizational restrictions); whereas, pay 
secrecy involves prohibiting the distribution and communication of most, if not all, pay 
information to employees (and possibly outsiders).
Pay secrecy, also known as wage secrecy (Danziger and Katz 1997; Gan 2002; 
King 2003), is a compensation practice that involves constraining employees from 
receiving information about other organizational members’ compensation from the 
employing organization (Bamburger and Belogolovsky 2010; Colella, Paetzold, 
Zardkoohi, and Wesson 2007; deCarufel 1986). This constriction, termed organizational 
restrictions, may involve an organization concealing or not supplying employees with 
certain types of pay information, such as individual employee pay, pay ranges, pay 
averages, pay raises, and/or the entire pay structure. Additionally, pay secrecy practices 
may involve the adoption of a policy (generally referred to as a pay secrecy policy but 
also labeled as pay confidentiality rules; (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman 
2003)) which restricts employees from communicating or exchanging their personal 
compensation information with other organizational members (and possibly outsiders) of 
the employing organization (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Bierman and Gely 
2004; Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003; Thompson and 
Pronsky 1975). In order to receive compliance with this restriction, termed employee 
restrictions, some organizations will compel employees to sign a pledge stating they will 
not discuss compensation information with other organizational members (and possibly 
outsiders), while other organizations may enforce the restriction by having disciplinary
9
consequences (such as tennination) for those employees who violate the policy (Gomez- 
Mejia and Balkin 1992). Generally, a pay secrecy policy is conveyed either verbally, 
usually during employee orientation or employee meetings, or in writing, such as in 
employee manuals or handbooks (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman 2003). 
Different Forms
Pay communication practices function to support organizations in their attainment 
of their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely and Bierman 2003), such as 
attracting highly skilled workers or achieving higher organizational performance. The 
needs of the organization determine the extent to which a pay openness or pay secrecy 
practice is used.
Pay secrecy was originally regarded as a single “all-or-nothing” concept (e.g., 
Lawler 1965b; (Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Thompson and Pronsky 1975)), with 
pay openness representing the “nothing” portion. However, pays communication 
practices (pay secrecy and pay openness) exist along a continuum (Burroughs 1982; 
Colella et al. 2007; Lawler and Jenkins 1992; Patten 1978) as organizations vary on the 
amount and type of pay information they present to employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 
1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005).
Lawler (1981) first indicated that pay communication “ranges from almost total 
secrecy ... through complete openness ...” (p. 6). Although, Lawler (1981) may have 
implied that different degrees of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) 
existed, it was Burroughs (1982) who demonstrated how organizations may differ in 
regards to their pay secrecy (or pay openness) levels by illustrating these different pay 
secrecy (or pay openness) categories. Burroughs (1982) referred to a “red” organization
10
as having complete pay secrecy, where employees are only provided their own pay 
information, while a “green” organization was indicated as an organization practicing 
complete pay openness, where all pay information on all organizational members is 
easily accessible. Additionally, “yellow” and “orange” organizations were identified, 
with the former more closely resembling pay openness where individual pay raise 
information is available, and the latter more closely resembling pay secrecy where pay 
ranges and their corresponding averages are supplied to employees. Building on 
Burroughs’ (1982) categories, it has been suggested (and widely accepted) that pay 
communication approaches occur along a continuum with one extreme representing 
absolute pay secrecy and the other representing absolute pay openness (Colella et al.
2007; Lawler and Jenkins 1992). A variety of pay secrecy and pay openness strategies 
reside on the continuum between these two extremes.
Recently, the pay secrecy concept has been further advanced by the proposal of 
two different pay secrecy constructs: individual and organizational pay secrecy (Noy 
2007). The main difference between the two forms of pay secrecy is the manner in which 
they are generated and preserved. Organizational pay secrecy (OPS) is sustained through 
the organization and its structure, strategies and policies (such as a pay secrecy policy); 
whereas, individual pay secrecy (IPS) is upheld by employees through different norms, 
such as social and cultural norms (Noy 2007). A three-factor model of perceived OPS 
(POPS) was established, with the three aspects characterizing perceptions of (1) policy 
and rules, (2) enforcement, and (3) organizational norms (Noy 2007). However, a 
substantiated measure of IPS has not been developed. Therefore, discriminant validity 
between the two constructs has yet to be determined.
Similar to Noy’s (2007) notion of multiple pay secrecy dimensions, Colella et al. 
(2007) argued for different enforcement approaches within an organization. Following 
the work of Burrough’s (1982), these authors argued that an organization’s enforcement 
tactics lie on a continuum ranging from implicit to explicit (Colella et al. 2007). The 
implicit extreme (similar to IPS) considers the employees more than the organization and 
entails a social norm, where employees decide not to discuss pay information on their 
own. The explicit extreme (similar to OPS) is more concerned with the organization and 
its usage of a formal pay secrecy policy. Various enforcement levels fall between these 
two extremes, such as levels consisting of departmental, organizational, or industrial 
norms.
Preferences
Even though there is a notion of pay secrecy being a multi-faceted construct (IPS 
and OPS), organizations and employees seem to have a similar preference for a certain 
pay communication strategy (e.g., HRnext.com Survey 2001). Employees (including 
managers) prefer pay secrecy practices (opposed to pay openness practices) in the 
workplace (Futrell and Jenkins 1978; Markels and Berton 1996; Schuster and Colletti 
1973). Additionally, managers have indicated they prefer pay secrecy practices because 
employees are more satisfied and most employees want their pay kept secret (Lawler 
1981). Privacy protection is the main reason employees have given for preferring pay 
secrecy (Schuster and Colletti 1973; Markels and Berton 1996). This privacy concern 
makes sense since pay information is a sensitive issue and discussions about it are 
considered crass.
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Over the past several decades, pay secrecy (as opposed to pay openness) appears 
to be the favored pay communication strategy for the majority of U.S. organizations 
(Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1985; HRnext.com Survey 2001; Lawler 1981; Scott,
Sperling, McMullen, and Wallace 2003). Several surveys have found that around three- 
fourths of employing organizations utilized pay secrecy policies (e.g., Balkin and Gomez- 
Mejia 1985).
Another survey found that about half of employing organizations do not have a 
specific pay communication strategy expressed in writing, such as a pay secrecy policy in 
an employee manual (HRnext.com Survey 2001). However, these organizations may 
simply not supply pay information to employees or they may unofficially communicate a 
pay secrecy policy verbally, perhaps during employee orientation or casual office 
meetings (Bierman and Gely 2004). Additionally, this study found that over a third of the 
private sector employing organizations imposed a pay secrecy policy that proscribed 
discussions of pay information with other employees (HRnext.com Survey 2001). 
However, this estimate of private sector employing organizations’ policies may be low 
since pay secrecy practices are more prevalent in the private sector than in the public 
sector (the majority of these organizations are required to practice pay openness due to 
government mandated policies).
Although the majority of organizations seem to prefer pay secrecy practices, 
many organizations appear to favor the idea of having pay ranges easily available to all 
employees (Lawler 1981). Therefore, organizations may practice pay secrecy where only 
individual pay information is withheld or forbidden in discussions, while they provide 
employees with pay ranges and possibly pay averages for those pay ranges. Nonetheless,
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less than a fourth of employing organizations release pay range information, while less 
than ten percent of organizations supply the base salary (Scott et al. 2003). In regards to 
pay openness practices, surveys have found that ten percent or less of employing 
organizations utilize this pay communication approach (HRnext.com Survey 2001; Scott 
etal. 2003).
Legality
Although organizations seem to prefer and utilize pay secrecy practices, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) along with the federal court system have 
consistently found pay secrecy practices (specifically pay secrecy policies) to be in 
violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thus, illegal (Bierman and 
Gely 2004; Estlund 2011; Gely and Bierman 2003). Specifically, the violation of the 
NLRA occurs when a pay secrecy practice (or policy) prohibits employees from 
discussing their employment conditions (such as pay information) with other employees 
(King 2003). Additionally, organizations that require employees to obtain preapproval 
from management when participating in ‘concerted activity’ (such as collective 
bargaining) defy the NLRA (King 2003).
The U.S. Congress ratified the NLRA to protect employees’ rights when engaging 
in activities that would help improve their employment conditions. Section 7 of the 
NLRA states that employees “shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection” (National Labor Relations Act). Therefore, 
discussions pertaining to pay information (whether with organizational members or
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outsiders) are protected under Section 7 since pay information is used during collective 
bargaining and thus, is “concerted activity” (e.g., Brockton Hospital v. NLRB 2002;
(Cote 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003)). Additionally, Section 8 (a)(1) of the NLRA states 
that it “shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... to interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]” (National Labor 
Relations Act). Therefore, a pay secrecy policy practice, including a policy discouraging 
malicious and disrespectful conversations about the organization, violates the NLRA 
since it impedes on employee rights stated in Section 7 by not allowing employees to 
freely discuss their own pay information. Thus, a pay secrecy policy practice that is 
formally or casually expressed either verbally (such as during employee orientation) or in 
writing (such as in an employee manual) violates Section 7 and 8 (a)(1) of the NLRA and 
is unlawful (Cote 2007; King 2003). In support of these NLRA violations, the federal 
court system has consistently ruled against pay secrecy policy practices and the 
organizations that utilize them, regardless of whether they are actually enforced (e.g., 
Brockton Hospital v. NLRB 2002; NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co. 1990).
There are two instances where the NLRB has found a pay secrecy policy practice 
to not violate the NLRA. First, a pay secrecy practice ordained for managers is not 
unlawful as managers do not qualify under the NLRA’s definition of an employee and 
thus, managers do not have the protection of Section 7 rights (King 2003). This exception 
seems appropriate since managers prefer to utilize pay secrecy (Lawler 1981). Second, if 
the pay secrecy policy is worded to be understood as protecting an organizations’ 
confidential information (such as trade secrets or customer information) by prohibiting its 
disclosure to unauthorized individuals or entities then it is not in violation of the NLRA.
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The NLRA has never specifically defined or described exactly what “concerted 
activity” entails (Cote 2007). However, in order for an activity to be considered 
“concerted” under the NLRA, at least two employees must take action together to 
ameliorate their employment terms and conditions. Additionally, “concerted activity” 
must intend to stimulate group (or perhaps in some instances individual) action, even if 
no explicit demands or actions are made. Individual actions qualify as protected and 
“concerted activity” provided that the activity is beneficial for a group of employees and 
not the individual employee, such as demanding safer working conditions. Activities are 
also protected despite their rationality or “reasonableness” provided that they do not 
cause the employee(s) to be unfit to perform work duties (NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works 
1946).
Despite the NLRA not explicitly defining “concerted activity,” the NLRB and 
federal courts have recognized that not all activities pertaining to improving employee 
conditions are considered “concerted activity” and thus, these activities are not protected. 
Activities that have an intolerable manner or a potentially harmful effect on the 
organization (and possibly other employees) are found to be undeserving of NLRA 
protection. For instance, unprotected activities include those that are abusive (e.g., NLRB 
v. City Disposal Sys., Inc. 1984), violent (e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metalurgical Corp. 
1939), illegal (e.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB 1942), in breach of a contract (e.g.,
NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co. 1939), hinder organizational production (e.g., Can- 
Tex Industries v. NLRB 1982), and noncompliant or unfaithful to the organization and its 
directives (e.g., NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Company 1990; NLRB v. Local Union No. 
1953). Additionally, when an employee with knowledge of other organizational
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member’s pay information for job purposes (such as employees holding positions in the 
human resource department) exposes other organizational member’s pay information to 
unauthorized individuals it is not considered “concerted activity” since it involves 
disclosing the organization’s confidential information.
The NLRA protects all employees (except managers), union or non-union, despite 
labor unions being frequently mentioned throughout its provisions. Moreover, the 
protection granted by the NLRA does not require non-union employees to form a union. 
Therefore, organizations that do not have dealings with labor unions are still not lawfully 
allowed to utilize pay secrecy policy practices. The NLRA protection also extends to 
employees experiencing disciplinary action for violations of a pay secrecy policy 
practice, such as termination.
At-Will
But the question that still remains is why do organizations exercise pay secrecy 
policy practices when the NLRB and the federal court system find them unlawful? Why 
do organizations thus risk costly settlements with court fines and employee back pay? 
There are several explanations for the common utilization of pay secrecy practices. First, 
even though employees have protection from the NLRA, the majority of them (especially 
non-union employees) are not aware that they are under NLRA protection nor do they 
understand their employee rights (Morris 1988; Kim 1997). For example, most 
employees do not know they are at-will employees or what exactly that classification 
entails (Kim 1997). At-will employees are employees who do not have a contractual 
arrangement with an organization and may be terminated for any reason (good, bad, or 
wrong) or for no cause at all provided that the organization does break any state or
17
federal statutes, such as discrimination (Estlund 2002). Generally, at-will employees are 
non-unionized and in the private sector (Kim 1997). Although at-will employees can be 
fired for any or no reason, the majority of them believe organizations must lawfully 
follow a “just-cause standard” when terminating employment. Employees even have this 
false belief when the organization explicitly states verbally or in writing (such as in an 
employee manual) that it has the right to terminate employment for any reason (Kim 
1997). Specifically, the majority of employees believe that organizations cannot lawfiilly 
terminate an employee based on personal dislike (89%), inaccurate beliefs of misconduct 
(87%), or a lower-waged replacement (82%; (Kim 1997)). Also, at-will employees tend 
to get confused with wording in employment manuals, such as when the manual refers to 
them as “permanent” employees or have a policy claiming that employee termination will 
only occur when there is just cause by believing that their employment cannot be 
terminated at any time (Kim 1997). Therefore, since the majority of at-will employees do 
not understand that they can be terminated for any reason, at any time, or that they 
receive protection from the NLRA, one could safely presume that these employees also 
do not know that pay secrecy policy practices violate the NLRA and their rights. Given 
that at-will employees are largely unaware about the illegality of pay secrecy policy 
practices, they are unlikely to report such practices and policies to the NLRB. On the 
other hand, employees who are aware of the illegality of pay secrecy policy practices 
may choose not to report their usage to the NLRB because they are aware of their status 
as at-will employees and hence they feel vulnerable to being fired or fear other forms of 
retaliation. The decline of labor unions also affects the possibility of the NLRB not being
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informed about an organizations’ pay secrecy policy practice as they are more likely than 
individual employees to report such practices to the NLRB (Gely and Bierman 2003).
The fact that the NLRB does not have their own employees to enforce the 
employee protection granted under the NLRA may be another reason why organizations 
employ pay secrecy policy practices. Because there is no enforcement arm of the agency, 
the NLRB only takes action when an employee or entity (such as a labor union) formally 
charges an organization with a NLRA violation. Since the majority of employees are 
unaware that pay secrecy policy practices violate the NLRA and their employee rights, 
violations often go unreported. Therefore, organizations may view the NLRB and its 
reactive strategy as weak and ineffective.
Another reason organizations are defiant of the NLRA’s injunction against pay 
secrecy policy practices may be because the penalties and fines are rather low (Gely and 
Bierman 2003). Therefore, organizations do not reap any costly monetary consequences 
that make them want to cease the practice. This low monetary cost for defiance further 
supports the notion that organizations may view the NLRB as weak.
Finally, the benefits associated with having a pay secrecy practice may be another 
reason why organizations dismiss its unlawfulness. A pay secrecy policy practice may be 
viewed as immensely valuable to organizations. Additionally, due to the low monetary 
cost associated with a NLRA violation offense, the perceived benefits of a pay secrecy 
practice (or policy) probably tremendously outweigh the perceived inconsequential 
disadvantages.
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Benefits and Costs
Nevertheless, pay secrecy research has indicated that such a practice provides not 
only benefits to organizations, employees, and society but also has costs for all three 
entities as well (Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003; Tremblay and Chenevert 
2008). As pointed out by Colella et al. (2007), some perceived benefits may also be costs. 
For instance, one organization’s perceived benefit may be a cost for employees or for 
society, if not for a different organization. Further, Colella et al. (2007) argued that the 
extent to which these perceived benefits and costs are endured will vary among 
organizations and employees due to diverse pay secrecy practices and different 
contextual and environmental factors affecting the organization or employee. Therefore, 
perceived benefits and costs may be heightened or reduced in different organizations or 
employees, depending on the fluctuations of the environmental factors.
Pay secrecy practices have been argued to have several major benefits (refer to 
Table 2.1 for an overview of the perceived benefits). First, pay secrecy offers 
organizations and employees privacy protection (Colella et al. 2007; Sim 2001). This is 
important since employees have listed privacy protection as their primary reason for 
preferring pay secrecy (Schuster and Colletti 1973; Markels and Berton 1996). However, 
the reasoning for privacy protection may differ among employees. For instance, lower- 
paid employees may want privacy to save them from embarrassment or having others 
think less or look down on them; whereas, higher-paid employees may want privacy to 
not be referred to as arrogant, risk their “sweet deal” or be targeted as a rate buster 
(Patten 1978). Additionally, with all of the advancements in technology and ease of 
gathering information, employees and organizations are constantly apprehensive in
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regards to their privacy. In regards to an organizations’ privacy, pay secrecy allows 
organizations to attract and retain better employees by giving them higher pay wages 
without upsetting current employees (Sim 2001). Another privacy protection benefit for 
an organization is the reduction of certain competitive tactics, such as poaching, since 
competitors are unaware of current pay information.
Table 2.1 Benefits of Pay Secrecy
Benefit EntityBenefitted Additional Benefits
Entity
Disadvantaged
Privacy
Protection
Employees
Organizations
Stops embarrassment and peer 
pressure; able to attract and retain 
employees by offering higher pay; 
reduces competitive tactics
Employees
Organizations
Society
Decline in 
Labor Mobility
Organizations Lowers employee opportunism; 
enhances continuance commitment; 
reduces poaching; decreases labor 
costs
Employees
Organizations
Society
Conflict
Avoidance
Organizations Reduces conflict, envy, and 
resentment; enhances group 
cohesion
Employees
Impact on 
employee 
behavior
Organizations Reduces persuasive or manipulative 
behaviors in hopes of getting more 
pay
Employees
Freedom & 
Flexibility in 
Pay
Administration
Organizations Pay reflects performance; less 
compressed pay structure; able to 
fix pay discrepancies; avoid 
confrontations
Employees
Autonomy
Limitations
Organizations Limits employee’s autonomy; 
decreases turnover
Employees
Organizations
Society
Enforcement
Approaches
Organizations Hinders pay inequities being found Employees
Society
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The resultant decline in labor mobility is another perceived benefit of pay secrecy 
practices to organizations, although it may be a cost to employees and society and 
possibly to some organizations (Colella et al. 2007; Danziger and Katz 1997; Patten 
1978; Sim 2001). Since employees are unable to compare pay information with external 
referents or the job market, the likely discovery of their lower relative pay is minimized, 
causing them to be unlikely to leave their current organization (Danziger and Katz 1997; 
Lawler 1971). Additionally, since employee opportunism or their perceptions of 
additional job opportunities is decreased, employee continuance commitment is boosted. 
As previously mentioned, poaching is minimized so competitors are less likely to be able 
to lure better-performing employees away from the organization. Therefore, labor 
mobility reduction helps organizations keep better-performing employees, while also 
evading certain labor costs, such as recruitment and training costs (Patten 1978).
Multiple forms of organizational control are other perceived benefits of pay 
secrecy practices (Colella et al. 2007). One form of organizational control is conflict 
avoidance (Colella et al. 2007; Patten 1978). Managers have claimed that one of their 
primary reasons for implementing pay secrecy practices is to evade “jealousies and strife 
among employees” (Bierman and Gely 2004) and the conflicts caused by pay envy and 
resentment (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Steele 1975). Additionally, conflicts may 
cause a loss of group cohesion (Opsahl 1967). Therefore, pay secrecy practices help 
diminish, if not eliminate, any jealousy or inequity employees may experience since 
actual pay levels are unknown.
A second form of organizational control that is beneficial to organizations entails 
influencing employee behavior (Bierman and Gely 2004). For example, under pay
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openness conditions, employees may participate in certain persuasive or manipulative 
behaviors or acts (such as informing management about a co-worker’s misconduct or 
attempting to deceitfully befriend managers) in attempt to receive more pay (Bartol and 
Martin 1989). These Machiavellian tactics may potentially lead to conflict between 
employees and possibly between employees and their managers). Thus, pay secrecy 
practices are thought to control employee behavior by preventing Machiavellian 
behaviors and the conflicts that may arise from them.
Another perceived advantage that pay secrecy creates for organizations is freedom 
and flexibility in pay administration (Bartol and Martin 1988; Colella et al. 2007; 
deCarufel 1986; Lawler 1981; Patten 1978). Pay secrecy practices allow managers to feel 
powerful and comfortable in making their pay decisions more reflective of employees’ 
performance differences without having to explain their decisions to the low-performing 
or angry employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Lawler 1981,1990; Leventhal, 
Michaels, and Sanford 1972). Therefore, managers are more inclined to appropriately 
dispense pay raises among employees based on their performance levels, resulting in a 
better pay-for-performance system. Additionally, pay secrecy allows pay ranges and the 
overall pay structure to be less compressed since managers can successfully, and without 
fear of angering employees, implement a genuine pay-for-performance system with 
maximum partitioning in the raises given (Bartol and Martin 1988). Organizations also 
have the flexibility to fix individual pay and pay structure discrepancies, inequities, or 
mistakes at their leisure, without having to deal with angry employees (and their 
complaints or whining) or explain the slightest inconsistency (deCarufel 1986; Gomez- 
Mejia and Balkin 1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005; Patten 1978).
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Some additional forms of organizational control that are enhanced from the usage 
of pay secrecy practices are autonomy limitations and enforcement approaches (Colella et 
al. 2007). Organizations restrict employees’ autonomy by keeping pay secret without 
giving employees the option of knowing. Organizations engage in these autonomy- 
limiting, paternalistic behaviors because they believe they know what is best for their 
employees and they want to deter them from acting unreasonably (such as quitting) when 
they experience distress from pay inequities. Therefore, organizations benefit from this 
type of autonomy control by potentially reducing turnover. Additionally, organizations 
control employees through the enforcement tactic they use to ensure the pay secrecy 
practice (such as pay secrecy policy) is upheld. Organizations benefit from enforcing a 
pay secrecy practice (such as terminating employment for violators) by hindering the 
employees’ ability to discover problems within the pay structure (such as pay inequities). 
As previously mentioned, the enforcement approach, like the pay secrecy construct, 
resides on a continuum ranging from implicit to explicit (Colella et al. 2007).
However, since Noy (2007) has expanded Colella et al’s (2007) enforcement 
approach by identifying IPS and OPS, the enforcement approach concept may be better 
represented as an enforcement strategy, where organizations control the manner in which 
employees comply with a pay secrecy practice (or policy) rather than which entity 
enforces the compliance. This enforcement strategy concept falls on a continuum ranging 
from permissive to intolerant. The intolerant extreme involves a zero-tolerance rule in 
regards to discussions of pay information and any rule infractions result in termination of 
employment. The permissive extreme entails the organization not reprimanding 
employees for violating the pay secrecy practice. An assortment of enforcement strategies
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fall between these two extremes. For example, one strategy near the permissive extreme 
may involve the organization giving a “warning” or a sign of disapproval to any rule 
violators without ever actually punishing them. Another strategy closer to the intolerant 
extreme may entail the organization having a two-step disciplinary program, such as a 
verbal warning and then termination of employment for rule violators.
Despite these perceived benefits, pay secrecy practices have been argued to 
produce several perceived costs or drawbacks for employees, organizations, and society 
(refer to Table 2.2 for an overview of the perceived costs). Naturally, human instincts 
associate a ‘secret’ with something bad. Hence, the notion of pay secrecy leads to the 
belief that something is wrong, especially since employees may ponder that “if nothing is 
wrong, then why is pay information being hidden?” Therefore, the term ‘pay secrecy’ 
influences the perception of the practice being detrimental for employees, organizations, 
or society. One perceived disadvantage of using a pay secrecy practice is the potential 
loss of fairness perceptions among employees (Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971). It is 
argued that when pay information is undisclosed, employees are unaware of the reasons 
for organizational salary differentials (such as whether they are based on performance 
levels or seniority), forcing employees to rely on managements’ claims that pay 
administration and pay decisions are honest and not based on bias, mistakes, or chance 
(Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,1990). Since employees cannot be completely sure of 
the organizations’ sincerity in pay administration and pay decisions, beliefs of unfair pay 
or pay inequities (such as pay discrimination) are likely to develop. In fact, a vicious 
cycle may develop where pay inequity beliefs may develop over time as employees begin 
to speculate about why pay information is being hidden, especially if pay issues are
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handled illegitimately. These unfair pay perceptions may lead to a lack of trust with 
management and the organization, especially when employees cannot perform their own 
inspection of the compensation system (Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1990). This distrust of 
management and the organization in general may further lead to conflict between the 
employees and managers and perhaps even result in workplace deviance (such as 
employee theft or equipment sabotage) out of retaliation for the injustice. However, 
organizations not utilizing pay secrecy practices (as they are exercising a pay openness 
practice instead) are able to demonstrate the integrity and consistency of their pay 
decisions and related matters by providing pay information and showing no bias or 
mistakes exist, or that they are minimal and are attempting to be slowly resolved 
(Milkovich and Newman 2005). For instance, pay openness practices help employees 
recognize the pay-for-performance system by showcasing that higher-performing 
employees receive larger earnings and raises (Lawler 1990). Additionally, pay openness 
practices will enhance employees trust in management and the organization since 
employees are able to evaluate the pay system and determine its credibility.
Table 2.2 Costs of Pay Secrecy
Cost EntityDisadvantaged Additional Costs
Entity
Benefitted
Unfairness
Perceptions
Employees Lack of trust in management and the 
organization; may lead to conflict 
between employee and managers; may 
lead to workplace deviance
Organizations
Lower
Work
Motivation
Employees
Organizations
May lower job performance; may 
increase turnover and pay 
dissatisfaction
None
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Table 2.2 (Continued)
Inefficient Employees Restricts employee opportunism; Organizations
Labor Organizations employees are unable to identify job
Market Society alternatives; employees may be
underemployed or underpaid;
organizations are incapable of
attracting higher-performing applicants
Another perceived disadvantage may be employees experiencing lower work 
motivation, which potentially leads to other undesired organizational outcomes 
(Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Futrell and Jenkins 1978; Lawler 1965a, 1966, 
1971; Opsahl and Dunnette 1966; Schuster and Colletti 1973). Lawler (1965a, 1966,
1971) has long argued that pay secrecy practices lead to lower employee motivation 
because employees lack the pay information needed to make accurate comparisons. 
Additionally, pay secrecy practices are argued to lower job performance (Futrell and 
Jenkins 1978) while increasing pay dissatisfaction (Opsahl 1967; Thompson and Pronsky 
1975).
An inefficient labor market is another perceived cost of utilizing pay secrecy 
practices (Colella et al. 2007; Danziger and Katz 1997). This is a cost to employees, 
organizations, and society. Pay secrecy practices cause employees to lose power by 
restricting them from gathering pay information, which could possibly lead them to 
identify a better job. Consequently, employees may be underemployed and/or underpaid 
because of their lack of awareness of higher paying job alternatives. Organizations are 
also affected by an inefficient labor market as they are deprived of potentially higher- 
performing applicants since they are incapable of marketing competitive pay information 
and, consequently, making better workers elsewhere realize the attractiveness of their
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organization’s compensation system. Therefore, by publicizing pay information, 
economists would argue the labor market would become more efficient and society 
would benefit from appropriate job transitions.
Theoretical Foundations
Over the past several decades, the pay secrecy literature has expanded its usage of 
theoretical foundations to explain empirical results. In the beginning, pay secrecy 
research did not explicitly utilize theories to justify hypotheses or to clarify findings (e.g., 
Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972). However, prevalent theories 
(such as equity theory) quickly penetrated the pay secrecy literature (e.g., Lawler 1971, 
1972). There have been several major theories continuously employed throughout the pay 
secrecy literature that comprise its theoretical framework. A review of these theories and 
their implications for pay secrecy are examined here.
Equity Theory
Equity theory (Adams 1965) is one of the most prominent theories used 
throughout the pay communication literature. Its prevalence is probably due to the 
importance of (and managerial desire for) a compensation system being fair or equitable. 
Adam’s (1965) equity theory mainly emanated from cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger 1957) with additional influences from the principles of distributive justice 
(Homans 1961), social comparison theory (Festinger 1954), and relative deprivation 
(Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams 1949). According to equity theory, 
employees contribute inputs and receive outcomes, while continuously comparing their 
ratios of inputs to outcomes with the perceived ratios of referent others to analyze the 
fairness of their pay. Equity theory claims that employees are concerned with the relative
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value or fairness of their outcomes rather than the absolute value of their outcomes 
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003). However, equity theory is ambiguous as to which referent 
others (such as internal versus external referents) are used when making comparisons. 
Employee inputs include contributions such as education, experience, skills, abilities, 
effort, creativity, and loyalty. Employee outcomes include rewards such as pay, benefits, 
working conditions, and job security. Perceived equity is attained when employees 
believe their personal input/outcomes ratio is equivalent to the referent others’ 
input/outcomes ratio. The perceived equity relationship is expressed by the following 
equation:
Outcomes (self) Outcomes (other)
Input (self) Inputs (other)
However, employees differ in which inputs and outcomes they use in their 
personal and referent others’ ratios. Employees also differ in which inputs they believe 
should have a major role in determining their outcomes and which outcomes are of 
greater importance. For instance, employees tend to believe that more weight should be 
put on their superior inputs rather than have an equal weight for all inputs, which makes 
their weaker inputs more noticeable and influential in the ratio (Lawler 1966,1981). 
Additionally, employees tend to overrate their personal inputs (e.g., Kane and Lawler
1979). Therefore, employees are unlikely to experience perceived equity in their 
comparisons.
Perceived inequity occurs when an employee perceives their personal 
inputs/outcomes ratio to be nonequivalent with the inputs/outcomes ratio of a referent 
other. There are two perceived inequity configurations: under-reward (positive) and over-
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reward (negative) inequity (Kreitner and Kinicki 2001). The perceived under-reward 
(positive) inequity occurs when an employees’ personal inputs/outcomes ratio is smaller 
(or less than) the referent others’ inputs/outcomes ratio. This type of inequity is more 
common and harmful for both employees and the organization as it may cause employees 
to engage in selfish and uncooperative behaviors (such as workplace deviance;
(Greenberg 1990a; Harder 1992)) due to feelings of relative deprivation. Under-reward 
inequity may develop from several scenarios. For example, under-reward inequity 
transpires when employees perceive they supply the same amount of inputs as a similar 
co-worker but receive smaller outcomes. Perceptions of under-reward also develop when 
employees believe they provide more inputs than a similar co-worker but receive the 
same outcomes. The under-reward (positive) inequity relationship is expressed by the 
following equation:
Outcomes (self) Outcomes (other)
  <  ---------------------------
Inputs (self) Inputs (other)
The perceived over-reward (negative) inequity occurs when an employees’ 
personal inputs/outcomes ratio is larger (or greater than) the referent others’ 
inputs/outcomes ratio. This type of inequity is typically innocuous to the benefitting 
employees since they are less likely to criticize this inequity; however, it is harmful to the 
organization as it may lower profits due to certain employees receiving higher pay. There 
are several ways for this type of inequity to manifest. For instance, when employees 
believe they do not put forth as much effort or time as a similar co-worker but receive the 
same outcomes, negative inequity transpires. Also, over-reward inequity develops when 
employees perceive their outcomes to be more than a similar co-worker who supplies the
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same amount of inputs. The over-reward (negative) inequity relationship is expressed by 
the following equation:
Outcomes (self) Outcomes (other)
  >  ---------------------------
Inputs (self) Inputs (other)
Both types of perceived inequities exist along a continuum, with the magnitude of 
the inequity increasing as the discrepancy between the two ratios becomes larger (Opsahl 
and Dunnette 1966). The discrepancy between the two ratios can be caused from 
differing amount of inputs and/or outcomes in the ratios. Generally, minor inequities arise 
when a discrepancy is between either the inputs or outcomes, while larger inequities are 
perceived when both the inputs and outcomes are nonequivalent or there is a substantial 
difference between either the inputs or outcomes (such as the employee exerts twice as 
much effort or referent others’ pay is double). Although the majority of employees may 
tolerate small inequities (Jaques 1961), the thresholds for under-reward and over-reward 
inequity differ. For instance, over-reward inequity may be more tolerable at lower levels 
than under-reward inequity since the employee is actually benefitting from the inequity. 
Additionally, the perceived inequity creates tension within employees at an amount 
proportional to the magnitude of the inequity. This tension causes employees to attempt 
to reduce dissonance and to restore equity through different cognitive and/or behavioral 
courses of actions. The strength of these equity restoration attempts is proportional with 
the tension created. Some of the tactics used to restore equity involve employees 
modifying their inputs (such as by increasing performance or withholding effort) or 
outcomes (such as by requesting a raise or donating money to charity), distorting their 
personal or referent others’ actual inputs and outcomes, changing their referent other(s)
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used for comparison, engaging in various behaviors to adjust inputs or outcomes (e.g., 
deviant behaviors such as employee theft, absenteeism, sabotaging equipment or others’ 
contributions), participating in alternative efforts (such as complaining, filing formal 
grievances, attempting to form a union), or changing jobs (such as transferring jobs or 
terminating employment). The chosen tactic is determined by the employee, and the 
amount of tension and other feelings experienced. Generally, employees enduring an 
under-reward inequity experience feelings of anger and behave selfishly and 
uncooperatively with the organization (Harder 1992); whereas, guilt and anxiety is felt 
for those undergoing an over-reward inequity (Homans 1961; Jaques 1961).
Equity theory explains the impact pay secrecy has on employees and the 
organization. Lawler (1965a, 1965b, 1967) has continuously argued (and empirically 
supported) that the motivational role of pay is weakened under pay secrecy practices 
because inaccurate and unfair pay comparisons are unavoidable when pay information is 
hidden. Specifically, managers tend to make inaccurate pay comparisons by 
underestimating their superiors’ pay and overestimating the pay of their subordinates and 
peers (Lawler 1965a, 1967,1972; Milkovich and Anderson 1972; Mahoney and Weitzel 
1978). According to equity theory, these inaccurate comparisons (specifically 
overestimating subordinates’ pay) will cause employees to feel tension and proclivity to 
restore equity through various methods. For example, employees who inaccurately 
overestimate their peers’ or subordinates’ pay and experience under-reward inequity will 
most likely reduce the dissonance by decreasing desired organizational outcomes, such as 
performance (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010), or by increasing unwanted and 
possibly harmful behaviors, such as self-interested or counter-productive behaviors (such
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as reducing effort or performance; (Harder 1992); stealing; (Greenberg 1990a); or 
sabotage of others’ contributions; (Skarlicki and Folger 1997)). Additionally, 
underestimating superiors’ pay undermines motivation as it lowers the expectancy that 
promotion will lead to a significant pay increase.
Referent Others and Comparisons. Although equity theory does not specifically 
explain which or how referent others are chosen, prior research on referents gives further 
insight in regards to comparisons. There are two types of referents: social and self- 
referents (Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Goodman 1974,1977; Scholl, Cooper, and McKenna 
1987). Self-referents involve the employees’ unique personal experiences (such as pay 
history) and expectations (such as ability to meet financial needs and future pay). Social 
referents entail using other employees in the comparison process and there are two types: 
external and internal referents (Hills 1980; Lawler 1990). External referents are 
individuals employed outside of the organization, but usually within the same job 
domain. Internal referents are individuals who are employed within the same 
organization, but not specifically in the same position, department, or job level. Internal 
referents may involve comparisons of employees at the same job level (horizontal 
comparisons), downward comparisons (subordinates or lower level employees; (Wills 
1991)), or upward comparisons (superiors or higher level employees; (Martin 1982)) 
within the organization. Generally, equity theory implies the usage of social referents 
(rather than self-referents) in either a similar position or job level (instead of downward 
or upward comparisons). Pay inequities with both external and internal referents have 
consequences for the employing organization, with external inequity usually being more 
severe (Lawler 1981,1990). External inequity may cause organizational deviance (such
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as absenteeism or withheld effort), intentions to quit, and turnover. On the other hand, 
internal inequity may not increase turnover (especially if there is external equity) but it 
may lead to interpersonal deviance (such as sabotage of others’ contributions) or other 
organizational problems (such as formal complaints and grievances being filed). 
Additionally, employees tend to use more than one referent and make multiple 
comparisons simultaneously (Goodman 1974). Therefore, employees may experience pay 
equity with some referents and pay inequity with other referents (Scholl et al. 1987).
Organizational Justice/Fairness. Similar to and deriving from equity theory 
(Adams 1965), the notion of organizational justice (Greenberg 1987a) argues that 
employees make judgments or fairness comparisons with referents in regards to the 
organizations’ behaviors towards the employee (such as pay outcomes) which, in turn, 
determines the attitudes and behaviors exhibited from the employee. Rather than 
prevailing as a single theory, organizational justice is regarded as a multi-dimensional 
construct (Latham and Pinder 2005) having four distinct dimensions (Colquitt 2001; 
Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng 2001): distributive justice (Adams 1965), 
procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker 1975), and interactional justice (Bies and Moag 
1986) which encompasses informational justice and interpersonal justice (Greenberg 
1990a, 1993).
The organizational justice concept attempts to explain the impact of justice or 
fairness perceptions in the workplace (Colquitt 2001; Greenberg 1990b). In other words, 
organizational justice research helps interpret and explain organizational behaviors 
(Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Greenberg 1990b). Typically, the resulting attitudes and 
behaviors are displayed in a reciprocative and complementary manner. Therefore,
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equitable judgments or perceptions of fairness suggest a social exchange relationship and 
are likely to lead to cooperative and organizationally beneficial attitudes and behaviors 
(such as organizational commitment and trust; (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; 
DeConinck 2010)); whereas, unfair or inequitable perceptions suggest an economical 
exchange relationship (Organ 1990) and are inclined to cause uncooperative, selfish and 
potentially harmful attitudes and behaviors (such as organizational distrust and workplace 
deviance; (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Johns 2001)). All organizational actions 
and decisions (such as pay outcomes) are used in determining perceptions of fairness or 
injustice. There are numerous distinct aspects of organizational justice that encompass all 
organizational actions, such as pay justice regarding fairness perceptions of individual 
compensation.
Pay justice refers to employee’s fairness perceptions of their distributed 
outcomes, the process used to determine their outcomes and the manner in which the 
outcomes and process are communicated to them (Andersson-Straberg et al. 2007). Even 
though both employees and organizations consider pay to be an important job factor 
(since it achieves employees needs and increases organizational productivity), the pay 
justice literature is limited (Greenberg 2001; Pfeffer 1997) with only a few studies 
analyzing fairness perceptions in regards to certain pay-related aspects (such as 
performance appraisals and pay allocations; (Colquitt, Greenberg, and Zapata-Phelan 
2005; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp 2001)). Generally, favorable or positive 
pay perceptions (such as a higher pay raise) tend to coincide with feelings of pay justice, 
while unfavorable or negative pay perceptions (such as a lower or no pay raise) lead to 
unfair feelings about pay (e.g., Folger and Konovsky 1989).
35
Perceptions of organizational justice, especially pay justice, are influenced by pay 
secrecy practices since they hinder the availability of pay information. Pay secrecy 
practices impede an employee’s ability to make accurate comparisons since the needed 
information is hidden, thereby suggesting illegitimacy and unfairness. Therefore, pay 
secrecy practices collide with the principles of organizational justice and produce 
perceptions of injustice. On the other hand, pay openness practices are consistent with 
organizational justice principles as the organization gives the impression of authenticity 
and fairness. Although each organizational justice dimension (such as distributive and 
procedural justice) is expected to be negatively affected by pay secrecy practices (Colella 
et al. 2007), each dimension is affected in a slightly different manner.
Distributive justice (Adams 1965) refers to the perceived fairness of the allocation 
of outcomes. Distributive justice (or injustice) is determined in the same manner as 
described in equity theory, where employees compare their personal inputs/outcomes 
ratio to referent others. As previously mentioned, when pay secrecy practices are 
implemented, employees are likely to make inaccurate pay estimations (e.g., Lawler 
1965a, 1967), which lead to negative comparisons and perceptions of unfairness and 
injustice. Additionally, pay secrecy practices create uncertainty for employees (Colella et 
al. 2007), especially since they are unable to receive actual pay information and must 
depend on innuendo and gossip (deCarufel 1986). According to uncertainty management 
theory (Lind and van den Bos 2002), this uncertainty of specific position in the pay 
structure and organizational worth is likely to cause employees to experience anxiety and 
an increased concern for fairness in order to cope with the tension. Additionally, when 
employees’ emotions are involved, to the extent that high levels of dissonance or anger
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are experienced, misperceptions or inaccurate comparisons are most likely to transpire 
(Lawler 1981) and thus, most likely causing feelings of unfairness or injustice. On the 
other hand, pay openness practices alleviate misperceptions and feelings of unfairness by 
allowing employees to examine the pay structure and their personal positioning in it. 
However, if the pay structure is not equitable or prone to favoritism, prejudice, 
discrimination or the like, then pay openness practices will actually strengthen the 
feelings of unfairness. Nevertheless, pay inequities are likely to be reduced under 
conditions of pay openness (deCarufel 1986). Additionally, fairness heuristic theory 
(Lind 2001) argues that when information is unavailable and specific perceptions of 
fairness (such as fairness of pay process) are unable to be made, employees will use other 
fairness perceptions or an overall perception of organizational fairness to infer judgments. 
Thus, when pay information is unavailable, employees will use their fairness perceptions 
of other organizational outcomes (such as office space or resources) or other forms of 
justice (such as procedural or interpersonal justice) to make a fairness judgment about 
their personal outcomes.
Procedural justice (Leventhal 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980; Thibaut 
and Walker 1975) refers to the perceived fairness associated with the process and 
procedures used to determine outcome distribution. In order for an outcome process to be 
perceived as fair or justified, there are several criteria (or standards) that the process 
should possess (Folger and Konovsky 1989; Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980): 
consistency, accuracy, bias suppression or neutrality, representation of all entities 
affected, comprehensiveness, social morality, and opportunity to correct mistakes. 
However, employees do not always follow these standards to evaluate all procedural
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fairness perceptions in that they change under different conditions, situations, or 
processes (Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Jones, Scarpello, and Bergmann 1999; Leventhal
1980). For instance, pay rate processes and pay raise processes use different justice 
standards or criteria to assess fairness (Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008). Procedural justice is 
likely to be affected by pay secrecy practices since they prevent the knowledge of the 
criteria or standards (such as being accurate and unbiased) used to verify its existence 
(Noy 2007). Therefore, perceptions of procedural unfairness or injustice are likely to 
prevail under pay secrecy practices since employees cannot determine that the procedures 
used to determine their outcomes reflect reality and were accurate, unbiased, and 
consistent with other employees’ procedures (Leventhal et al. 1980; Thibaut and Walker 
1975). Pay openness practices confirm that organizational rules were not transgressed or 
neglected for certain employees and that all pertinent information was accurate and 
utilized in determining the employees’ outcomes. Therefore, the practice of pay openness 
leads to perceptions of fairness. As previously mentioned, fairness heuristic theory (Lind 
2001) argues that when there is a lack of information (as there would be under pay 
secrecy conditions), procedural justice may be determined by the fairness perceptions of 
other organizational processes (such as disciplinary or raise procedures) or other justice 
dimensions (such as distributive justice). Therefore, if employees view the disciplinary 
process as being fair or their personal outcomes as being favorable then procedural 
justice (rather than unfairness) is likely to exist. Also, procedural and distributive justice 
create the “fair process effect” (Folger 1993, p.241), in that even when outcomes are 
unfavorable, as long as the processes used to determine those outcomes are perceived as
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fair, the employee will be more inclined to accept the outcome as being fair and not 
respond negatively or in retaliation (Cropanzano and Folger 1991; Greenberg 1987b).
The social component of organizational justice, interactional justice, refers to the 
interpersonal treatment employees receive from the organization (usually from their boss 
or superiors) as procedures are executed (Bies and Moag 1986). Interactional justice is 
comprised of four criteria: justification, truthfulness, respect, and propriety (Bies and 
Moag 1986). In the beginning interactional justice lacked consensus in regards to its 
measurement competency in that some researchers considered it to be a subset of 
procedural justice (e.g., Niehoff and Moorman 1993) while others treated it as a third 
type of organizational justice (e.g., Skarlicki and Folger 1997) or originally tested it as a 
third type of justice but then combined it with procedural justice due to high 
intercorrelations (e.g., Skarlicki and Latham 1997). Additionally, interactional justice was 
separated for research purposes into two dimensions: explanations and sensitivity 
(Greenberg 1990a). This separation led to the formation of interpersonal justice, which 
encompassed the respect and propriety criteria, and informational justice, which included 
the justification and truthfulness criteria (Greenberg 1993). Further research 
demonstrated the importance of having separate measures not only for interactional 
justice but also for interpersonal and informational justice as each separate component of 
organizational justice displayed different effects (e.g., Colquitt 2001).
Informational justice is the social side of procedural justice and refers to the 
amount, quality, and timing of information provided to employees that explain the 
procedures used to determine outcomes (Bies, Martin, and Brockner 1993; Greenberg 
1993). Information needs to be accurate, complete, and supplied in timely manner in
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order for perceptions of fairness to prevail. Therefore, employees are more likely to 
experience informational justice (rather than injustice) when they are more adequately 
informed about the processes used to determine their outcomes (Andersson-Straberg et al. 
2007). Additionally, perceptions of informational justice are likely to be enhanced when 
information is given on a regular basis and face-to-face (Bies et al. 1993). Informational 
justice is likely to be affected by pay secrecy practices since they prohibit employees 
from receiving pay information. Therefore, informational unfairness or injustice is likely 
to be experienced when pay secrecy practices are in effect since no information is 
supplied to the employees. On the other hand, pay openness practices lead to 
informational justice since pay information is given to the employees. However, if the 
pay information has flaws or is obtained in an untimely manner, perceptions of 
informational justice will decrease.
Interpersonal justice is the social side of justice and refers to the extent to which 
employees are treated with politeness, dignity, and respect from the organization (usually 
from their boss or superiors) when procedures used to determine their outcomes are 
executed (Greenberg 1990b, 1993). In order for perceptions of interpersonal justice to be 
positive, employees need to be treated courteously on every occasion where pay 
information is supplied. Pay secrecy practices are likely to affect interpersonal justice 
negatively since the employees’ superior is not allowed to supply pay information and 
may come across as being rude, uncaring, or disrespectful of the employee and his/her 
feelings toward their pay. However, pay openness practices may lead to positive 
perceptions of interpersonal justice since employees may feel as though their superiors 
respect them and their feelings by providing pay information. Although pay openness
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practices may lead employees to feel as though their superiors respect them by providing 
them with pay information, if the pay information is given in a rude or insensible manner 
then perceptions of interpersonal unfairness are likely to transpire. Additionally, when 
there are no interactions about pay information (as may occur under pay secrecy 
conditions), fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001) argues that employees will supplement 
this perception of fairness with other judgments involving interactions with superiors 
(such as conversations about scheduling) or other justice dimensions (such as 
informational justice). Therefore, perceptions of interpersonal injustice are likely to occur 
when other interactions involving superiors are discomforting or negative.
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) is a motivation theory which argues that 
employees choose to engage in certain behaviors because they are motivated by the 
expectation of receiving a specific outcome that is associated with the chosen behavior. 
According to expectancy theory, there are different motivational elements (expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence), rather than only the desired outcome, that determine the 
behavior selected. The formula for motivation involves two components: expectancy and 
valence. Valence refers to the value the employee personally attributes to a certain 
outcome or reward.
Expectancy refers to an employee’s belief that specific outcomes will result from 
engaging in certain behaviors. There are two parts of the expectancy element: effort- 
performance expectancy and performance-outcome expectancy. The effort-performance 
expectancy refers to the employees’ belief that increased effort will lead to achieving 
desired performance levels. The performance-outcome expectancy, also referred to as
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instrumentality (Kreitner and Kinicki 2001), refers to the employees’ belief that 
attainment of expected performance levels will result in an outcome or reward (such as a 
pay raise or promotion).
Expectancy theory is expressed by the following equation:
Expectancies
Motivation = [Effort-Performance x Performance-Outcome] X Valence
The most significant portion of the expectancy model relating to pay secrecy 
practices is the instrumentality element (performance-outcome expectancy) since it 
motivates employees. However, expectancy theory requires employees to identify a pay- 
for-performance relationship since an outcome or reward (such as pay raise) is used as 
the motivator. Nevertheless, several scholars (e.g., Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,
1990) have argued that pay secrecy practices prevent employees from recognizing this 
relationship because pay information is withheld. Therefore, a direct relationship between 
pay and performance cannot be established and motivation for higher performance levels 
is reduced. For instance, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) found that a decrease in 
pay-for-performance perceptions partially explained the relationship between pay secrecy 
policy practices and lower task performance levels among employees with lower inequity 
tolerance levels. On the other hand, pay openness practices have been suggested to 
substantiate a pay-for-performance relationship (Lawler 1990; Mulvey, LeBlanc, 
Heneman, and Mclnemey 2002). In support of this supposition, Futrell and Jenkins 
(1978) found employee performance increased when an organizations’ current pay 
communication practice changed from pay secrecy to pay openness, where the existence 
of a pay-for-performance relationship was able to be corroborated and hence to motivate 
performance.
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Prior Research
Even though pay secrecy practices have been commonly acknowledged by 
practitioners as a good human resource and compensation practice (Lawler 1965b, 1966,
1972), their usage has been a controversial issue for researchers for decades (Bamberger 
and Belogolovsky 2010; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003). Despite the fact 
that discussions about pay are widely considered crass, inapt, and uncomfortable, 
researchers have been successful in getting employees and organizations to openly 
discuss (or at least respond to questionnaires) their beliefs, attitudes, outcomes, and 
expectations about pay secrecy and pay openness practices (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967; 
Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010). However, the pay communication literature is best 
described as scarce and confusing. Because pay secrecy practices (specifically pay 
secrecy policy practices) are both unlawful and a crucial decision for top management 
and organizations (Henderson 1985), it is baffling as to how limited the pay 
communication (especially pay secrecy) literature is since it began almost fifty years ago. 
These limitations (such as few organizational outcomes analyzed) further confuse 
scholars and practitioners, leading both to question the value of pay secrecy.
Additionally, the pay communication research has somewhat conflicting results (e.g., 
Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Thompson and Pronsky 1975), leading to further confusions 
about pay secrecy’s overall efficiency and common practice in the workplace. 
Nonetheless, this limited research insinuates that pay secrecy practices are detrimental for 
employees and organizations and thus, should not be utilized (e.g., Bartol and Martin 
1989; Lawler 1965a, 1967).
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Lawler (1965a, 1965b, 1967) is generally recognized as the seminal researcher in 
the pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) literature (Noy 2007). He is the 
most notable opponent of pay secrecy practice usage in the workplace (Lawler 1965a, 
1967,1990). For decades Lawler has argued for the usage of a pay openness practice and 
more pay information dispersion to employees. Lawler’s rationale for these arguments is 
that pay secrecy practices lower employee motivation which, in turn, decrease other 
desired organizational outcomes (such as pay satisfaction and organizational trust). Thus, 
pay secrecy practices are counter-productive and contradict organizational goals and 
objectives.
Pay Level
The compensation literature has categorized employees’ pay into several 
dimensions, such as pay level, pay structure, form and basis of pay (Gerhart and Rynes 
2003). Even though pay communication practices can involve and vary across all of the 
pay dimensions, the majority of the pay communication research has utilized the pay 
level dimension (e.g., Lawler 1965a; (Gerhart and Rynes 2003)), with some also 
including pay structure (e.g., Lawler 1965; Milkovich and Anderson 1972). The pay level 
dimension has conventionally been used throughout the pay communication literature 
because employees tend to have a bigger concern for it than other pay matters (such as 
certain benefits), because it is associated with an employees’ decision to quit or to apply 
with an organization, and because it is easily observable to make pay comparisons 
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003).
Pay Estimations
One of the main reasons organizations claim to utilize pay secrecy practices is to 
eliminate employees from making negative pay comparisons with internal referents, 
which leads to pay dissatisfaction (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967,1972). Basically, 
organizations believe that employees will be incapable of making pay comparisons when 
pay information is limited. However, Andrews and Henry (1963) found that even when 
organizations used a pay secrecy policy practice, managers made pay comparisons. Based 
on this finding and additional work from Patchen (1961), Lawler dedicated his initial pay 
communication research to analyzing the effect pay secrecy practices would have on 
producing accurate pay comparisons among managers (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1966,1967). 
For an overview of the pay estimation studies refer to Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Prior Research Involving the Pay Estimation Outcome
Study Sample Pay Communication Practice Main Findings
Lawler Lower- and Some organizations used Pay secrecy negatively affects
(1965a, middle-level a complete pay secrecy pay comparisons;
1965b, 1966) managers in practice and some used overestimated subordinates’
several an extreme pay openness and peers’ pay;
organizations practice (only individual 
pay hidden)
underestimated superiors’ pay
Lawler Lower-level Used a pay secrecy Overestimated subordinates’
(1967) managers to 
top
management 
in one
organization
practice and peers’ pay; 
underestimated superiors’ 
pay; misestimations were 
manifested two levels away; 
overestimation of peers’ pay 
correlated with pay 
dissatisfaction
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Table 2.3 (Continued)
Milkovich Lower and Used a moderate pay Overestimated subordinates’
and middle-level secrecy practice and peers’ pay;
Anderson managers in (supplied pay ranges underestimated superiors’
(1972) one and median pay for pay; misestimations were
organization personal pay level) manifested two levels away; 
accurate estimations were 
correlated with higher levels 
of pay dissatisfaction; 
overestimations of peers’ pay 
correlated with higher levels 
of pay satisfaction
Lawler Managers in Used a pay secrecy Overestimated subordinates’
(1972) one practice and peers’ pay;
Study 1 organization underestimated superiors’ 
pay; misestimations were 
manifested two levels away; 
overestimation of peers’ and 
subordinates’ pay associated 
with higher levels of pay 
dissatisfaction; accurate 
estimations were correlated 
negatively with pay 
satisfaction
Lawler Managers in One organization gave Overestimated unknown
(1972) Study two annual raises but parts (size & frequency) of
2 organizations amount was unknown; 
one organization gave 
10% raises but 
frequency was 
unknown
the raises
Mahoney Managers in Used a moderate pay Overestimated subordinates’,
and Weitzel one openness practice peers’, and superiors’ pay;
(1978) organization accurate estimations of 
peers’ pay correlated with 
higher levels of pay 
dissatisfaction; 
underestimations of peers’ 
pay correlated with higher 
levels of pay satisfaction
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Lawler’s (1965a. 1965b. 1966) Pay Secrecy—Pav Comparisons Study. Lawler’s
original study (1965a, 1965b, 1966) was comprised of lower- and middle-level managers 
employed with several organizations in different industries. Some of the organizations 
utilized pay secrecy practices and others practiced pay openness with only individual pay 
information being hidden. The data revealed that pay secrecy practices do negatively 
affect the accuracy of pay comparisons among managers employed in both the public and 
private sectors. Specifically, the managers (in both sectors) consistently overestimated the 
pay of their peers and subordinates. Additionally, the private sector managers (but not the 
public sector) had a propensity to underestimate the pay of their superiors; however, the 
public sector managers tended to be more accurate in their superiors’ pay estimation. The 
managers from the public sector tended to be more accurate in their pay estimations than 
the private sector managers. Lawler (1965a, 1965b) claimed the reasoning for this was 
most likely due to the fact that public sector organizations supply more pay information 
to their employees than private sector organizations. Overall, the results show that pay 
secrecy practices do not stop employees from making pay comparisons but actually 
increase the likelihood of making inaccurate and unfavorable pay comparisons, especially 
since the public sector managers were more accurate in their estimations.
In addition, the majority of the managers (77%) indicated that pay information 
was best undisclosed. However, this is most likely due to the fact that most of the 
managers also thought their pay was too little. The results also show that managers 
believed the pay structure to be too compressed, in that the pay differentials were not 
large enough between managerial levels, since they had a tendency to overestimate their 
subordinates’ pay and underestimate their superiors’ pay. Therefore, Lawler (1965a)
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claimed that managers were most likely to be dissatisfied with their pay since they 
generated negative pay comparisons and perceived the pay differentials to be too small. 
Additionally, since the downward pay differentials were more likely to be viewed as 
smaller than the upward pay differentials, Lawler (1965a) claimed that the 
overestimations of subordinates’ pay would probably have a bigger impact on pay 
dissatisfaction. Lawler (1965a) concluded that pay secrecy practices may not only lead to 
pay dissatisfaction, but also decrease managers’ motivation for better job performance 
and desire for a promotion.
Lawler’s (1967) Pav Secrecy—Pav Estimations—Pav Satisfaction Study. Lawler 
(1967) conducted another study in hopes of replicating his original (Lawler 1965a,
1965b, 1966) findings of inaccurate pay estimations and to analyze outcomes he expected 
to be associated with the misestimates, such as pay dissatisfaction and job performance. 
The participants ranged in their managerial level (from lower-level to top management) 
and were all employed in the same organization that utilized a pay secrecy practice. In 
this study, the participating managers not only estimated pay for those directly above and 
below them in the organizational structure but also two levels above and below them.
Similar to his original study’s (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1966) findings, managers 
had a tendency to underestimate their superiors’ pay and overestimate their peers’ and 
subordinates’ pay. These trends were even more manifested for the managers’ pay 
estimates of those two levels away from the participants. Therefore, the further away a 
position was from the participating managers’ position, the more pronounced the 
inaccuracy of the pay estimations became. This demonstrates that managers misinterpret 
their organizations’ total pay structure. Additionally, due to these inaccurate pay
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estimations, managers believed there was not enough pay distance between the 
managerial levels.
In regards to satisfaction with pay, pay dissatisfaction was associated with 
overestimations of peers’ pay but not with inaccurate estimations of subordinates’ or 
superiors’ pay. The non-relationship between overestimations of subordinates’ pay and 
pay dissatisfaction is surprising and against expectations. Lawler (1967) concluded this 
result may have occurred due to the participating managers not using their subordinates 
or superiors as reference groups in their pay comparisons, especially since the data 
revealed external referents to be the most significant group used in pay comparisons.
As expected, managers who underestimated superiors’ pay were more likely to 
indicate how nonessential a promotion was to them. Contrary to expectations, managers 
who overestimated their superiors’ pay (and therefore, those potentially more likely to 
view promotion as important) had been given lower performance (or effort) ratings by 
their superiors. Lawler (1967) reasoned that this surprising result may be due to managers 
not making an association between pay and performance, possibly also causing 
employees to receive incorrect performance feedback. Thus, pay secrecy practices not 
only resulted in managers making negative pay comparisons but (as argued throughout 
Lawler’s original study; (Lawler 1965a)) also affected pay satisfaction, promotion 
desirability, job performance, and possibly perceptions of performance feedback.
Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) Replication Study. Milkovich and Anderson 
(1972) attempted to replicate Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967) prior findings in 
hopes of better understanding the effects pay secrecy and pay openness practices have on 
managers’ pay estimations and additional work outcomes, such as pay dissatisfaction.
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This study was fairly similar to Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967) studies except 
Lawler’s (1967) questionnaire was vaguely tailored to add questions about the extent to 
which pay communication was expressed by the subjects’ supervisor and the degree to 
which the organization utilized pay secrecy was different. In this study, participants were 
lower- or middle-level managers working for the same organization which used a 
moderate pay secrecy practice (supplied pay ranges and median pay for the manager’s 
personal pay level).
Similar to Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967) studies, managers in this study 
had a propensity to systematically underestimate their superiors’ pay and overestimate 
their peers’ and subordinates’ pay. These inaccurate estimations were manifested at two 
levels away from the managers’ own level as found in Lawler’s (1967) study. However, 
this study produced higher overestimations of subordinates’ pay than Lawler’s (1967) 
study. Therefore, the weakened pay secrecy practice did not help deteriorate inaccurate 
estimations of others’ pay. Additionally, even though the majority of the managers 
indicated they had received their managerial levels’ pay range (79%) and pay median 
(64%) information, only a small percentage of them (8% and 10% respectfully) were able 
to successfully estimate the mean salary for their managerial level. Surprisingly, those 
managers who indicated they were not given pay range or median information were 
identical in their accuracy (or inaccuracy) of estimations. Actually, the managers who 
were not informed of pay range information had a better likelihood (15%) of accurately 
approximating pay estimations than those who were given the pay information (9%). 
Milkovich and Anderson (1972) claimed this may have occurred due to communication 
issues (such as the information communicated was not accurate or information was not
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actually communicated) or trust issues (such as employees may not trust that the 
information is accurate).
Contrary to Lawler’s (1967) expectations, this study found that managers who 
underestimated subordinates’ pay (53%) were more likely to believe the pay differential 
between them and their subordinates was too small than those who overestimated their 
subordinates’ pay (31%). As expected though, the results indicated that managers who 
underestimated their superiors’ pay (24%) were more likely to believe the pay differential 
between them and their superiors was too small than those who overestimated their 
superiors’ pay (23%).
In regards to pay satisfaction, this study had a much larger percentage of 
managers (40%) who were satisfied with their pay than in Lawler’s (1967) study (13%). 
Despite expectations, the data revealed that managers who were more likely to be 
accurate in their pay estimations were the most dissatisfied with their pay; whereas, those 
who were the most satisfied with their pay were the managers that overestimated their 
peers’ pay. This contradicts Lawler’s (1967) findings that managers experiencing the 
highest dissatisfaction were those who overestimated their peers’ pay. Milkovich and 
Anderson (1972) argued this discrepancy may be due to pay satisfaction (or pay 
dissatisfaction) being manipulated to some extent by pay communication efforts or an 
overall satisfaction perception.
Despite the inconsistencies in Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) and Lawler’s 
(1967) studies, the results substantiate that inaccurate pay estimations will prevail despite 
the utilization of a semi-open pay practice. These previously mentioned discrepancies 
may be due to several differences in the methodology and samples used. For instance,
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Lawler’s (1967) study had some participants that were higher-level or top managers; 
whereas, Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) study only had lower- and middle-level 
managers. Also, Lawler’s (1967) study only analyzed total pay secrecy and its effects; 
whereas, Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) study examined the effects of a semi-open or 
semi-secret practice. However, since the studies differed in the pay communication 
variable used to predict organizational outcomes the results are expected to vary to some 
degree.
Lawler’s (1972) Additional Outcome Study. Due to previous unexpected findings 
(Lawler 1967) regarding pay dissatisfaction (specifically the nonexistent relationship 
between pay satisfaction and the overestimation of subordinates’ pay) and the possibility 
of inaccurate perceptions of performance feedback, Lawler (1972) conducted two 
separate studies to further analyze these relationships. Contrary to previous pay 
communication studies, this research utilized theoretical foundations (specifically social 
comparison theory, equity theory, and relative deprivation theory) to assist in developing 
the hypotheses and interpreting the findings.
Study 1 was concerned with the prior surprising results involving pay satisfaction. 
The sample consisted of managers from one organization that utilized pay secrecy 
practices. The pay estimates for other managers included those two levels away and 
referent groups were also measured. As found in prior research (e.g., Lawler 1965a,
1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972), managers tended to underestimate their superiors’ 
pay and overestimate their peers’ and subordinates’ pay. Also similar to previous findings 
(e.g., Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972), the incorrect estimations were 
evident at two levels away from the participants’ own managerial level. As expected, the
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pay differential between the subjects and their subordinates was believed to be too small. 
Contrary to previous findings (e.g., Lawler 1967) and as expected, pay satisfaction was 
affected by the overestimation of subordinates’ pay. In fact, the higher the 
overestimations of subordinates’ and peers’ pay, the more pay dissatisfaction was 
experienced (with subordinates’ pay being more significantly correlated with pay 
dissatisfaction). Pay satisfaction was also negatively related to accuracy of pay 
estimations and pay differentials (especially the discrepancy between the managers and 
their subordinates’ pay). Additionally, the managers’ perceived relative standing better 
predicted pay satisfaction than the actual relative standing.
Study 2 analyzed performance feedback as a possible outcome of the pay 
secrecy—inaccurate pay estimate relationship. This study used pay raises instead of pay 
level since raises signify recent performance feedback. Participants were managers from 
two organizations that both used a merit system for dispersing raises. However, one 
organization gave yearly raises but the size of the raise was unknown, while the other 
organization gave ten percent raises but the frequency of the raises were unknown. 
Performance feedback was represented by the relative size and frequency of the raises. In 
both organizations, the participants overestimated the unknown parts of the pay raise 
systems (the average size or frequency of raises given to their peers). Therefore, 
managers were interpreting negative performance feedback from their superiors since 
they believed they were receiving pay raises either less often or less in amount. However, 
the managers’ perceived personal pay raise characteristics only had a small relationship 
to self-evaluation of performance. Therefore, pay raise characteristics did not influence
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the managers’ self-evaluation. Lawler (1972) concluded that under pay secrecy 
conditions, inaccurate performance feedback was being given to managers.
Mahoney and Weitzel’s (1978) Regression Study. This study was conducted to 
analyze the same effects of pay communication practices (such as pay secrecy 
influencing inaccurate pay estimations and pay dissatisfaction) utilizing regression. The 
participants used in this study were all employed in one organization and ranged across 
five different managerial levels, with the majority holding positions in the top two levels. 
The organization used a moderately open pay practice, in that managers were given pay 
ranges and midpoints for their own managerial level and contiguous levels (immediate 
above and below levels). Contrary to previous studies (Lawler 1967; Milkovich and 
Anderson 1972), this study examined the pay estimates of the managers’ peers and 
adjacent managerial levels (not two levels away).
Similar to the previous studies (e.g., Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 
1972), managers had a propensity to overestimate their peers’ and subordinates’ pay. 
Surprisingly, this study found that managers were also more likely to overestimate their 
superiors’ pay. This contradicts Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966, 1967) and Milkovich and 
Anderson’s (1972) results of managerial tendencies to underestimate superiors’ pay. This 
study, like the prior studies (e.g., Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972), had a 
relatively small number of managers make accurate estimations of peers’, superiors’, and 
subordinates’ pay.
This study had three distinct measures for pay satisfaction: with compensation 
amount, with compensation administration, and with compensation comparisons. 
Estimations of peers’ pay were significantly related to pay satisfaction with compensation
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amount and compensation administration. There were no other significant relationships 
associated with pay estimations and pay satisfaction. However, managers who correctly 
estimated their peers’ pay experienced the highest pay dissatisfaction across all of the pay 
satisfaction measures.
Contrary to Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) results, managers who 
underestimated their peers’ pay were more likely to experience greater pay satisfaction 
than those who overestimated or accurately estimated their peers’ compensation. In fact, 
contrary to Lawler’s (1967) findings, managers who correctly estimated their peers’ pay 
had a higher propensity to be dissatisfied with their pay than managers who inaccurately 
estimated their peer’s pay. However, the effect on pay satisfaction was opposite for 
estimating subordinates’ pay, in that the managers who accurately estimated their 
subordinates’ pay experienced greater pay satisfaction while the greater pay 
dissatisfaction was felt by those who underestimated their subordinates’ pay. This 
contradicts Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) results since they found the managers who 
expressed the highest dissatisfaction with their pay were the ones who made accurate 
estimations for others’ pay. In regards to superiors’ pay estimations, managers who 
misestimated their superiors’ pay was more likely to be satisfied (at about an equal extent 
for under- and overestimations) than those who accurately estimated their superiors’ pay.
Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) performed additional tests on the relationships 
between the adjacent managerial levels and pay estimations. The first test was comprised 
of regression for each of the pay satisfaction measures with the three perceived pay 
ratios: selfisubordinate, peer/self, superior/self pay. As expected, the peer/self pay ratio 
was negatively significant for all three pay satisfaction measures and the self/subordinate
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pay ratio was positively significant for all three pay satisfaction measures. However, 
since pay estimations explained only a small amount of the variance in pay satisfaction in 
most of the instances, there is little support for the relationship of pay secrecy causing 
pay misestimations which lead to pay dissatisfaction. Additionally, the superior/self pay 
ratio was not significant for any of the pay satisfaction measures. The second test was 
similar to the first except actual pay (taken from data supplied by the organization) for 
the three pay ratios were used. Contrary to Lawler’s (1967) arguments, the observed pay 
satisfaction levels were significantly greater than the estimated pay satisfaction levels 
across all three pay satisfaction measures. This result suggests that a pay openness 
practice would result in more pay dissatisfaction.
Lawler’s (1971) Pav Satisfaction Model and Analysis. Based on his previous 
results (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967), Lawler (1971) further developed his research 
by building a model that explains the pay perceptions—pay satisfaction relationship. This 
model of pay satisfaction utilized several theories (equity theory, social comparison 
theoiy, and discrepancy theory). The pay satisfaction model was proposed to be a 
function of two perceptions: the amount of pay an employee receives and the amount of 
pay an employee believes he/she should receive. Essentially, Lawler (1971) defined pay 
satisfaction as the difference between an employees’ perception of the amount of pay 
he/she should receive and the amount of pay he/she actually receive. Additionally,
Lawler (1971) proposed that the second function would be influenced by the employees’ 
perceptions of five factors: personal job inputs (such as skill, education, seniority, 
performance); job characteristics (such as complexity of tasks and amount of autonomy 
or responsibility); non-monetary outcomes (such as job security or status); pay history;
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inputs and outcomes of referent others. However, since the overall model is based to 
some extent on social comparisons, the fifth factor (inputs and outcomes of referent 
others) has been argued to be redundant and should be excluded as a factor (Schwab and 
Wallace 1974).
Dyer and Theriault (1976) empirically tested a portion of Lawler’s (1971) pay 
satisfaction model as it excluded non-monetary outcomes, income and output of referent 
others, and pay history factors. Additionally, the employees’ perception of pay system 
administration was added as a determinant of pay satisfaction. This added factor 
represents the employees’ perception of the different policies and procedures (such as pay 
secrecy practices) used to determine pay. The sample was comprised of three groups of 
managers: United States (US), French-Canadian (FC), and English-Canadian (EC). All 
three groups consisted of managers across multiple levels (except first-level managers) 
from several different organizations. The results partially supported the portion of 
Lawler’s (1971) model tested. Once the administrative-type variables were added to the 
model the amount of variance explained in pay satisfaction was significantly greater than 
that explained by Lawler’s (1971) model. Also, the addition of the perceived pay system 
administration variable caused some of the previous results to faintly change in that pay 
satisfaction was significantly negatively related to performance level for the US group 
only (the FC and EC groups were not significantly related to any personal job inputs) and 
perceived job difficulty and responsibility for the EC group only (the US and FC groups 
were not significantly related to job characteristics).
Weiner (1980) also empirically tested Lawler’s (1971) pay satisfaction model and 
Dyer and Theriault’s (1976) addition of the perceived pay system administration variable.
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However, Weiner (1980) claimed ‘equitable pay’ was a better term for Lawler’s (1971) 
definition of pay satisfaction. Pay satisfaction (referred to as relative equitable pay) is the 
difference between what the employee should be paid and actually is paid relative to 
his/hers salary. The sample consisted of various employees (not only managers) 
employed in one organization. The explanatory power for each pay satisfaction scale 
(e.g., Lawler’s (1971) and Dyer and Theriault’s (1976) relative equitable pay) was 
compared against the University of Minnesota Satisfaction Question (MSQ) and tested 
for predictive abilities in work outcomes. Relative equitable pay accounted for more of 
the variance (27%) in pay satisfaction (MSQ scale) than Lawler’s (1971) model (17 %). 
Dyer and Theriault’s (1976) model accounted for more than twice the variance (67%) in 
pay satisfaction (MSQ scale) than Lawler’s (1971) model (27%). Additionally, Dyer and 
Theriault’s (1976) model had the most accurate predictions for turnover and retention, 
while Lawler’s (1971) model was the least predictive. The MSQ scale was the only 
measure predictive of absenteeism. Attitude toward unionization was predicted positively 
by Lawler’s (1971) model and predicted negatively by the MSQ scale. Overall, Dyer and 
Theriault’s (1976) model (with the inclusion of the pay system administration factor) was 
strongly supported as an explanation for pay satisfaction and as a predictor for work 
outcomes.
Pav Satisfaction
Even though several authors (e.g., Lawler 1967; Mahoney and Weitzel 1978) 
evaluated pay satisfaction as an outcome of the pay secrecy—inaccurate pay estimation 
relationship, pay satisfaction has also been analyzed to be directly related to pay secrecy
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(e.g., Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Thompson and Pronsky 1975). For an overview of the 
following pay satisfaction studies refer to Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Prior Research Involving the Pay Satisfaction Outcome
Study Sample Pay Communication Practice Main Findings
Thompson Employees
and
Pronsky
(1975)
Futrell
and
Jenkins
(1978)
Cappelli
and
Sherer
(1988)
in two
organizations
Employees 
in one
organization
Employees 
in one
organization
One organization 
used a complete pay 
secrecy practice; one 
used a partial pay 
openness practice; 
both sales 
departments used a 
complete pay 
openness practice
Originally used a 
form of a pay secrecy 
practice; changed to a 
complete pay 
openness practice
Used a form of a pay 
openness practice; 
used a two-tier plan 
where those in the 2' 
tier received about 
25% less than those
nd
Pay secrecy negatively related 
to pay satisfaction; those in 
complete pay openness or 
partial pay openness groups 
were more likely to exclusively 
make internal pay 
comparisons; those in complete 
pay secrecy group were more 
likely to make external or 
combination pay comparisons
Change to pay openness 
increased job performance, pay 
satisfaction, and satisfaction 
with promotional policies, 
superiors, and work but 
decreased superior satisfaction, 
and did not affect peer 
satisfaction
Those in the second tier were 
more satisfied with pay than 
those in the first tier
in the 1st tier
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Table 2.4 (Continued)
Martin and 
Lee (1992)
Mulvey and 
Colleagues’ 
(2002)
Day (2006)
Employees in 
multiple 
stores of one 
organization
Cloutier and Employees 
Vilhuber in one
(2008) organization
Used a form of a pay 
openness practice; 
used a two-tier plan 
where those in the 2' 
tier received less pay 
than those in the 1st 
tier
nd
Employees
and
managers in
multiple
organizations
Graduate
students
Measured with seven 
items
Measured with five 
items
Measured with two 
items
Prior pay knowledge was 
positively related to pay 
satisfaction and pay fairness; 
current pay knowledge was 
negatively related to pay 
satisfaction and pay fairness; 
those in the 2nd tier who had 
low prior pay knowledge were 
more likely to have negative 
pay attitudes than those who 
had high prior pay knowledge; 
those in the 1st tier (whether 
low or high prior pay 
knowledge) were more likely 
to have positive pay attitudes
Pay knowledge positively 
related to pay satisfaction and 
organizational effectiveness
Pay communication practice did 
not impact any of the pay 
satisfaction dimensions or the 
referent choice; referent choice 
did not impact pay satisfaction; 
those in a pay openness 
environment were more likely 
to perceive pay inequity
Pay openness did not impact 
pay equity, pay satisfaction, or 
job satisfaction
Thompson and Pronskv’s (1975) Comparative Study. Following the news of an 
organizations’ bad experience with the adoption of a pay openness practice, Thompson 
and Pronsky (1975) conducted a study to investigate the direct impact open pay practices 
have on pay satisfaction, pay comparisons, and employee motivation. The sample 
consisted of employees from two organizations similar in every aspect except pay
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policies. One company utilized a complete pay secrecy practice, while the second 
company used a partial (extreme) open pay practice where only individual pay 
information was hidden. Additionally, both organizations’ sales departments utilized a 
complete pay openness practice where employees were aware of everyone’s pay. 
Therefore, three different pay system practices (complete pay secrecy, complete pay 
openness, and partial pay openness) were available for analysis.
The analysis showed a direct negative relationship between pay secrecy and pay 
satisfaction. As pay information became more unavailable or secret, employees’ 
satisfaction with pay decreased. For instance, almost half of the complete pay openness 
group (42%) and a third of the partial pay openness group were satisfied with their pay; 
whereas, a considerably smaller percentage of the total pay secrecy group (12%) 
experienced pay satisfaction.
The results also revealed that more than half of the complete pay openness and 
partial pay openness groups (52% and 50% respectfully) were more likely to exclusively 
make internal pay comparisons (as opposed to only external pay comparisons or a 
combination of the two); whereas, the majority of the complete pay secrecy group was 
more likely to make only external pay comparisons or a combination of internal and 
external pay comparisons (34% exclusively made internal pay comparisons).
Additionally, the majority of the complete pay openness group was more likely to 
recognize a relationship between performance and reward (85%) and expect a pay 
increase for extra effort expended (79%). Contrary to expectations, the complete pay 
secrecy group was more likely than the partial pay openness group to identify the
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performance-reward relationship (57% vs. 39%) and expect more pay when effort was 
increased (59% vs. 43%).
Based on these findings, Thompson and Pronsky (1975) concluded that the best 
pay communication approach was not pay openness or pay secrecy, but a moderately 
open pay communication approach that was a mixture of pay secrecy and pay openness. 
Thompson and Pronsky (1975) also argued that there were four factors that would assist 
in determining the proper pay system approach: individual performance measures (pay 
openness approach needs objective measures); employee or job interdependence (pay 
openness approach requires low interdependence among jobs or employees); availability 
of inclusive performance measures (pay openness approach should involve performance 
measures for all primary job characteristics); input-output relationship (pay openness 
approach should entail a clear relationship with results occurring relatively quickly).
Futrell and Jenkins’ (1978) Longitudinal Study. Based on the concluding remarks 
of Thompson and Pronsky (1975) and Schuster and Colletti (1973) in regards to 
organizations needing to delay efforts to change their pay communication system from 
pay secrecy to pay openness until the effects that more pay information would have on 
employees (such as performance, pay and job satisfaction) are identified, prompted 
Futrell and Jenkins (1978) to analyze the effects that increased pay information would 
have on employees. An experiment with a pre-post test design with a control group was 
utilized. The sample consisted of sales employees from one organization with multiple 
branches. Although the organization’s original pay communication approach (perhaps 
complete or moderate pay secrecy) before the experiment is not explicitly described, the 
experimental group experienced a change to complete pay openness where some pay
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information was automatically provided to all participants (such as individual low, high, 
and average pay levels for the different organizational tenure groups and pay raises) and 
all pay information could be obtained upon request (such as individual pay levels and 
individual performance evaluations). Both groups were surveyed a month before the 
change in pay communication occurred and a year after the change was implemented in 
the experimental group.
The analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences between 
the participants in the experimental group and control group for pay satisfaction, job 
performance, and several facets of job satisfaction (such as with superiors and work 
characteristics). Specifically, the participants in the experimental group experienced 
higher levels of pay satisfaction, promotional policies satisfaction, superior satisfaction, 
work satisfaction, and five factors of job performance (product knowledge, coverage of 
territory, human relations ability, activity reporting, overall job performance) when the 
pay openness approach was implemented. However, superior satisfaction (or satisfaction 
with bosses) decreased after the implementation of the pay openness practice. 
Additionally, co-worker (peer) satisfaction was not influenced by the change to a pay 
openness system as there was no significant difference between the experimental and 
control group. The results suggest that pay secrecy hampers employee motivation, 
performance, pay satisfaction and various facets of job satisfaction. Additionally, the 
results support Lawler’s (1966) supposition that a pay openness practice will provide a 
high pay-for-performance link which, in turn, will increase employee motivation, job 
performance, and pay satisfaction.
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Cappelli and Sherer’s (1988) Two-Tier Study. After the airline industry 
underwent a period of restructuring for employment conditions, Cappelli and Sherer 
(1988) surveyed employees of a unionized airline about pay and job satisfaction. Pay 
levels for each occupation (such as pilot or flight attendant) were available since 
unionization was present for each one, thereby representing a pay openness system 
throughout the organization. The organization’s reformation entailed all occupations 
enduring wage concessions. Specifically a two-tier plan was implemented with the 
second tier employees (newer hires) receiving about 25 percent less than those in the first 
tier (those hired before a certain date) and after a certain period of time (five to fifteen 
years, depending on the agreement) the second tier employees would receive pay equality 
with those in the first tier.
Surprisingly, the employees in the second tier were significantly more satisfied 
with their pay and job than those in the first tier. The authors argued that pay satisfaction 
may have been higher for those in the second tier because they were relatively new to the 
industry and therefore, did not classify themselves as being as experienced as those in the 
first tier. Additionally, Cappelli and Sherer (1988) argued that the differences in job 
satisfaction may be due to the employees in the two tiers having different work standards 
(such as those in the second tier may have lower standards than those in the first tier) or 
referents used for comparisons (such as those in the second tier may use external 
referents for comparisons). These results demonstrate how pay inequities may, to some 
extent, not only be tolerable under pay openness conditions, but also beneficial to 
enhance different facets of satisfaction (such as pay and job) in employees. Furthermore, 
this contradicts some organization’s justification for utilizing pay secrecy practices in that
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pay inequities are hidden (whether intentional or not) and conflict and jealousies among 
employees are avoidable (Bierman and Gely 2004).
Martin and Lee’s (19921 Extended Two-Tier Study. Following the work of 
Cappelli and Sherer (1988), Martin and Lee (1992) extended the two-tier research by 
including two pay knowledge variables (prior pay knowledge and current pay 
knowledge) to assist in predicting pay attitudes and multiple pay referents (such as social 
and self-referents). The participants were employed in five stores of a retail food 
organization. The organization had implemented a two-tier wage system where the 
employees who were hired after the implementation date were placed in the lower tier. 
Additionally, there was a job-duty tier, which when combined with the wage tier created 
four tier groups. Pay raises were given until those in the lower tier reached the higher tier. 
Therefore, several tier groups were available for analysis. Since the employees were 
unionized, a pay openness approach was being employed.
There was a significantly positive relationship between prior pay knowledge and 
the pay attitudes (pay satisfaction and pay fairness). However, there was a significantly 
negative relationship between current pay knowledge and pay attitudes (pay satisfaction 
and pay fairness). Martin and Lee (1992) argued that the negative relationship between 
current pay knowledge and pay attitudes was due to the employees basing their current 
pay knowledge on mainly internal referents. Additionally, those in the lower tier groups 
who had low prior pay knowledge were more likely to have negative pay attitudes than 
those who had high prior pay knowledge. Those in the high tier groups who had low and 
high prior pay knowledge were related to positive pay attitudes. Therefore, low prior pay 
knowledge was more likely to be related to negative pay attitudes (such as pay
satisfaction) for those in the low tier groups than in the high tier groups. These findings 
suggest that prior pay knowledge was more important in explaining pay attitudes, such as 
pay satisfaction and pay fairness, instead of current pay knowledge.
Mulvev and Colleagues’ (2002) Pay Knowledge Study. Based on organizations 
adopting different compensation plans in an attempt to increase employee productivity 
and overall organizational performance, Mulvey et al. (2002) analyzed the impact that 
pay knowledge had on organizational effectiveness and pay satisfaction. Knowledge of 
pay involved total pay amount (base pay knowledge and pay raise knowledge) and total 
pay process (knowledge of pay determination and pay structure determination) and was 
measured with seven items (e.g., “I understand the basis for periodic adjustments made to 
base pay ranges” and “I understand how my pay range is determined”). Organizational 
effectiveness involved employee engagement and was measured by organizational 
commitment, trust in management, employee retention, employee referrals, and 
perceptions of pay-for-performance. The participants were employees and managers of 
multiple U.S. and Canadian organizations across various industries.
The results showed that the participants were more satisfied with pay amounts 
than pay processes. This may have been due to the participants indicating they did not 
understand the pay process very well. Additionally, pay knowledge positively influenced 
pay satisfaction and organizational effectiveness. Furthermore, the findings indicated that 
organizations paying less than competitors attained higher levels of organizational 
effectiveness by providing more pay information, and those organizations paying more 
than competitors increased employee perceptions of organizational worth by providing 
more pay information. Mulvey et al. (2002) concluded that providing pay information
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was beneficial for organizations despite paying above or below the market and thus, a 
pay openness practice should be utilized.
Day’s (2006) Referent Study. Following previous research regarding pay secrecy 
and pay satisfaction (e.g., Thompson and Pronsky 1975), Day (2006) further developed 
the relationship by arguing that referent choice partially mediates the relationship 
between pay communication and pay attitudes. The sample consisted of graduate students 
that provided a variety of organizations and ranges of pay communication practices were 
included in the sample. A measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) 
was developed specifically for this study since no such scale existed previously. The 
scale consisted of five items which concentrated on the pay level and structure. Only one 
item focused on the employee’s perception of communication about the lowest and 
highest pay level for his/her pay grade. The other four items focused on the employee’s 
perception of communication about how pay levels are determined.
The analyses showed that none of the pay satisfaction dimensions (pay level, 
benefits, raises, and pay administration) were significantly influenced by pay 
communication practices. Therefore, pay communication (pay secrecy or pay openness) 
practices had no to little impact on pay satisfaction. Also, pay communication practices 
did not affect the referent choice in that those who received more pay information (or in a 
pay openness environment) appeared to choose the same referents as those who received 
less pay information (or in a pay secrecy environment).Therefore, all of the participants, 
whether in a pay secrecy or pay openness environment, used the same referents in 
making pay comparisons. Additionally, referent choice did not significantly predict pay 
satisfaction. Thus, referent choice did not mediate the relationship between pay
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communication practices and pay satisfaction. However, participants who indicated they 
were provided with higher levels of pay information (or who worked in a pay openness 
environment) were more likely to perceive pay inequity. Overall, these results suggest 
that increased pay information (or pay openness environment) may have negative effects 
on employee perceptions, such as pay equity.
Cloutier and Vilhuber’s (2008) Procedural Justice Study. Following the work of 
Leventhal and colleagues (Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980), Cloutier and Vilhuber 
(2008) expanded the procedural justice construct to the context of salary determination. 
Cloutier and Vilhuber (2008) proposed that there are four dimensions in the salary 
determination context: system transparency (open pay systems), appeal procedures, and 
the perceived characteristics of allocation procedures and decision makers. System 
transparency was tested by developing a scale specifically for the study. The system 
transparency scale consisted of two items referring to job evaluations and procedure 
compliance. The participants were Canadian employees of an administrative unit in an 
energy and natural resource organization. Following the Quebec Pay Equity Act of 1997, 
which mandated organizations to adopt new job evaluation procedures and methods that 
produce more equitable pay structures, the organization had recently executed the 
required procedures for compliance.
All of the dimensions in the salary determination context of procedural justice 
were significantly correlated with procedural justice. However, the appeal procedures 
dimension was removed as a distinct dimension since it had weak factor loadings. 
Additionally, the system transparency dimension (pay openness) did not significantly 
predict the perception of pay equity (distributive justice), pay satisfaction, or job
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satisfaction. Further, the dimension of system transparency demonstrated problems as it 
provided no unique contribution once the other two dimensions were controlled for. This 
suggests that the system transparency dimension (pay openness) only affects the 
perception of procedural justice indirectly through the other two dimensions. Thus, the 
system transparency dimension (pay openness) provides no independent contribution to 
the procedural justice concept in the salary determination context and does not 
significantly predict employee attitudes, such as satisfaction and pay equity.
Individual and Organizational Preferences
Another topic briefly examined in the pay communication literature involves 
employees’ and organizations’ preferences for the utilization of pay secrecy or pay 
openness practices (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1990; Schuster and Colletti 1973). 
Additionally, pay system preferences of employees experiencing certain pay 
communication conditions (such as pay openness practices) has been analyzed (Beer and 
Gery 1972). For an overview of these findings refer to Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Prior Research Involving the Preference Outcome
Study Sample Pay Communication Practice Main Findings
Beer and Employees Measured with six Pay openness related to a
Gery (1972) in one
organization
items greater preference for a merit 
system and a lower preference 
for a security system
Schuster and Employees Measured by whether Those with a graduate degree
Colletti in one participants agreed, opposed pay secrecy, while
(1973) organization disagreed, or 
undecided with pay 
being kept secret
those without a degree or with a 
bachelor’s degree favored pay 
secrecy; feelings of pay fairness 
were marginally related to 
favoring pay secrecy
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Table 2.5 (Continued)
Balkin and Employees Measured by which 
Gomez- in multiple orgs used a pay 
Mejia (1990) organizations openness or pay
secrecy
Organizational strategy was 
related to pay system 
strategies; pay openness was 
related to organizations with a 
single-product strategy or 
dynamic growth strategy or 
organic patterns; pay secrecy 
was related to organizations 
with a related-product strategy 
or rationalization/maintenance 
strategy or mechanistic pattern; 
organizations with a dominant- 
product strategy were related 
with moderate pay secrecy
Beer and Gerv’s (1972) Pay System Preference Study. Since an organization’s 
pay system is an important and influential part of an organization that evolves over time, 
Beer and Gery (1972) examined employee attitudes and behaviors towards a new pay 
system. Several factors were analyzed to determine what influenced employee’s 
preference for a pay system. One of these factors was the openness of the organizational 
culture or the amount of knowledge of the current pay system. The organizational culture 
(pay openness environment) was measured with six items created specifically for this 
study. The six items represented communication about the pay system and addressed 
knowledge of the employees’ pay range (minimum and maximum), pay grade 
classification, and types, size, and frequency of pay raises available. The sample 
consisted of employees from a single organization in the manufacturing industry.
The results show that organizational culture (pay openness) was related to pay 
system preference. Specifically, the employees with more pay knowledge had a greater 
preference for a merit system (performance-based system) and a lower preference for a
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security system (a system with annual pay increase based on cost-of-living rather than 
performance). Additionally, Beer and Gery (1972) argued that this relationship between 
organizational culture (pay openness) and pay system preference may have effects on 
employee motivation and satisfaction in that a change to a merit system may increase 
employee’s motivation and satisfaction.
Schuster and Colletti’s (1973) Individual Preference Study. Based on the 
continuing utilization of pay secrecy practices in organizations and managements’ strong 
preference for pay secrecy, Schuster and Colletti (1973) conducted a study identifying 
different employee characteristics that favor and oppose pay secrecy. Preference for pay 
secrecy was addressed by the participants responding to whether they agreed, disagreed, 
or were undecided with base salary pay information being kept secret. There were five 
characteristics examined: age, education, occupation, pay level, and job performance 
(rated by superior). The participants were non-managerial employees working in the 
same organization.
The findings show education to be the only characteristic to demonstrate a 
statistically significant difference between preferences for pay secrecy. Specifically, 
participants with a graduate degree (60%) opposed pay secrecy (and favored pay 
openness), while those without a degree (50%) or with a bachelor’s degree (46%) favored 
pay secrecy. Additionally, there was a positive relationship between pay and performance 
in that the higher-performers received larger raises than those who were poor-performers. 
Age, occupation, and pay level had no substantial differences in preference for pay 
secrecy in that the participants were almost equally divided to favoring and opposing pay 
secrecy. Additional performance-related perceptions of pay were analyzed for pay
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secrecy preferences. Feelings of pay fairness were marginally related to favoring pay 
secrecy. However, self-rated performance levels (effort, productivity, and work quality) 
showed no significant difference for pay secrecy preference. Participants who identified a 
pay-for-performance relationship (pay based on effort, productivity, and work quality) 
were compared with those who identified a non-performance relationship with pay (pay 
based on education, experience, training, and responsibility); however, there were no 
significant differences within the two groups in that both groups were nearly equal in 
those favoring and opposing pay secrecy. Overall, the results demonstrated that there 
was nearly an equal preference for pay secrecy.
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia’s (19901 Organizational Strategy Study. Following the 
research advocating pay systems be linked to organizational strategies (e.g., Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia 1987; Carroll 1987; Lawler 1981), Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) 
analyzed the impact of organizational strategies (at the corporate and business unit level) 
on pay system strategies (pay communication practices such as a pay secrecy policy). 
Corporate strategy referred to the extent to which the organization was diversified. There 
were three corporate strategies used for analyses: single-product, dominant-product, and 
related-product (unrelated product was deleted from analysis due to lack of participants in 
this strategy). Business unit (SBU) strategy referred to the organizations products and 
market segment. There were two SBUs used for analyses: dynamic growth and 
rationalization/maintenance (due to lack of participants in the other SBUs several did not 
qualify for analysis). The participants were employed across 600 business units from 
different manufacturing organizations.
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Organizations with a single-product strategy (not diversified) were associated 
with low levels of pay secrecy. However, those with a related-product strategy (most 
diversified) were associated with high levels of pay secrecy. Additionally, those with a 
dominant-product strategy (semi diversified) experienced moderate levels of pay secrecy 
which were between the other two corporate strategies. For SBUs, organizations with a 
dynamic growth strategy were associated with low levels of pay secrecy, whereas those 
with a rationalization/maintenance strategy were associated with high levels of pay 
secrecy. Overall, the findings demonstrate that organizational strategy (corporate and 
business unit) does determine pay system strategies, such as pay secrecy. Organizations 
with a mechanistic pattern (related-product and rationalization/maintenance strategies) 
are more likely to employ and benefit from pay secrecy practices. However, 
organizations with an organic pattern (single-product and dynamic/growth strategies) 
tend to employ and benefit from pay openness practices.
Reward Allocations
Another variable that has been analyzed to be affected by pay communication 
conditions involves allocating pay (such as pay raises) to employees (e.g., Kidder, 
Bellettirie, and Cohn 1977; Leventhal et al. 1972; Trahan, Lane, and Dobbins 1991). The 
argument contends that under conditions of pay secrecy, pay allocators (or managers) are 
more likely to appropriately and widely distribute rewards (pay raises) based on 
individual performance and effort since they will not have to justify their reasoning to 
lower-performing (and thus, those receiving smaller pay allocations) employees 
(Burroughs 1982). Furthermore, under pay openness conditions pay allocators are less 
likely to link pay to performance and reward all employees with similar or slightly
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distinct pay allocations to avoid conflict and inquiring of their decisions. For an overview 
of these findings refer to Table 2.6.
Table 2.6 Prior Research Involving the Reward Allocation Outcome
Study Sample Pay Communication Practice Main Findings
Leventhal and Undergraduate Experiment; no pay Worst performers allocations
Colleagues’ students communication was increased at the best
(1972) 
Study 1
practice mentioned performers expense; best 
performers given a slightly 
higher pay allocation than the 
worst performers
Leventhal and Undergraduate Experiment; complete Under both conditions,
Colleagues’ students pay secrecy and majority of allocators
(1972) complete pay dispersed more to the best
Study 2 openness conditions performers; the difference of 
pay allocations between the 
best and worst performers was 
greater under pay secrecy 
conditions than the pay 
openness condition; under the 
pay openness condition, the 
smaller difference in pay 
allocations was at the best 
performers expense
Kidder and Undergraduate Experiment; complete Under pay openness conditions,
Colleagues’ students pay secrecy and women distributed allocations
(1977) complete pay 
openness conditions
equally, men distributed 
allocations equitably and 
allocated more to themselves; 
under pay secrecy conditions, 
women distributed allocations 
equitably and allocated more to 
themselves, men distributed 
allocations equally
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Table 2.6 (Continued)
Reis and
Gruzen
(1976)
Undergraduate
students
Trahan and 
Colleagues’ 
(1991) 
Study 1
Trahan and 
Colleagues’ 
(1991) 
Study 2
Experiment;
experimenter
aware/unaware
conditions; other
participant’s
aware/unaware
conditions
Undergraduate
students
Graduate
students
When the experimenter was 
aware the pay allocations 
tended to be based on equity 
than when the experimenter 
was unaware; when the peers 
were aware the pay 
allocations tended to be 
based on equality than when 
peers were unaware; smallest 
allocation differences was 
when peers were aware and 
the experimenter was 
unaware; largest allocation 
differences was when the 
experimenter was aware and 
peers were unaware; 
participants gave themselves 
bigger pay allocations when 
everyone was unaware
Experiment; complete Pay openness did not impact 
pay secrecy and pay allocation distributions 
complete pay 
openness conditions
Experiment; complete Pay openness did impact pay
pay secrecy and 
complete pay 
openness conditions
allocation decisions in that there 
was a greater distinction in the 
allocations between high and 
low performers than under the 
pay secrecy condition; worst 
performers received larger 
allocations under pay secrecy 
conditions than under pay 
openness conditions
Leventhal and Colleagues’ (19721 Pay Allocation Study. Based on previous 
research showing that pay allocation decisions are influenced by different desires of the 
pay allocator (such as to decrease power threats; (Leventhal and Bergman 1969)), 
Leventhal et al. (1972) examined the pay allocators’ desire to prevent conflict between
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employees and between themselves and employees. Two studies were conducted with the 
method for data collection involving an experiment for both studies. Participants from 
both studies were undergraduate students.
Study 1 analyzed the participant’s (pay allocator’s) desire to prevent conflict 
without a pay communication condition mentioned. The results showed that the 
participants increased the worst performer’s allocations at the best performer’s expense 
even though the best performers were usually given a (slightly) higher pay allocation than 
the worst performers. This suggests that participants believed that by giving low 
performers a low reward (although most likely deserved), a bigger conflict formed than 
high performers receiving lower allocations (although most likely not deserved). 
Additionally, it appears as though participants presumed that pay openness conditions 
existed (even though no mention of a specific pay communication practice was 
mentioned) and attempted to maintain equity in order to reduce conflict.
Study 2 analyzed the impact pay secrecy and pay openness had on the 
participants’ distribution of pay allocations. The participants dispersed pay allocations 
twice, once under the condition of complete pay secrecy and once under the condition of 
complete pay openness. The findings show that under both pay secrecy and pay openness 
conditions, a majority of the participants (42 of 44 and 34 of 44, respectfully) gave the 
best performers higher pay allocations than the worst performers. Therefore, participants 
maintained pay equity under both conditions. However, the difference between the pay 
allocations of the best and worst performers was greater under the pay secrecy condition 
than in the pay openness condition. As expected, under the pay openness condition, the 
smaller difference between the pay allocations of the best and worst performers was from
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a decrease in the best performer’s allocation and an increase in the worst performer’s 
allocation. Additionally, the difference between the intermediate performer’s pay 
allocations was significantly greater under the pay secrecy condition than in the pay 
openness condition. However, there were insignificant findings in identifying whether the 
intermediate performers with high effort and low performance were given bigger pay 
allocations than the intermediate performers with low effort and high performance. These 
findings suggest that under pay secrecy conditions pay allocators are able to distribute 
pay allocations more equitably without fear of conflict. Overall, both studies show that 
pay allocator’s will attempt to maintain equity with pay allocations. However, pay 
secrecy conditions offer the pay allocator an opportunity to better disperse pay allocations 
in proportion to performance while also reducing interpersonal conflict.
Reis and Gruzen’s (19761 Equity Versus Equality Study. Following the work of 
Leventhal et al. (1972), Reis and Gruzen (1976) expanded their research by analyzing 
pay equality (versus pay equity) under pay openness conditions and the amount of pay 
allocations when the allocator was included in the distribution. The study was conducted 
using an experiment with four different forms of pay communication practices: 
experimenter aware/unaware conditions and other participant’s aware/unaware 
conditions. The participants were undergraduate students who were required to disperse a 
payment amongst their group including themselves.
The results showed that when participants knew the experimenter was aware of 
the pay allocation distributions, pay allocations tended to be based more on equity (input 
factors) than when the experimenter was unaware of the pay allocation distributions. 
However, when peers (other group participants) were expected to be aware of the pay
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allocation distributions, pay allocations tended to be based more on equality (all 
recipients receiving similar portions) than when peers were not aware of the pay 
allocation distributions. Therefore, the smallest pay allocation difference occurred when 
the peers were aware and the experimenter was unaware of the distributions, while the 
largest difference in the pay allocations occurred when the experimenter was aware and 
the peers were unaware of the distributions. Additionally, participants were found to give 
themselves bigger pay allocations under complete pay secrecy conditions (when the 
experimenter and peers were unaware). These findings are similar to those found in 
Leventhal et al.’s (1972) study in that pay communication practices influenced how pay 
allocations were distributed.
Kidder and Colleagues’ (19771 Gender Disparity Study. Following prior research 
on gender differences in pay allocations (e.g., Leventhal, Popp, and Sawyer 1973),
Kidder et al. (1977) extended the research by examining pay allocation differences with 
men and women under different pay communication conditions (pay secrecy and pay 
openness). The pay openness condition entailed the experimenter and other group 
member being aware of the pay allocation distributions, while the pay secrecy condition 
involved full anonymity in distributing pay allocations. The participants for all three 
studies were undergraduate students.
The two studies pertaining to the pay allocations under different pay 
communication conditions both showed that women distributed pay allocations equally in 
pay openness conditions and equitably in pay secrecy conditions, while men did the exact 
opposite and allocated pay equitably in pay openness conditions and equally in pay 
secrecy conditions. Additionally, women allocated more to themselves under pay secrecy
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conditions, while men allotted themselves more in the pay openness conditions. The 
gender of the other group member did not affect pay allocation distributions in that they 
were the same whether the other person was the same gender or not. Overall, these 
findings further demonstrate how pay openness conditions influence pay allocation 
distributions.
Bartol and Martin’s (1989) Dependence and Dependency Threat Study.
Following previous research showing under pay openness conditions pay allocators 
distribute pay more evenly (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972), Bartol and Martin (1989) 
extended this research by examining the dependence (increase cooperation of 
subordinates) and dependency threats (many alternative job opportunities) of pay 
allocations under pay secrecy and pay openness conditions. The research was conducted 
using an experiment. The pay secrecy condition was implicated in the instructions by 
stating a security system and information system were installed on the computer which 
provided privacy protection for employees as well as compliance with the pay secrecy 
policy. The pay openness condition was also implicated in the instructions by stating 
there were security problems with the computer systems and all pay-related decisions 
should be made under the assumption that they would be known to subordinates. The 
participants for both studies were middle-level bank managers enrolled in a banking 
school.
Study 1 did not reach significance in the three-way interaction of dependence, 
dependency threat, and pay secrecy. However, the data suggested there were higher pay 
allocations when dependence and dependency threat were both high in the pay secrecy 
condition. Even though the two-way interactions of dependence and dependency threats
79
were not significantly associated with pay secrecy at an alpha level of .05, they were 
significant at an alpha level of .07. Therefore, a second study was conducted which 
provided a little more information about a valuable subordinate and his preference for 
pay equity. Study 2 had the two-way interaction between dependence and pay secrecy 
and the three-way interaction reach significance. However, the two-way interaction 
between dependency threats and pay secrecy did not reach significance. The two-way 
interaction between dependence and pay secrecy showed the only significant difference 
between pay allocations was under the pay openness condition with higher pay 
allocations being allotted to the focal person when dependence was high than when 
dependence was low. Additionally, the focal person was allotted a significantly higher 
pay allocation in the high dependence and pay openness condition when dependency 
threat was high than when it was low. Contrary to expectations, the focal person was 
allotted a higher pay allocation in the high dependence and high dependency threat 
condition under pay openness than under pay secrecy. Therefore, participants were more 
generous in pay allocations under high dependence and high dependency threat 
conditions only under pay openness. Thus, these findings further support the notion that 
pay allocations are influenced by pay secrecy and pay openness conditions.
Trahan and Colleagues’ (1991) Pay Allocation Study. Based on Freedman and 
Montanari’s (1980) model which proposes several influences (such as organizational, 
managerial, subordinate, and environmental with each one having sub-categories) on pay 
allocation decisions, Trahan et al. (1991) tested three of the proposed organizational 
determinants (such as pay communication conditions such as pay openness and pay 
secrecy) of pay allocation decisions. The pay secrecy and pay openness conditions were
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identified in the instructions by a statement regarding the policy about pay disclosure. 
This research was conducted using experiments. The first study consisted of 
undergraduate students, while the participants in the second study were graduate students.
Contrary to expectations, pay openness did not influence the pay allocation 
decisions in study 1. Consequently, Trahan et al. (1991) argued that a lack of work 
experience among the participants may have contributed to the nonsignificance of pay 
openness on pay allocation decisions and thus, conducted a second study using graduate 
students who would be more likely to have work experience. The results of study 2 
showed the pay openness condition did impact pay allocations in that there was a greater 
distinction in the allocations between high and low performers than under the pay secrecy 
condition. Additionally, the employees who were rated low on both performance ratings 
received larger allocations under pay secrecy conditions than under pay openness 
conditions. Therefore, when pay openness conditions were utilized, the participants made 
greater distinctions in pay allocations between high and low performers. The results are 
consistent with previous findings of pay allocations being based on equity under pay 
openness conditions. However, the results of study 2 conflict with those of Leventhal et 
al. (1972) in that their study showed a greater distinction in pay allocation between high 
and low performers under the pay secrecy condition. The authors argue that the type of 
participants (undergraduate versus graduate students) may explain this opposition.
Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis
The fair wage-effort hypothesis is another topic that has been explored in the pay 
secrecy research. Based on equity theory (Adams 1965) and social exchange theory (Blau 
1964), Akerlof and Yellen (1990) proposed the fair wage-effort hypothesis to explain
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employee behavior. According to the hypothesis, employees have a notion of what 
constitutes a fair wage and base their level of effort (or performance) on how their actual 
wage compares to the fair wage. When employee’s actual wage exceeds the fair wage, 
full effort will be exerted. However, when employee’s actual wage is below the fair wage 
they will balance inputs and outputs by withdrawing effort proportionately to correspond 
with the actual wage. The authors concluded that wage compression was an optimal 
solution to employee concerns with pay equity.
Danziger and Katz’s (1997) Pay Secrecy Convention Extension Article. The fair 
wage-effort hypothesis was extended to justify the utilization of pay secrecy practices. 
Danziger and Katz (1997) argued that pay secrecy practices prevented employees from 
discussing pay information such as their pay level, whether they had received higher pay 
offers from other employers, and had their current employer matched these offers. 
Therefore, pay secrecy practices affect organizational performance by effectively 
reducing labor mobility since employees are unable to identify higher paying 
organizations. Additionally, this reduction in mobility to some extent embeds or binds 
employees to their current employer and increases the viability of risk-shifting contracts.
Danziger and Katz (1997) analyzed and compared three different labor market 
arrangements: pay secrecy convention, binding convention, and a spot market. A binding 
convention requires employees to stay employed with the organization while the 
organization pays the employees a specific amount. A pay secrecy convention requires 
employees to not discuss pay information with other employees. It also requires 
organizations to pay employees a specific amount, while allowing employees to accept 
employment elsewhere, but it does hinder employees’ ability to identify higher paying
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organizations or pay offers that their current employer matched for other employees. A 
spot market has no conventions preventing labor mobility, utilizes pay openness 
practices, and employees are able to accept employment at a higher paying organization. 
The authors argue that a pay secrecy convention is preferable to a binding convention 
since higher levels of utility are expected from employees with a pay secrecy convention. 
However, a binding convention is preferable to a pay secrecy convention when the 
organization encounters aggregate shocks (but not relative shocks) due to risk aversion 
since a pay secrecy convention is expected to yield lower levels of utility from employees 
than a binding convention. Also, a pay secrecy convention is preferable to a spot market 
convention since the pay secrecy convention always produces efficient organizational 
production and provides some insurance. Therefore, a pay secrecy convention is 
suggested to be the most beneficial convention of the three compared.
Gan’s 12002) Extended Model. Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) fair wage-effort 
hypothesis was expanded by Gan (2002) with the addition of uncertainty to the model 
and its application to pay secrecy. Gan’s (2002) uncertain fair wage-effort hypothesis 
assumes only the employee knows the fair wage and the employing organization does 
not; whereas, Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) model assumes that employees and the 
employing organization know the fair wage. Additionally, Gan (2002) argues that the fair 
wage varies amongst employees because they differ in their reference groups and the 
importance of these reference groups in configuring their fair wage. These fair wage 
variations make it difficult for an organization to identify the fair wage, causing it to be a 
random variable. Therefore, the organization encounters uncertainty with the employee’s 
fair wage. Gan’s (2002) model also assumes the employing organization’s set pay (or
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wages) is higher than employees’ reservation pay and employees adjust effort according 
to the offered pay. This differs from Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) model since pay is not 
obtained but speculated as the weighted average of the reference group and the market- 
clearing wages.
Gan (2002) argued that a lower mean of the uncertain fair wage is likely to result 
from pay secrecy. Additionally, Gan (2002) argues that the actual wage is probably 
smaller than the mean of the uncertain fair wage under pay secrecy conditions. 
Furthermore, the uncertain fair wage is likely to have a larger variance under pay secrecy 
conditions. Therefore, Gan (2002) claims that pay secrecy is better than pay openness 
conditions since it is more likely to produce higher profits for employers.
There are two effects of pay secrecy taken into consideration in this model. The 
misperception effect entails the employee’s tendency to overestimate the pay of their 
peers and underestimate the pay of their superiors. The uncertainty effect involves the 
employees being uncertain of the reference groups’ pay and therefore, placing less weight 
on it. Additionally, if the reference group consists of the employees’ peers, the mean of 
the uncertain fair wage is probably higher under pay secrecy conditions. Therefore, pay 
openness conditions should be employed when the reference group is the employees’ 
peers. However, if the reference group is the employees’ superiors, the mean of the 
uncertain fair wage is probably lower under pay secrecy conditions.
Chamess and Kuhn’s (2007) Empirical Fair Waee-Effort Study. Based on the fair 
wage-effort hypothesis, its assumptions (such as perceptions of receiving an unfair wage 
leading employees to withhold effort and fairness perceptions depending on other 
employees’ pay (Akerlof and Yellen 1990)), and its previous utilization to explain wage
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compression (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1990) and pay secrecy (Gan 2002; Lawler 1990), 
Chamess and Kuhn (2007) conducted an experiment to determine if pay secrecy is the 
optimal organizational practice for the efficiency wage model. Pay secrecy was employed 
by only allowing participants to know their own personal pay when determining their 
effort level. Pay openness was employed by allowing participants to know their wages 
and the wages of the other worker (or participant) before deciding their effort level. The 
participants consisted of students.
The results show all of the fifteen wage-offer pairs were chosen under pay secrecy 
conditions. However, under the pay openness condition all of the pairs were chosen 
except for the pair offering the highest pay to the low-performing employee and the 
lowest pay to the high-performing employee. Additionally, the employee’s personal pay 
had a strong and statistically significant effect on effort under both pay secrecy and pay 
openness conditions. The other employee’s pay did not have strong effect on effort under 
pay secrecy or pay openness conditions. This finding was expected under the pay secrecy 
condition since the participants were unaware of the other participants’ offered pay, but it 
was not expected under the pay openness condition. Therefore, the argument for pay 
secrecy being a profit-maximizing policy because it hinders employee’s ability to identify 
others’ pay and consequently, reduces effort under pay unfairness perceptions, is not 
supported.
Additional Outcomes
There have been several more recent studies analyzing pay communication’s 
influence on additional employee attitudes and behaviors (such as trust in management
(Noy 2007)) and organizational outcomes (such as performance (Tremblay and 
Chenevert 2008)). An overview of these findings can be found in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7 Prior Research Involving Additional Outcomes
Study Sample
Pay
Communication
Practice
Main Findings
Noy (2007) Employees 
and managers 
in multiple 
organizations
Measured pay 
secrecy with 
fourteen items
Developed POPS scale; POPS was 
not related to management trust, 
distributive justice, procedural 
integrity, or interpersonal justice but 
was negatively related to 
informational justice and was 
positively related to procedural voice 
and only managerial trust for non­
managers
Tremblay and 
Chenevert 
(2008)
Managers 
in multiple 
organizations
Measured pay 
communication 
by six items
High-technology orgs are less likely 
to use a pay openness approach than 
low-technology organizations; pay 
openness was not related to higher 
organizational performance in high- 
technology organizations; pay 
openness was negatively related 
employees’ discretionary efforts and 
market performance and positively 
related to work climate
Bamberger
and
Belogolovsky
(2010)
Undergraduate Experiment; 
students complete pay 
secrecy and 
extreme pay 
openness 
conditions
Pay secrecy not related to employee 
task performance; inequity tolerance 
moderated the relationship between 
pay secrecy and employee task 
performance, pay secrecy and 
perceptions of instrumentality, and 
the pay secrecy-instrumentality 
perceptions-employee task 
performance relationship for those 
with a lower tolerance of inequity
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Nov’s (2007) Organizational Justice and Trust Study. Following Burrough’s 
(1982) proposal of a pay secrecy continuum, Noy (2007) conceptualized pay secrecy into 
two separate dimensions: individual and organizational pay secrecy. Organizational pay 
secrecy (OPS) originates and is upheld by the organization and its strategies and 
structure. Individual pay secrecy (IPS) is initiated and sustained by the employees and 
their norms, intentions, and motives. As part of his dissertation requirements, Noy (2007) 
developed a perceived OPS (POPS) measure and analyzed its relationship with 
organizational justice dimensions (such as distributive and procedural justice) and trust. 
Participants were employees and managers of multiple U.S. organizations across various 
industries.
The POPS scale consisted of three sub-dimensions: policy and rules, enforcement, 
and organizational norms. The entire scale was comprised of fourteen items (such as “my 
company has rules against discussing employee pay with others” and “discussing pay at 
my company is something you can be reprimanded for”). A confirmatory factor analysis 
was conducted on the POPS measure using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The 
results showed all of the measurement models for the three sub-dimensions and the 
overall measurement model for POPS fit well according to the values of the fit indices. 
Additionally, each of the sub-dimensions significantly predicted POPS. The Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients for the overall POPS scale and the three sub-dimensions signified good 
reliability (all were above .88). Although the perceived IPS (PIPS) measure was not 
analyzed as part of his dissertation, Noy (2007) did anticipate two sub-dimensions (social 
norms and personal preference) and generated fourteen items for the overall scale.
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The analyses revealed that POPS was not related to management trust, distributive 
justice, interpersonal justice, or procedural integrity (a sub-dimension of procedural 
justice). However, POPS was significantly negatively related to informational justice. 
Contrary to expectations, POPS was significantly positively related to procedural voice (a 
sub-dimension of procedural justice). Noy (2007) suggested several explanations for the 
positive relationship between POPS and procedural voice, such as privacy needs, fear of 
identifying employees who are paid more, and previous involvement with pay secrecy 
practices yielding a growing personal expectation of such a practice being presently 
employed. Although not significantly related to managerial trust, POPS was significantly 
positively related to managerial trust for employees who had no managerial 
responsibilities but not for employees who had managerial responsibilities. Therefore, the 
positive relationship between POPS and managerial trust is significantly stronger for non­
managers, while the relationship between POPS and managerial trust is insignificant 
(near zero) for managers.
Tremblay and Chenevert’s (2008) Organizational Performance Study. Following 
previous studies examining the compensation systems correspondence with 
organizational strategies in high-technology organizations, Tremblay and Chenevert 
(2008) extended this research by analyzing the relationship between prior disregarded 
dimensions of compensation systems (pay openness and pay secrecy) and organizational 
performance (such as productivity and market performance). Pay information 
transparency analyzed the pay secrecy dimensions and was measured by six items 
specifically generated for this study (such as “we try to discourage nonmanagement 
employees from disclosing their pay to coworkers,” and “Managers are really well
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informed about wage policies”). The longitudinal study consisted of human resource 
managers employed across various industries in Canada.
The results showed that high-technology organizations are less likely to utilize a 
pay openness approach to compensation systems than low-technology organizations. 
Additionally, a pay openness approach was not related to higher organizational 
performance in high-technology organizations. Contrary to expectations, a pay openness 
approach negatively influenced employee’s discretionary efforts and market 
performance, while it positively impacted work climate (relationship between employees 
and other employees or management). These findings demonstrate that pay openness may 
not be beneficial for organizations, even though employee relations are increased, since 
employees appear to reduce their discretionary effort and organizational performance is 
decreased.
Bamberger and Beloeolovsky’s (20101 Employee Performance Study. Based on 
Colella et al.’s (2007) proposal of pay secrecy having a negative impact on employee 
motivation and ultimately their performance, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) 
analyzed the relationship between pay secrecy and employee task performance.
Following additional suggestions by Colella et al. (2007), the researchers examined 
several variables (such as instrumentality, procedural and informational justice) that may 
assist in explaining the relationship between pay secrecy and employee task performance. 
Additionally, tolerance for inequity was analyzed to moderate the relationships between 
pay secrecy and task performance and the mediating variables (such as instrumentality, 
procedural and informational justice). The study was conducted using an experiment 
involving undergraduate students. The pay secrecy condition entailed the participants
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receiving only their own personal performance level and pay. The pay openness 
condition involved the participants receiving the same information as the pay secrecy 
condition as well as the pay of their other group members.
The results show that although the relationship between pay secrecy and 
employee task performance was nonsignificant, it was in the predicted negative direction. 
Thus, tests of mediation for this relationship were not performed. However, tolerance for 
inequity did moderate the relationship between pay secrecy and employee task 
performance in that the relationship was more negative for the participants with a lower 
tolerance for inequity. Additionally, the relationship between pay secrecy and perceptions 
of instrumentality was moderated by tolerance for inequity in that the relationship was 
more negative for those with a lower tolerance for inequity. The pay secrecy- 
instrumentality perceptions-employee task performance relationship was also moderated 
by tolerance for inequity in that the mediated relationship was intensified for those with a 
lower tolerance for inequity. These findings showed that instrumentality perceptions 
mediate the negative relationship between pay secrecy and employee task performance 
for those with a lower tolerance for inequity. Overall, the results demonstrate the 
unfavorable outcomes (such as reduced employee performance) pay secrecy has for 
employees with a low inequity tolerance and the organizations that employ them.
Discussion
Although limited, the previous pay communication research has shed some light 
on the effects of pay secrecy and pay openness practices. The scant literature 
demonstrates how pay secrecy practices may harm or benefit employees and 
organizations. For instance, the research shows that pay secrecy practices do negatively
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impact the accuracy of pay estimations (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967; Milkovich and 
Anderson 1972). Overall, pay secrecy practices influenced pay estimations such that 
employees (including managers) overestimated subordinates’ and peers’ pay while 
underestimating superiors’ pay (except in Mahoney and Weitzel 1978). These inaccurate 
pay estimations were manifested at two levels away (e.g. Lawler 1967). Additionally, the 
accuracy of pay estimations was associated with higher levels of pay dissatisfaction (e.g., 
Milkovich and Anderson 1972). Even though the research shows a mediated relationship 
between pay secrecy, pay estimations, and pay dissatisfaction, the direct relationship 
between pay secrecy and pay satisfaction/ dissatisfaction is inconclusive due to 
contradicting results in that studies have shown a negative relationship between pay 
secrecy and pay satisfaction (Thompson and Pronsky 1975) and a positive relationship 
between pay information (pay openness practices) and pay satisfaction (e.g., Futrell and 
Jenkins 1978; Mulvey et al. 1992), while others have found no relationship to exist (e.g., 
Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Day 2006). The stream of research examining the impact 
pay communication practices have on pay allocation distributions is also inconclusive 
and conflicting with some studies showing pay secrecy conditions to elicit a better pay- 
for-performance distribution (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972) and other studies showing pay 
openness conditions to elicit an equity-based distribution (e.g., Trahan et al. 1991).
Conclusion
The pay communication literature is scarce and underdeveloped. Over the past 
fifty years, pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices have only been studied in relation 
to a few outcomes. More recently there have been additional outcomes examined, 
however, there have only been a select few and each has only been tested once. Even
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though this lack of research is a limitation of the pay communication literature, it does 
offer ample opportunities for future research.
Future Research
There are many directions the pay communication literature can extend into to 
make worthwhile contributions. First, a definitive pay communication (pay secrecy and 
pay openness) scale needs to be developed in order to elicit research. The majority of past 
research has either conducted their study in a specific organizational setting where the 
type of pay communication approach utilized by the organization is the one studied or by 
utilizing an experiment where the pay communication approach is manipulated. A 
validated measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) will allow the 
results to extend to all levels of pay secrecy or pay openness on the continuum, rather 
than just one or two specific levels of pay communication. Several scholars have created 
a measure of pay communication specifically for their studies (e.g., Day 2006; Cloutier 
and Vilhuber 2008); however, most of them have not been properly validated or extended 
to additional studies. Noy’s (2007) POPS scale is the only pay secrecy and pay openness 
measure that has undergone the appropriate steps of development, but it has not been 
extended beyond the original dependent variables of Noy’s study (organizational justice 
and trust). Additionally, Noy’s (2007) POPS scale may require refinement due to its sub­
dimensions possibly causing confliction within the scale itself. For instance, due to the 
Enforcement sub-dimension, if the organization does not actually enforce the rule of not 
discussing pay with other employees then the overall pay secrecy level is lowered even 
though the organization may practice complete pay secrecy by not providing any pay
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information. Therefore, a more refined measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and 
pay openness) is needed to advance the literature.
Another future direction is to analyze additional dependent variables that pay 
secrecy or pay openness practices may impact. For instance, some organizational 
outcomes that may potentially be influenced by pay communication practices are 
organizational commitment, workplace deviance, and organizational citizenship 
behaviors. Additionally, some previously examined organizational outcomes that were 
found to not be significantly impacted by pay secrecy or pay openness practices may 
deserve another examination using different methods. For instance, trust in management, 
the organizational justice dimensions (such as distributive and procedural justice), and 
employee and organizational performance should definitely be reanalyzed. Also, the 
previous streams of pay communication research involving pay estimations, pay 
satisfaction, and pay allocation outcomes may need to be reexamined since the majority 
of those studies were conducted several decades ago.
CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPMENT OF A PAY COMMUNICATION 
(PAY SECRECY AND PAY OPENNESS)
MEASURE
Employees have indicated that their compensation is an important job factor 
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Opsahi and Dunnette 1966). Compensation represents many 
different things to employees, such as achievement or recognition (Ackley 1993; 
Goodman 1974; Lawler 1966, 1971; Lawler and Porter 1967), and organizational value 
(Lawler 1966,1971), among other things. Additionally, compensation has the ability to 
influence employee behavior which, in turn, can affect organizational effectiveness (Beer 
and Gery 1972; deCarufel 1986; Lawler 1981). Despite its importance, compensation is a 
sensitive issue and discussions regarding it are typically avoided altogether, whether the 
communication is between the organization and employees or amongst employees.
Pay communication, an aspect of an organization’s compensation system, refers 
to the organizational practice that determines when, how, and which pay information 
(such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay levels, and/or the entire pay 
structure) is distributed and communicated to employees and possibly outsiders. Pay 
communication practices function to support organizations in their attainment of their 
compensation systems’ goal and objectives (Gely and Bierman 2003), such as attracting
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more qualified applicants or increasing organizational performance. Therefore, the needs 
of the organization determine the pay communication practices.
Pay communication is an important concept that unfortunately has a limited and 
underdeveloped literature. The scarce literature may be due to the lack of a valid and 
comprehensive pay communication scale. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to 
develop a pay communication scale that is inclusive by encompassing all practices. Three 
multistage studies accomplish this goal, yielding a 22-item Pay Communication scale 
comprised of four sub-dimensions: Pay Policy Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational 
Norms, and Employee Norms.
Literature Review
Pay communication is the compensation practice that determines when, how, and 
which pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay 
levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees 
(and possibly outsiders) and whether discussions involving pay information are permitted 
amongst employees (and possibly with outsiders). The purpose of pay communication 
practices are to support organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and 
objectives (Gely and Bierman 2003), such as increased performance.
Pay communication practices differ among organizations as the degree of these 
practices vary by the amount and type of pay information provided or withheld to 
employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005). Therefore, 
pay communication practices exist along a continuum and appear in a variety of forms 
(Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1981; Lawler and Jenkins 1992; Patten 
1978). The two anchors (or commonly acknowledged practices) of the pay
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communication continuum are pay secrecy and pay openness. The extent to which a pay 
secrecy or pay openness practice is utilized depends on the needs and strategic goals of 
the organization.
Pay openness is the organizational practice that allows employees to discuss their 
personal pay information with other organizational members (and possibly outsiders). 
Additionally, pay openness practices may involve the organization distributing most, if 
not all, pay information to employees on a regular basis (usually at specific time intervals 
such as yearly) or upon request. Consequently, pay secrecy is the organizational practice 
that prohibits the organization (and management) from distributing and communicating 
most, if not all, pay information to employees (Bamburger and Belogolovsky 2010; 
Colella et al. 2007; deCarufel 1986). Pay secrecy practices may also involve the adoption 
of an organizational policy (usually referred to as a pay secrecy policy but also labeled as 
pay confidentiality rules; (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman 2003)) that 
discourages or forbids employees to discuss their personal pay information with other 
organizational members and possibly with outsiders (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; 
Bierman and Gely 2004; Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003; 
Thompson and Pronsky 1975). A pay secrecy policy practice is usually the most 
detectable pay communication practice among employees and is expressed either in 
writing (such as in employee manuals) or verbally (such as during an employee 
orientation or employee meeting). Organizations may attempt to obtain compliance of a 
pay secrecy policy practice by compelling employees to sign a pledge stating they will 
not discuss pay information with other organizational members (and possibly outsiders)
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or by having policy violators suffer disciplinary consequences (such as termination; 
(Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992)).
A variety of pay communication practices (such as mild pay secrecy or moderate 
pay openness) reside along the continuum between the complete pay secrecy anchor and 
complete pay openness anchor. For instance, a mild pay secrecy practice may involve 
employees being provided with only their personal pay information, and pay range and 
pay average for their personal pay level, but no more information being freely given. 
Additionally, there may be no existence of a formal pay secrecy policy with a mild pay 
secrecy practice; whereas, a moderate pay openness practice may involve employees 
being supplied with their personal pay information, and pay ranges and pay averages for 
their pay level and adjacent pay levels in the pay structure.
Legal Issues
Pay secrecy (opposed to pay openness) practices appear to be the preferred pay 
communication practice for organizations (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1985; HRnext.com 
Survey 2001; Lawler 1981; Scott et al. 2003), managers and employees (Futrell and 
Jenkins 1978; HRnext.com Survey 2001; Markels and Berton 1996; Schuster and Colletti 
1973). However, pay secrecy policy practices have consistently been found to be 
unlawful by the NLRB and the federal court system for violating the NLRA (specifically, 
Sections 7 & 8) since these policy practices prohibit employees from discussing certain 
employment conditions (such as pay information) with other employees (Bierman and 
Gely 2004; Estlund 2011; Gely and Bierman 2003; King 2003). Regardless of whether 
pay secrecy policy practices are actually enforced by the organization, their existence is 
considered unlawful except in two instances. Pay secrecy policy practices are not in
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violation of the NLRA when they specifically pertain to managers or are worded to be 
understood as protecting an organizations’ confidential information (such as trade secrets 
or customer information) by prohibiting its’ disclosure to unauthorized individuals 
(including other employees) or entities (King 2003). Even though pay secrecy policy 
practices are illegal, organizations may use different methods, other than a written pay 
secrecy policy, that are not as concrete and/or harder to confirm exist, such as verbally 
expressing a policy practice (such as during an employee orientation or employee 
meeting) or by engaging in other pay secrecy practices (such as not providing employees 
with certain pay information).
Prior Research
Despite the pay communication research beginning over fifty years ago, the 
literature is limited and underdeveloped. Most of the literature has analyzed pay secrecy 
and/or pay openness practices’ impact on only a few outcomes, such as pay estimations 
(e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967), reward allocations (e.g., Bartol and Martin 1989; Leventhal et 
al. 1972), and pay satisfaction (e.g., Cloutier and Vilhuber, 2008; Day 2006). More 
recently, pay communication practices (specifically, pay secrecy practices) have been 
examined to influence other outcomes, such as employee task performance (Bamberger 
and Belogolovsky 2010), organizational justice and trust in management (Noy 2007). 
Although the literature has expanded within the last few years, there are still only a 
handful of variables that have been considered to be impacted by pay secrecy and/or pay 
openness practices. Additionally, the pay communication research has provided 
somewhat conflicting results (e.g., Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Thompson and Pronsky 
1975), leading to confusions about pay secrecy’s overall efficiency and common practice
98
in the workplace. Nonetheless, the scant literature implies that pay secrecy practices are 
detrimental for both employees and organizations and thus, should not be utilized (e.g., 
Bartol and Martin 1989; Lawler 1965a, 1967).
These conflicting and confusing results could mainly be due to the various 
methodological techniques utilized in these research studies. For instance, the majority of 
the research conducted in the first several decades involved either collecting data in one 
or two specific organizations (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967) or via a laboratory (scenario) 
experiment (e.g., Bartol and Martin 1989; Leventhal et al. 1972) where only one or two 
specific levels of pay communication (e.g., complete pay secrecy and complete pay 
openness) practices were manipulated. Additionally, those studies conducted in one or 
two specific organizational environments (which were all of the pay estimation outcome 
and most of the pay satisfaction outcome studies) occasionally failed to use an 
organization with the same (or nearly similar) type of pay communication practice as 
previous studies to properly replicate and/or extend the research. Therefore, the 
conflicting findings may be due to one study analyzing a complete pay secrecy practice 
and a second study analyzing a moderate pay secrecy or mild pay openness practice (e.g., 
Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972). Also, the studies involving one or two 
specific organizations had a tendency to unsuccessfully indicate or properly describe in 
detail the exact type of pay communication practice utilized in the organization (e.g., 
Lawler 1967,1972), which prevented other scholars from being able to replicate the pay 
communication practice.
In regards to the studies that conducted an experiment (which were all of the pay 
allocation outcome studies and the employee task performance outcome study), the
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majority of them described using complete pay secrecy and complete pay communication 
manipulations. However, many of these experimental studies did not explicitly describe 
the conditions that established their complete pay secrecy and complete pay openness. 
Therefore, one of these experimental studies may have used complete pay secrecy and 
complete pay openness conditions, while another study used complete pay secrecy and 
moderate pay openness conditions. Also, these studies did not acknowledge any other 
forms of pay communication practices, such as moderate pay secrecy or mild pay 
openness.
Another problem encountered throughout the pay communication literature 
involves each study having fairly dissimilar samples. Specifically, the pay estimation 
outcome studies used participants with several different managerial levels. The 
participants in these studies were classified as lower to middle-level managers (e.g., 
Lawler 1965a), lower-level managers to top management (e.g., Lawler 1967), or had no 
specific managerial level indicated (e.g., Lawler 1972). The pay allocation studies, 
mainly used samples consisting of undergraduate students (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972); 
however, some of these studies did use samples comprised of graduate students (e.g., 
Trahan et al. 1991) or managers (e.g., Bartol and Martin 1989). The pay satisfaction 
outcome studies mainly used samples of employees (e.g., Thompson and Pronsky 1975); 
however, managers (e.g., Mulvey et al. 2002) and graduate students (e.g., Day 2006) 
were also used in several studies. Although under most exploratory research 
circumstances, different samples are desired for generalizability (or external validity) and 
research advancement, the pay communication research is still very underdeveloped and 
some of the samples that have been used are possibly inappropriate or unbefitting for the
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pay communication research. For instance, samples consisting of managers may be 
inappropriate since they are not protected under the NLRA and therefore, probably only 
encounter complete or extreme pay secrecy practices.
Additionally, the student samples (primarily the undergraduate students) are 
unsuitable because the students most likely have limited work experience which affects 
the probability of them enduring pay secrecy or pay openness practice effects directly; 
therefore, they may not have knowingly encountered or properly understood pay secrecy 
or pay openness practices, or attribute the same importance to their pay as regular 
employees (Noy 2007; Trahan et al. 1991). For instance, Trahan et al. (1991) argued that 
their first study’s lack of significant results (in that pay communication practices did not 
influence pay allocation decisions) may have been due to their sample being comprised 
of undergraduate students who were deficient in work experience. Accordingly, Trahan 
et al. (1991) conducted a second study using graduate students, who would most likely 
have work experience, and found pay communication practices did impact pay allocation 
decisions. However, the findings of the second study conflicted with previous research 
(e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972). Trahan et al. (1991) again argued that the difference in the 
samples caused this inconsistency in the findings in that Leventhal et al.’s (1972) study 
used undergraduate students. Thus, samples comprised of undergraduate students and 
managers are inappropriate and may potentially bias or corrupt the analyses.
These methodological issues in the literature may be alleviated by a definitive and 
valid measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices. An 
inclusive pay communication scale will eliminate the issue of observing only one or two 
levels of pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices by allowing multiple levels of these
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practices on the continuum to be measured. The ability to measure multiple levels of pay 
communication practices may also resolve the issue of previous studies having 
conflicting or confusing results. Additionally, a pay communication measure may help 
further develop the current research while also possibly enticing scholars to extend and 
advance the pay communication literature.
There is only one pay communication assessment that has been properly 
developed, Noy’s (2007) Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) scale. However, 
the POPS scale (Noy 2007) was not evaluated for convergent or discriminant validity 
during its development process. Additionally, the POPS scale has yet to be extended to 
additional research other than the original variables it was used to analyze (e.g., 
organizational justice and trust dimensions). There have also been several additional 
measures of pay communication created for specific studies and analyses (e.g., Cloutier 
and Vilhuber 2008; Day 2006). However, none of these measures were properly 
developed and validated nor extended to additional studies outside their original purpose. 
A thorough evaluation of each of these measures is provided to additionally support the 
argument of a needed definitive pay communication scale.
Validated Measures
Noy (2007) proposed the pay secrecy concept to be comprised of two separate 
constructs: organizational and individual pay secrecy. The two types of pay secrecy 
mainly differ by the manner in which they are created and maintained. Perceived 
organizational pay secrecy (POPS) is created and upheld by the organization and its 
structure, strategies, and policies (such as a pay secrecy policy); whereas, perceived 
individual pay secrecy (PIPS) is formed and sustained by employees through different
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social and cultural norms (Noy 2007). A three-factor model of POPS was developed, 
with the three aspects portraying perceptions of (1) policies and rules, (2) enforcement, 
and (3) organizational norms. Noy’s (2007) POPS scale was comprised of fourteen items 
and all of the measurement models (sub-dimensions and overall POPS models) fit well 
and had suitable Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (refer to Appendix A for a description of 
the scale and items). The IPS scale, on the other hand, has not yet been substantiated even 
though Noy (2007) generated fourteen items for its development. Therefore, discriminant 
validity between the two types of pay secrecy has not been established.
Although Noy (2007) properly substantiated the POPS scale, it may have internal 
problems and confliction. For example, the Enforcement sub-dimension comprises a third 
of the total scale items (five items) and focuses on the repercussions employees 
experience when discussing pay information. However, if the organization does not 
actually enforce the pay secrecy policy practice by reprimanding employees (such as by 
terminating employment) for discussing pay with other organizational members then the 
overall score is reduced. This is a problem since the degree of pay secrecy may be 
extreme but due to the organization not punishing violations of a pay secrecy policy 
(given that one exists) the overall score will be minimized and the level of pay secrecy 
may appear to be moderate, if not low. Additionally, the Enforcement sub-dimension 
could be argued to be a separate construct, needing to be measured independently from a 
pay communication scale. For instance, if an organization practices extreme pay secrecy 
but does not have a formal (written) or informal (verbally expressed) pay secrecy policy 
prohibiting the discussion of pay then enforcement of obeying a pay secrecy policy is 
inconsequential. Therefore, the Enforcement sub-dimension may cause the overall pay
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secrecy score to be reduced and should be considered to be a separate construct requiring 
its own measurement.
The Policies & Rules sub-dimension has the most items contributing to the overall 
scale (six items) and focuses on formal (written) and perhaps informal (verbally 
expressed) pay secrecy policy practices. Even though the existence of a pay secrecy 
policy is important in a pay communication scale, it should not have such a heavy weight 
for several reasons. First, an organization may practice extreme pay secrecy but not 
express a pay secrecy policy due to its unlawfulness and thereby, this dimension causes 
the overall score to be reduced and the level of pay secrecy practice to appear moderate, 
if not low. Additionally, organizations having previously encountered court issues, such 
as NLRB grievances and/or employee lawsuits pertaining to pay secrecy policy practices 
(such as for wrongful termination due to violating a pay secrecy policy), would most 
likely not formally or unofficially express a pay secrecy policy but may continue to 
practice pay secrecy by not providing employees with various pay information.
Therefore, items pertaining to other specific practices of pay communication may be 
better alternatives than pay secrecy policy existence items. Furthermore, some of the 
items do not specifically identify who represents ‘others’ in their wording or whom 
exactly the employees cannot discuss their pay information with. This is a problem as 
organizations may have a pay secrecy policy practice regarding employees not disclosing 
their pay information with ‘other’ employees and/or ‘other’ people outside of the 
organization.
The Organizational Norms sub-dimension consists of three items and focuses on 
pay secrecy practices and informal (verbally expressed) pay secrecy policy practices. As
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previously argued the items pertaining to specific pay communication practices (such as 
organization withholds certain pay information from employees) are important and 
should probably have a heavier weight in the overall pay communication measure. 
However, these items make up less than a fourth of the overall scale. Additionally, the 
specific practice items need to address certain types of practices used in organizations, 
such as type of pay information (e.g., pay ranges and pay averages) provided to or 
withheld from employees; however, these practice-oriented items only pertain to whether 
the employing organization is secretive in regards to pay.
Non-Validated Measures
The additional assessments of pay communication were not properly substantiated 
and they were designed (and worded) specifically for certain studies. Consequently, these 
measures have not been extended to additional studies outside of their original purpose, 
most likely due to their specificity and inability to apply to multiple occupations and/or 
organizations. For a description of these pay communication measures and items refer to 
Appendix B.
Beer and Gery (1972) were the first scholars to measure pay communication 
practices with specific items. They used an ‘organizational culture’ measure which 
analyzed the openness of the culture in regards to the organization providing or 
withholding certain pay information. The six items focused on specific pay 
communication practices by analyzing the employee’s knowledge of certain pay 
information (such as pay range and pay raises). The items were analyzed individually, 
rather than collectively as a scale. Consequently, a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was not 
provided.
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Mulvey et al. (2002) created a seven-item measure to represent knowledge of pay. 
The measure specifically focused on pay communication practices by analyzing the 
employee’s knowledge of certain pay information. Specifically, the items referred to pay 
grades, pay raises, pay ranges, and the processes used to determine their pay. Even 
though the items were collectively combined to produce an overall pay knowledge scale, 
a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was not provided.
Day (2006) generated a five-item measure of pay communication with higher 
levels representing pay openness practices rather than pay secrecy practices. The items 
focused on the employee’s perception of communication concerning pay level 
determination and pay range information. The items were analyzed against other 
variables collectively as a scale and produced a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .75. 
However, almost half (41%) of the variance was accounted for by one item. Additionally, 
Day (2006) asserted that the pay communication scale she created may not adequately 
measure “the breadth and depth of issues” a pay communication scale should identify and 
assess (p. 757).
Cloutier and Vilhuber (2008) created a two-item measure of system transparency. 
The items pertained to pay openness practices and focused solely on whether procedures 
used to determine pay levels and pay raises were followed. This measure produced a 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .80.
Tremblay and Chenevert (2008) generated a six-item measure of pay information 
transparency. The items pertained to pay openness practices and focused on employee’s 
knowledge of the pay process, pay policies, and disclosure of pay information. However, 
only half of the questions were concerned with employees, while the other half referred
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to managers. In fact, there were only three completely different items and each item was 
reworded to pertain to employees in one and managers in the other. Additionally, four of 
the items were reverse-coded. The measure produced a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
.84.
All of these non-validated pay communication assessments evaluate important 
aspects of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness). However, most of these 
measures only include one or two of these essential pay communication aspects. An 
inclusive pay communication assessment needs to encompass these practices but also 
other specific practices. Therefore, a measure with a broader scope of pay communication 
(pay secrecy and pay openness) practices is needed for a high-quality research and 
knowledge advancement.
Based on the above arguments and descriptions of the current pay communication 
scales, a more comprehensive assessment of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay 
openness) practices is needed in the management literature to further develop the 
research. Although these assessments offer a good starting point, a more refined and 
definitive measure of pay communication is urgently needed. Therefore, the purpose of 
this paper is to produce a pay communication scale that includes all of the important 
aspects of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices.
Three multistage studies were conducted to properly develop and validate a pay 
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale. The scale development process 
was adapted from the procedures and stages proposed by Hinkin (1995) and Schwab 
(1980). Each study was individually approved by Louisiana Tech University’s Internal 
Review Board (refer to Appendix C for a copy of the approval letters). The first study
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consisted of generating a pool of 79 items pertaining to pay communication practices and 
having a panel of experts review and assess these items, resulting in 42 items. Study 2 
involved further refining the items by analyzing the inter-item correlations, variances, 
and factor loadings of each item in an exploratory factor analysis, which resulted in 22 
items loading on four distinct factors. In the third study, the proposed scale and 
dimensionality (four sub-dimensions) of the remaining 22 items was confirmed by using 
confirmatory factor analysis. Additionally, construct validation was determined for the 
Pay Communication scale by providing evidence of convergent and discriminant validity.
Study 1: Instrument Development
Stage 1: Item Generation
The purpose of this stage was to create a large, inclusive pool of items about pay 
communication practices, so that together they meet the description of pay 
communication (pay secrecy and/or pay openness) and encompass the entire domain of 
pay communication practices.
Procedure 1. Participants were active members of the Society of Human 
Resource Management (SHRM). Specifically, members of the Northeast Louisiana 
(Monroe #0207), Central Louisiana (Alexandria #0367), and Imperial Calcasieu Human 
Resource Management Association (Lake Charles #0402) SHRM chapters participated in 
this study. An email was sent to each chapter’s current President requesting to survey 
their current members (refer to Appendix D). Once the survey was approved by the 
Chapter Presidents and their Board of Directors, an introductory email was sent to the 
potential respondents (SHRM Chapter members) explaining the purpose of the study and
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inviting them to participate in the study (refer to Appendix E). Participants were given 
ten to fourteen days to access and complete the survey. A reminder email was sent to the 
potential respondents (SHRM Chapter members) five days after the introductory email 
was delivered (refer to Appendix F).
The introductory and reminder emails were delivered to 360 potential 
participants. Twenty-four currently active SHRM members participated in the survey, 
yielding a 6.67% response rate. The majority of the participants were female (54.2%), 
Caucasian (83.3%), working full-time (91.7%), and employed in their organization’s 
human resources department (62.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 27 to 67 with 
half of the participants being in their forties. The mean age was forty-five. Most of the 
participants had been with their current employer for one to five years (45.8%). All of the 
participants who provided a response for the education category possessed at least a 
bachelor’s degree (95.8%). Refer to Table 3.1 for a complete overview of the descriptive 
statistics for the sample.
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Stage 1 of Study 1)
N % Cumulative %
Louisiana SHRM Chapters:
Alexandria Chapter (Central Louisiana) 5 20.8 20.8
Lake Charles Chapter (ICHRMA) 10 41.7 62.5
Monroe Chapter (Northeast Louisiana) 9 37.5 100.0
Gender:
Female 13 54.2 54.2
Male 10 41.7 95.9
Not Given 1 4.2 100.0
Age:
20’s 2 8.3 8.3
30’s 3 12.5 20.8
40’s 12 50.0 70.8
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
50’s 3 12.5 83.3
60’s 2 8.3 91.6
Not Given 2 8.3 100.0
Ethnicity:
African American 1 4.2 4.2
American Indian 0 0.0 4.2
Asian/Pacific Islander 1 4.2 8.4
Caucasian 20 83.3 91.7
Latino/Hispanic 1 4.2 95.9
Middle Eastern 0 0.0 95.9
Native American 0 0.0 95.9
Other 0 0.0 95.9
Not Given 1 4.2 100.0
Tenure:
Less than 1 year 2 8.3 8.3
1 to 5 years 11 45.8 54.1
6 to 15 years 8 33.3 87.4
16 to 25 years 2 8.3 95.7
Not Given 1 4.2 100.0
Hours Per Week:
Less than 10 hours 0 0.0 0.0
10 to 20 hours 0 0.0 0.0
21 to 30 hours (part-time) 1 4.2 4.2
30 (full-time) to 40 hours 7 29.2 33.4
More than 40 hours 15 62.5 95.9
Not Given 1 4.2 100.0
Education:
Did not complete high school 0 0.0 0.0
High school diploma or GED 0 0.0 0.0
Some college 0 0.0 0.0
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS) 15 62.5 62.5
Technical college or Trade school 0 0.0 0.0
Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS) 0 0.0 0.0
Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (e.g., MD) 2 8.3 70.8
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA) 6 25.0 95.8
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD) 0 0.0 95.8
Not Given 1 4.2 100.0
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Industry:
Agriculture, Mining 0 0.0 0.0
Communications, Utilities 2 8.3 8.3
Construction 2 8.3 16.6
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 2 8.3 24.9
Government 1 4.2 29.1
Health Care 6 25.0 54.1
Internet 0 0.0 54.1
Manufacturing 3 12.5 66.6
Retail, Wholesale 0 0.0 66.6
Services 2 8.3 74.9
Transportation 1 4.2 79.1
Nonprofit 1 4.2 83.3
Other (e.g., Banking, Legal, Education) 3 12.5 95.8
Not Given 1 4.2 100.0
Managerial/Departmental Level:
Employee (no managerial duties) 3 12.5 n/a
Lower-level management 0 0.0 n/a
Middle-level management 6 25.0 n/a
Higher-level (top) management 7 29.2 n/a
Human Resources department 15 62.5 n/a
Professional (e.g., Instructor, Law Firm Partner) 2 8.3 n/a
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the 
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a 
box (refer to Appendix G). Additionally, participants were given the researchers’ current 
description of pay communication (which was based on the management literature), 
instructions, and requested to openly respond to several five open-ended research 
questions and eight demographic questions (refer to Appendix H). A deductive approach 
was used to generate the items. Two research questions requested participants provide 
and describe at least two examples of practices that their current employer and another 
organization (such as former employer or spouse’s employer) currently utilize or does not 
utilize pay communication practices in the workplace. Three research questions requested
I l l
participants identify what pay secrecy means to them personally, to their current 
employer, and to their current co-workers (such as peers, subordinates, superiors). This 
procedure generated 142 items.
Procedure 2. The researcher independently edited poorly-written items and 
eliminated duplicate items. Additionally, the researcher produced 22 distinct items based 
on the previously published pay communication literature. This created a total of 79 items 
(refer to Appendix I for an overview of the items).
Stage 2: Item Refinement
The purpose of this stage was to create a manageable representation of pay 
communication practices by systematically reducing the number of items generated in 
Stage 1.
Sample. Participants (or judges) were Ph.D. academics and doctoral students in 
the management discipline with the majority having an emphasis in human resource 
management and/or organizational behavior. All of the judges were personally known to 
the researcher. The majority of the participants were male (54.5%), Caucasian (63.6%), 
and possessed a doctoral degree (54.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 28 to 53 
with most of the participants (those who provided a response) being in their thirties 
(55.6%).The mean age was thirty-eight. Most of the participants have been with their 
current employer for one to five years (63.6%). Refer to Table 3.2 for an overview of the 
descriptive statistics for the sample.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Stage 2 of Study 1)
N % Cumulative %
Gender:
Male 6 54.5 54.2
Female 5 45.5 100.0
Age:
20’s 1 9.1 9.1
30’s 5 45.4 54.5
40’s 2 18.2 72.7
50’s 1 9.1 81.8
Not Given 2 18.2 100.0
Ethnicity:
African American 1 9.1 9.1
American Indian 0 0.0 9.1
Asian/Pacific Islander 2 18.2 27.3
Caucasian 7 63.6 90.9
Latino/Hispanic 0 0.0 90.9
Middle Eastern 0 0.0 90.9
Native American 0 0.0 90.9
Other 1 9.1 100.0
Tenure:
Less than 1 year 1 9.1 9.1
1 to 5 years 7 63.6 72.7
6 to 15 years 3 27.3 100.0
Education:
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA) 5 45.5 45.5
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD) 6 54.5 100.0
Position:
Dissertation Committee Member 3 27.3 n/a
Doctoral Student/Candidate of Management 5 45.5 n/a
Management Professor at Louisiana Tech University 3 27.3 n/a
Management Professor at Other University 4 36.4 n/a
Procedure. Potential judges were requested to participate in the study by email. 
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the Internal 
Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a box on
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the first page of the electronic survey (refer to Appendix G). The eleven judges rated and 
reviewed each of the 79 items based on several criteria: (the degree to which each item 
has): consistency with the pay communication description (either pay secrecy or pay 
openness), generalizability to a wide variety of organizations and occupations, and clarity 
and conciseness (editing of items was allowed). The items were investigated based on the 
three criteria using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree or not at 
all) to 5 (strongly agree or highly). The judges were also given the opportunity to modify 
items or request an item be eliminated from further analyses. Additionally, five 
demographic questions were included at the end of the survey (refer to Appendix J for an 
overview of the review survey).
Items that received a mean score of 3.0 or less on any of the three rating criteria 
were eliminated from further analyses. The majority of the items (all but one item) that 
were suggested to be deleted due to their complexity or difficulty were also eliminated. 
The one item that was not eliminated was modified. Items that were requested for 
modification were altered following the judges’ comments. This process yielded 42 items 
for further analysis (refer to Appendix K for an overview of the items).
Study 2: Scale Evaluation
Sample
Seventy-nine participants volunteered to participate after being recruited from a 
social networking website (e.g., Facebook) and 227 were recruited from an online survey 
panel (e.g., Qualtrics) which rewarded those who completed the survey with points that 
could be used for merchandise or money. There were a total of 306 participants. The 
majority of the participants were male (66.7%), Caucasian (85.9%), working full-time
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(96.4%), had no labor union involvement for their job or any jobs in their organization 
(67.3%), and possessed at least a bachelor’s degree (59.8%). The participants’ ages 
ranged from 19 to 69 with a third of the participants (33.3%) being in their thirties. The 
mean age was forty-one. Most of the participants had been with their current employer 
for one to five years (33.3%) and were classified as an ‘employee’ with no managerial 
duties (44.1%). Refer to Table 3.3 for a complete overview of the descriptive statistics for 
the sample.
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Study 2)
N % Cumulative %
Gender:
Female 100 32.7 32.7
Male 204 66.7 99.3
Not Given 2 .7 100.0
Age:
19 to 29 49 16.0 16.0
30’s 102 33.3 49.3
40’s 67 21.9 71.2
50’s 65 21.2 92.4
60’s 21 6.9 99.3
Not Given 2 .7 100.0
Ethnicity:
African American 14 4.6 4.6
American Indian 0 0.0 4.6
Asian/Pacific Islander 13 4.2 8.8
Caucasian 263 85.9 94.7
Latino/Hispanic 12 3.9 95.9
Middle Eastern 1 .3 98.4
Native American 2 .7 98.7
Not Given 4 1.3 100.0
Union Status:
Yes, job is unionized but not all jobs in organization 24 7.8 7.8
Yes, entire organization is unionized 27 8.8 16.7
No, but other jobs in the organization are unionized 47 15.4 32.0
No, no job in the entire organization is unionized 206 67.3 99.3
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Not Given 2 .7 100.0
Tenure:
Less than 1 year 30 9.8 9.8
1 to 5 years 101 33.0 42.8
6 to 10 years 79 25.8 68.6
11 to 15 years 46 15.0 83.7
16 to 20 years 18 5.9 89.5
21 to 25 years 16 5.2 94.8
26 years or more 14 4.6 99.3
Not Given 2 .7 100.0
Hours Per Week:
Less than 10 hours 2 .7 0.7
10 to 20 hours 2 .7 1.3
21 to 30 hours (part-time) 5 1.6 2.9
30 (full-time) to 40 hours 159 52.0 54.9
More than 40 hours 136 44.4 99.3
Not Given 2 .7 100.0
Education:
Did not complete high school 1 0.3 0.3
High school diploma or GED 45 14.7 15.0
Some college 77 25.2 40.2
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS) 97 31.7 71.9
Technical college or Trade school 15 4.9 76.8
Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS) 22 7.2 84.0
Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (e.g., MD) 6 2.0 85.9
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA) 31 10.1 96.1
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD) 10 3.3 99.3
Not Given 2 .7 100.0
Managerial/Departmental Level:
Employee (no managerial duties) 135 44.1 n/a
Lower-level management 52 7.0 n/a
Middle-level management 73 23.9 n/a
Higher-level (top) management 24 7.8 n/a
Human Resources department 7 2.3 n/a
Professional (e.g., Instructor, Law Firm Partner) 15 4.9 n/a
Not Given 3 1.0 n/a
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Industry:
Agriculture, Mining S 2.6 2.6
Communications, Utilities 13 4.2 6.9
Construction 19 6.2 13.1
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 14 4.6 17.6
Government 53 17.3 35.0
Health Care 31 10.1 45.1
Internet 11 3.6 48.7
Manufacturing 40 13.1 61.8
Retail, Wholesale 45 14.7 76.5
Services 45 14.7 91.2
Transportation 11 3.6 94.8
Nonprofit 8 2.6 97.4
Other (e.g., Engineering) 6 2.0 99.3
Not Given 2 .7 100.0
Organizational Size:
10 employees or less 28 9.2 9.2
11 to 50 employees 49 16.0 25.2
51 to 100 employees 26 8.5 33.7
101 to 500 employees 63 20.6 54.2
501 to 1,000 employees 30 9.8 64.1
1,001 to 5,000 employees 51 16.7 80.7
5,001 to 25,000 employees 20 6.5 87.3
25,001 to 50,000 employees 12 3.9 91.2
50,001 to 100,000 employees 9 2.9 94.1
100,001 employees or more 16 5.2 99.3
Not Given 2 0.7 100.0
Income
$13,500 or less 9 2.9 2.9
$13,501 to $20,000 18 5.9 8.8
$20,001 to $30,000 37 12.1 20.9
$30,001 to $40,000 52 17.0 37.9
$40,001 to $50,000 55 18.0 55.9
$50,001 to $60,000 46 15.0 70.9
$60,001 to $70,000 21 6.9 77.8
$70,001 to $80,000 18 5.9 83.7
$80,001 to $90,000 12 3.9 87.6
$90,001 to $100,000 8 2.6 90.2
$100,001 or more 28 9.2 99.3
Not Given 2 .7 100.0
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N % Cumulative %
State:
Alabama 5 1.6 1.6
Arkansas 1 .3 2.0
California 8 2.6 4.6
Colorado 1 .3 4.9
Connecticut 1 .3 5.2
Delaware 1 .3 5.6
Florida 10 3.3 8.8
Georgia 3 1.0 9.8
Illinois 3 1.0 10.8
Indiana 4 1.3 12.1
Iowa 4 1.3 13.4
Kansas 2 .7 14.1
Louisiana 46 15.0 31.0
Maine 1 .3 31.4
Massachusetts 5 1.6 33.0
Michigan 4 1.3 34.3
Minnesota 3 1.0 35.3
Missouri 2 .7 35.9
Nebraska 1 .3 36.3
Nevada 1 .3 36.6
New Hampshire 1 .3 36.9
New Jersey 4 1.3 38.2
New York 4 1.3 39.5
North Carolina 6 2.0 41.5
Ohio 10 3.3 44.8
Oklahoma 2 .7 45.4
Pennsylvania 8 2.6 48.0
South Carolina 2 .7 48.7
Tennessee 6 2.0 50.7
Texas 8 2.6 53.3
Utah 3 1.0 54.2
Virginia 1 .3 54.6
Washington 1 .3 54.9
Wisconsin 1 .3 55.2
Wyoming 1 .3 55.6
Do not live in the U.S. (e.g., Canada) 3 1.0 56.5
Not Given 133 43.5 100.0
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Procedure
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the 
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a 
box (refer to Appendix G). Additionally, participants were given a description of pay 
communication including depictions for pay secrecy and pay openness, instructions, and 
requested to respond to the 42 prospective items that endured Study 1 ’s analyses and 12 
demographic questions (refer to Appendix L). Specifically, the participants indicated the 
extent to which their current employing organization engaged in certain pay 
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices on a 7-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Negatively worded items were recoded to match the scale anchors (e.g., pay 
secrecy representing the high extreme and pay openness representing the low extreme). 
This analysis yielded 22 items (refer to Appendix M for an overview of the items).
Stage 1: Item Selection Process
Items were evaluated based on item-total correlations and variances. Items 
demonstrating high inter-item correlations with other items in the same sub-category 
were selected to be included in the sub-dimensions since a scale should consist of highly 
interrelated items (DeVellis 2012). Additionally, items with low variances (below 1.5) 
were eliminated since they do not allow differences between the participants to be 
established (DeVellis 2012). This process resulted in the elimination of 4 items, yielding 
38 items. The means and standard deviations for the remaining 38 items are presented in 
Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Means and Standard Deviations of Items (Stage 1 of Study 2)
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Item M SD
1. All individual pay information is only known to a select few 
staff members, such as the HR hiring manager, accountant, and/or 
CEO.
5.20 1.88
2. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my 
organization.
4.03 2.07
3. An employees’ individual pay is strictly confidential at my 
organization.
4.87 2.04
4. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone. 5.49 1.94
5. Employees are well informed about pay policies at my 
organization.
3.08 1.75
6. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ 
(gossip) at my organization.
4.35 1.85
7. Even though employees at my organization are not supposed to 
discuss their personal pay information they do.
4.35 1.75
8 .1 am provided information only about my individual pay level. 5.17 1.84
9 .1 am provided the pay average for every job in my organization. 4.41 2.06
10.1 am provided my job’s pay range. 3.31 2.00
11.1 know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of 
pay increases presently available.
3.60 1.93
12.1 know whether my pay is above, below, or equal to the average 
pay for my job.
3.33 1.83
13. Management openly discusses all employees’ individual pay. 5.52 1.74
14. My organization distributes pay ranges for every job in the 
organization.
4.30 2.05
15. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own 
pay with coworkers.
4.24 1.94
16. My organization does not have a policy, procedure, or unwritten 
standard on discussing pay information.
4.25 1.95
17. My organization does not provide employees with any 
coworkers’ individual pay.
5.54 1.73
18. My organization does not provide employees with the 
procedures used to establish pay.
3.94 1.86
19. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees 
from discussing their pay with each other.
3.64 1.87
20. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from 
discussing pay information with coworkers.
3.97 2.04
21. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with 
other employees.
4.28 2.00
22. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I 
understand.
3.67 1.87
23. My organization is secretive when it comes to employee pay. 4.62 1.85
24. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not 
talking about pay.
3.80 1.91
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25. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential. 4.91 1.90
26. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my 
job.
3.45 1.88
27. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed 
under any circumstances.
4.05 1.97
28. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available. 4.29 2.00
29. My organization provides employees with information with 
information about how pay is determined.
3.64 1.87
30. My organization requires employees to sign a contractual 
agreement stating they will comply with the pay secrecy policy by 
not discussing their individual pay information with coworkers.
2.89 1.97
31. My organization shows its’ concern for employees’ 
privacy/confidentiality by not releasing everyone’s individual pay 
level.
4.80 1.83
32. My organization suggests individual pay information should be 
kept private.
4.89 1.76
33. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule 
with employees.
3.95 1.95
34. My organization withholds my job’s pay average from me. 3.41 1.74
35. No pay information, other than personal pay level, is disclosed 
to employees at my organization.
4.46 1.88
36. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my 
organization.
4.96 1.90
37. There are no negative consequences for discussing pay at my 
organization.
3.95 1.88
38. There is a statement in my organization’s employee 
handbook/manual stating employees should not discuss their pay 
with coworkers.
3.85 2.04
Note: Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). N  -  306.
Stage 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis
Items were evaluated on their interrelationships (factor weight and factor 
loadings) using a principal axis factor analysis with direct oblique rotation. A principal 
axis factor analysis was used because this type of factor analysis is primarily concerned 
with the common variance and identifying the underlying dimensions. Additionally, a 
direct oblique rotation was utilized since the items were expected to be correlated. A 
factor weight of .40 was used as the minimum cutoff. Additionally, items were only
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allowed to load on one factor. Therefore, the minimum difference between weights for an 
item on different factors was more than. 10. Items not meeting the criteria were 
eliminated. This process resulted in 16 items being removed due to not meeting the 
minimum requirements, yielding 22 items. Additionally, the 22 items loaded on four 
separate factors, resulting in a potential four-factor model. As shown in Table 3.5, these 
four factors appear to represent different aspects of pay communication practices. These 
sub-dimensions were labeled Pay Policy Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational Norms, 
and Employee Norms.
Table 3.5 Principal Axis Factor Analysis, Oblimin Rotation (Stage 2 of Study 2)
Factor Loadings
Pay Policy Pay Organizational Employee
Item Existence Structure Norms Norms
1. An employee could be fired for .76 .49
discussing pay information at my
organization.
2. At my organization, all pay .44 .74
information is available to
anyone.
3. Employees discover .76
coworkers’ pay through the
‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my
organization.
4. Even though employees at my .74
organization are not supposed to
discuss their personal pay
information they do.
5 .1 am provided my job’s pay .70
range.
6 .1 know about the different .74
types, sizes, and/or frequencies of
pay increases presently available.
7. My organization does not allow .84 .58
employees to discuss their own
pay with coworkers.
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8. My organization enforces the .81 .43
policy/rule that forbids employees
from discussing their pay with 
each other.
9. My organization has a policy .86 .45
forbidding employees from
discussing pay information with 
coworkers.
10. My organization has a rule to .86 .56
not share pay information with
other employees.
11. My organization has a solid .85 
pay structure/model that I
understand.
12. My organization is very strict .89 .51
in regards to employees not
talking about pay.
13. My organization keeps all pay .65 .82
information strictly confidential.
14. My organization makes it .84 
clear how pay is determined for
my job.
15. My organization makes it .92 .59
clear that pay should not be
discussed under any 
circumstances.
16. My organization makes the .75 .42
entire pay structure/model
available.
17. My organization provides .82 
employees with information about
how pay is determined.
18. My organization shows its’ .42 .72
concern for employee’s
privacy/confidentiality by not 
releasing everyone’s individual 
pay level.
19. My organization suggests .62 .77 .47
individual pay information should
be kept private.
20. My organization verbally .81 .61
expresses a pay secrecy
policy/rule with employees.______________________________________________
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21. Only a few employees have .49 .75
access to pay information at my
organization.
22. There is a statement in my .78 .53
organization’s employee
handbook/manual stating
employees should not discuss
their pay with coworkers.
Note: Numbers in boldface indicate dominant factor loadings.
Study 3: Scale Validation
Sample
Participants were recruited using a third party online survey organization (e.g. 
Mechanical Turk). Those who completed the anonymous survey were compensated one 
dollar directly by the online survey organization. The respondents were completely 
anonymous to the researcher. The number of participants was 611. The majority of the 
participants were female (57.9%), Caucasian (73.6%), working full-time (81.5%), had no 
labor union involvement for their job or any jobs in their organization (73.3%), and 
possessed at least a bachelor’s degree (70.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 
68 with over 40% of the participants being in their twenties and a third (33.4%) being in 
their thirties. The mean age was thirty-four. Most of the participants had been with their 
current employer for one to five years (55%) and were classified as an ‘employee’ with 
no managerial duties (62.2%). Refer to Table 3.6 for a complete overview of the 
descriptive statistics for the sample.
Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Study 3)
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N % Cumulative %
Gender:
Female 354 57.9 57.9
Male 257 42.1 100.0
Age:
18 and 19 2 .3 .3
20’s 252 41.2 41.6
30’s 204 33.4 75.0
40’s 78 12.8 87.7
50’s 48 7.9 95.6
60’s 27 4.4 100.0
Ethnicity:
African American 33 5.4 5.4
American Indian 28 4.6 10.0
Asian/Pacific Islander 62 10.1 20.1
Caucasian 450 73.6 94.1
Latino/Hispanic 21 3.4 97.5
Middle Eastern 4 .7 98.2
Native American 11 1.8 100.0
Tenure:
Less than 1 year 88 14.4 14.4
1 to 5 years 336 55.0 69.4
6 to 10 years 117 19.1 88.5
11 to 15 years 45 7.4 95.9
16 to 20 years 15 2.5 98.4
21 to 25 years 4 .7 99.0
26 years or more 6 1.0 100.0
Hours Per Week:
Less than 10 hours 8 1.3 1.3
10 to 20 hours 24 3.9 5.2
21 to 30 hours (part-time) 81 13.3 18.5
30 (full-time) to 40 hours 291 47.6 66.1
More than 40 hours 207 33.9 100.0
Education:
Did not complete high school 8 1.3 1.3
High school diploma or GED 35 5.7 7.0
Some college 137 22.4 29.5
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS) 253 41.4 70.9
Technical college or Trade school 10 1.6 72.5
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Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS) 60 9.8 82.3
Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (e.g., MD) 14 2.3 84.6
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA) 88 14.4 99.0
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD) 6 1.0 100.0
Industry:
Agriculture, Mining 13 2.1 2.1
Communications, Utilities 22 3.6 5.7
Construction 14 2.3 8.0
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 47 7.7 15.7
Government 101 16.5 32.2
Health Care 76 12.4 44.7
Internet 31 5.1 49.8
Manufacturing 34 5.6 55.3
Retail, Wholesale 84 13.7 69.1
Services 151 24.7 93.8
Transportation 15 2.5 96.2
Nonprofit 22 3.6 99.8
Other 1 0.2 100.0
Organizational Size:
10 employees or less 65 10.6 10.6
11 to 50 employees 112 18.3 29.0
51 to 100 employees 72 11.8 40.8
101 to 500 employees 115 18.8 59.6
501 to 1,000 employees 59 9.7 69.2
1,001 to 5,000 employees 71 11.6 80.9
5,001 to 25,000 employees 51 8.3 89.2
25,001 to 50,000 employees 16 2.6 91.8
50,001 to 100,000 employees 14 2.3 94.1
100,001 employees or more 36 5.9 100.0
Union Status:
Yes, job is unionized but not all jobs in organization 45 7.4 7.4
Yes, entire organization is unionized 48 7.9 15.2
No, but other jobs in the organization are unionized 70 11.5 26.7
No, no job in the entire organization is unionized 448 73.3 100.0
Managerial/Departmental Level:
Employee (no managerial duties) 380 62.2 n/a
Lower-level management 102 16.7 n/a
Middle-level management 103 16.9 n/a
Higher-level (top) management 11 1.8 n/a
Human Resources department 20 3.3 n/a
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Professional (e.g., Medical Doctor) 9 1.5 n/a
Income
$13,500 or less 96 15.7 15.7
$13,501 to $20,000 73 11.9 27.7
$20,001 to $30,000 124 20.3 48.0
$30,001 to $40,000 99 16.2 64.2
$40,001 to $50,000 74 12.1 76.3
$50,001 to $60,000 47 7.7 84.0
$60,001 to $70,000 31 5.1 89.0
$70,001 to $80,000 26 4.3 93.3
$80,001 to $90,000 13 2.1 95.4
$90,001 to $100,000 6 1.0 96.4
$100,001 or more 22 3.6 100.0
State:
Alabama 8 1.3 1.3
Arkansas 17 2.8 4.1
California 8 1.3 5.4
Colorado 52 8.5 13.9
Connecticut 14 2.3 16.2
Delaware 6 1.0 17.2
Florida 1 .2 17.3
Georgia 31 5.1 22.4
Illinois 21 3.4 25.9
Indiana 4 .7 26.5
Iowa 5 .8 27.3
Kansas 22 3.6 30.9
Louisiana 15 2.5 33.4
Maine 2 .3 39.3
Maryland 5 .8 40.1
Massachusetts 12 2.0 42.1
Michigan 15 2.5 44.5
Minnesota 9 1.5 46.0
Mississippi 9 1.5 47.5
Missouri 15 2.5 49.9
Montana 4 .7 50.6
Nebraska 5 .8 51.4
Nevada 5 .8 52.2
New Hampshire 2 .3 52.5
New Jersey 17 2.8 55.3
New Mexico 4 .7 56.0
New York 38 6.2 62.2
North Carolina 23 3.8 66.0
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Ohio 30 4.9 70.9
Oklahoma 7 1.1 72.0
Oregon 7 1.1 73.2
Pennsylvania 21 3.4 76.6
Rhode Island 3 .5 77.1
South Carolina 13 2.1 79.2
South Dakota 2 .3 79.5
Tennessee 14 2.3 81.8
Texas 51 8.3 90.2
Utah 4 .7 90.8
Virginia 20 3.3 94.1
Washington 15 2.5 96.6
West Virginia 4 .7 97.2
Wisconsin 15 2.5 99.7
Wyoming 1 .2 99.8
Other (e.g., Washington, D.C.) 1 .2 100.0
Procedure
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the 
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a 
box (refer to Appendix G). The participants could not proceed with the survey until they 
had marked the box and pressed next. Participants were given instructions and requested 
to respond to the 22 prospective items that endured Study 2’s analyses and 12 
demographic questions (refer to Appendix N for an overview of the survey). Specifically, 
the participants indicated the extent to which their current employing organization 
engaged in certain pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices on a 7- 
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Additionally, participants responded to other pay communication scales (e.g., Day 2006; 
Mulvey et al. 2002; Noy 2007) and a High Performance Work Practices measure (e.g., 
Huselid 1995) for construct validation.
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Negatively worded items were recoded to match the scale anchors (e.g., pay 
secrecy representing the high extreme and pay openness representing the low extreme). 
Stage 1: Dimensionality
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Amos 20 was conducted to evaluate 
the fit of the measurement model (e.g., the relationship between the items and the factors) 
and to cross-validate the dimensionality of the scale. A CFA was performed on each sub­
factor (or first-order latent variables) of the Pay Communication model as proposed in the 
EFA solution. Additionally, a second-order CFA using all four extracted pay 
communication dimensions was conducted to examine whether all four identified 
dimensions actually refer to a superordinate pay communication construct. The fit of the 
four-factor model was also compared to the fits of 1-factor, 2-factor, and 3-factor models.
First, the four sub-factors of the Pay Communication model were analyzed 
independently using several Model Fit indices (e.g., RMSEA) and Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient (Cronbach 1951). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Normative Fit Index 
(NFI), and Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA), and x2 indices were used to evaluate the fit of each sub-factor. The CFI, NFI, 
and GFI indicate a well-fitting model when values are closer to 1.0; whereas, the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation indicates a well-fitting model when values are 
below .08 (Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson 2010). The results of the independent sub­
factor indices are presented in Table 3.7. Each sub-factor demonstrated reliability by 
having suitable Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of above .70 (Hair et al. 2010). The fit 
indices for each sub-factor measurement model (except for the Employee Norms sub­
factor) indicated that each sub-factor demonstrated a moderate or well fit. The Employee
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Norms sub-factor was unable to be analyzed independently because it only consists of 
two measured items and therefore, is an underidentified model.
Table 3.7 Pay Communication Model Fit Indices from Amos (Study 3)
Measurement Model x2 df CFI NFI GFI RMSEA AVE
Cronbach’s
a
Pay Policy Existence 311.76 27 .95 .95 .89 .13 74% .96
sub-factor
Pay Structure sub­ 70.32 9 .98 .97 .96 .11 66% .92
factor
Organizational 13.77 5 .99 .99 .99 .05 57% .87
Norms sub-factor
Employee Norms - - - - - - 59% .74
sub-factor
1-factor model 4000.54 209 .67 .66 .51 .17 67% .98
2-factor model 1878.10 208 .86 .84 .74 .12 67% .98
3-factor model 1669.67 206 .87 .86 .76 .11 67% .98
4-factor model 1143.85 205 .92 .90 .85 .09 67% .98
Note: N = 6 \ l .
Convergent validity, the extent to which the items of a construct share a high 
proportion of variance in common, for each sub-factor was determined. Three methods 
were used to establish convergent validity: item or factor loadings (at least .5 or higher), 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE; at least 50% or higher), and reliability by means of 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (at least .70 or above). Each sub-factor’s item loadings are 
shown in Figure 3.1, while the AVE’s and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are shown in 
Table 3.7. Each sub-factor had significant item loadings of .65 or higher with only two 
items loading below .70. Additionally, the AVE for the sub-factors ranged from .57 to .74 
and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranged from .74 to .96. Therefore, each sub-factor 
exhibits convergent validity.
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Figure 3.1 Sub-Factor Correlations and Factor Loadings from Amos (Study 3)
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A second-order CFA was conducted to determine whether the Pay 
Communication construct was better represented by the 4-factor model, 3-factor model,
2-factor model or 1-factor model (where pay communication is a first-order latent 
variable). The fit of each measurement model was evaluated using the same Model Fit 
indices (e.g., CFI, NFI, GFI, RMSEA, y?) used for analyzing each sub-factor 
independently. As shown in Table 3.7, the 4-factor model demonstrates a better fit for the 
second-order latent variable pay communication than the 3-factor model, 2-factor model, 
and 1-factor model. Additionally, each of the four sub-factors (first-order latent variables) 
have a significant (p<0.001) and positive loading on the second-order latent variable, 
ranging from .45 to .88 (refer to Figure 3.2). Furthermore, all of the sub-factors have 
significant (p<0.001) correlations with each other (refer to Figure 3.1). Therefore, the 
four sub-factors demonstrate a convergence on a common underlying construct (Lages, 
Lages, and Lages 2005), which further suggests a second-order model accounts for the 
data better than a first-order model (or 1-factor model). Based on these results (e.g., the 
overall fit indices, the first-order latent variables factor loadings, and the sub-factors 
correlations), the 4-factor model displays the better fit.
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Figure 3.2 Second-Order 4-Factor Model of Pay Communication from Amos (Study 3)
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Stage 2: Convergent and Discriminant
Validity
Convergent validity exists when a measure covaries with other measures alleging 
to assess the same or similar construct in that scores on the pay communication scale 
developed in this paper should be relatively highly correlated with scores on other pay 
communication, pay secrecy, and pay openness measures. Convergent validity was 
analyzed by comparing the Pay Communication scale developed in this paper with Noy’s 
(2007) POPS scale, Mulvey et al.’s (2002) Pay Knowledge scale, and Day’s (2006) Pay 
Communication scale.
Specifically, it is expected for each comparison pay communication scale to 
statistically correlate with the pay communication measure developed in this paper. 
Additionally, it is predicted that both Day’s (2006) and Mulvey et al.’s (2002) scales will 
have higher correlations with the Pay Structure sub-factor since both of these earlier 
scales and this scales sub-factor focus on the amount of pay information employees are 
provided and their understanding of that information. However, the significant 
correlations between Day’s (2006) and Mulvey et al.’s (2002) scales with the Pay 
Communication scale and its sub-factors are expected to be negative since both Day and 
Mulvey et al’s scales have pay openness representing the larger numbered anchors (the 
opposite of the Pay Communication scale). Also, Noy’s (2007) Organizational Norms 
sub-dimension is predicted to have a higher correlation with the Organizational Norms 
sub-factor; whereas, both the Enforcement and Policies and Rules sub-dimensions are 
expected to have a higher correlation with the Pay Policy Existence sub-factor. An 
overview of the correlation comparisons are presented in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8 Correlations between Pay Communication, Similar Measures, and Dissimilar 
Measures (Study 3)
Observed Correlations
Comparison Measure
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Noy’s POPS scale .93’ .43" .72" .45" .89"
Noy’s Policies and Rules sub-factor .93" .39” .67" .44" .86"
Noy’s Enforcement sub-factor .91” .40" .64" .40" .85"
Noy’s Organizational Norms sub­
factor .76" .47" .79" .43" .83"
Mulvey’s Pay Knowledge scale -.34" -.84" -.31" -.34” -.58"
Day’s Pay Communication scale -.16" -.72" -.29 -.20" -.44"
Huselid’s HPWP scale -.10’ -.60" -.04 -.20" -.28”
Huselid’s Employee Skills and
Organizational Structures sub­ -.11" -.59" -.06 -.20" -.29"
dimension
Huselid’s Employee Motivation -.04 1 * * .03 .15" -.18"sub-dimension
Note:N=  611.
*p <.05. " p < .0 1 .
Results for Convergent Validity. Consistent with expectations, both Day’s (2006) 
and Mulvey et al’s (2002) scales are significantly negatively correlated (p < .01) with the 
Pay Communication scale and all four of the sub-factors. Additionally, both Day’s (2006) 
and Mulvey et al’s (2002) scales have the highest correlation with the Pay Structure sub­
factor as expected.
As predicted, Noy’s (2007) POPS scale and each of its sub-dimensions are 
significantly positively correlated (p < .01) with the Pay Communication scale and each 
of its sub-factors. Furthermore and as expected, both the Enforcement and Policies and 
Rules sub-dimensions have the highest correlation with the Pay Policy Existence sub­
factor. Contrary to expectations, Noy’s (2007) Organizational Norms sub-dimension has
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the highest correlation with the overall Pay Communication scale, with the next highest 
correlation being the Organizational Norms sub-factor. Thus, evidence of convergent 
validity is provided for the Pay Communication scale.
Discriminant validity exists when the measure does not covary with other 
measures alleged to assess different constructs in that scores on a particular scale should 
either not be related or only slightly correlated with scores on other construct measures. 
Discriminant validity was analyzed by comparing the Pay Communication scale 
developed in this paper with a modified adaptation of Huselid’s (1995) High Performance 
Work Practices (HPWP) measure, which consists of two sub-dimensions. The first sub­
dimension is referred to as Employee Skills and Organizational Structures and the second 
is labeled Employee Motivation. This measure was utilized for discriminant validity 
because it analyzes organizational work practices that are dissimilar from pay 
communication practices. Therefore, Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale is expected to have 
low, yet most likely still significant (due to the both scales encompassing organizational 
practices), correlations with the Pay Communication scale.
Although the correlation comparison method is a common approach in 
determining discriminant validity, it does not provide strong evidence of discriminant 
validity as two distinct constructs may be related (e.g., have a high correlation) due to 
some underlying theoretical reasoning (Hair et al. 2010). Therefore, discriminant validity 
was also analyzed by comparing the shared variance (e.g., the square of the correlation) 
among the Pay Communication scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale to each of the 
scales’ AVE. The logic of this notion is that a construct (e.g., Pay Communication or 
HPWP) should not explain more of the variance it shares with another construct than the
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average variance extracted from its own scale items. Thus, discriminant validity is 
demonstrated when the squared correlation estimate of two constructs is less than the 
AVE of each of those constructs (Fomell and Larcker 1981; Hair et al. 2010).
Results for Discriminant Validity. The results of the correlation comparison 
between the Pay Communication scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale show that the 
overall HPWP scale and its two sub-dimensions do significantly correlate with the Pay 
Communication scale and most of its sub-factors (refer to Table 3.8). Specifically, the 
overall HPWP scale and the Employee Skills and Organizational Structures sub­
dimension significantly negatively correlate with the overall Pay Communication scale (p 
< .01), the Pay Structure sub-factor (p < .01), the Employee Norms sub-factor (p < .01), 
and the Pay Policy Existence sub-factor (p < .05 and p < .01, respectively). The 
Employee Motivation sub-dimension significantly negatively correlates with the overall 
Pay Communication scale (p < .01) and the Pay Structure sub-factor (p < .01), and has a 
significant positive correlation with the Employee Norms sub-factor (p < .01). Neither the 
overall HPWP scale nor its two sub-dimensions significantly correlate with the 
Organizational Norms sub-factor. Although the HPWP scale and its sub-dimensions 
significantly correlate with the Pay Communication scale and most of its sub-dimensions, 
the correlations are smaller (except for those regarding the Pay Structure sub-factor) than 
the correlations the Pay Communication scale has with other pay communication 
measures (e.g., Noy 2007). The larger correlations between the HPWP scale and its sub­
dimensions with the Pay Structure sub-factor are not surprising since both the sub-factor 
and the HPWP scale measure different organizational practices.
137
The comparison of the shared variance (e.g., the square of the correlation) among 
the Pay Communication scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale to each of the scales’ 
AVE was also analyzed. As shown in Table 3.9, the squared correlation of each pair (the 
Pay Communication scale or a sub-factor and the HPWP scale or a sub-dimension) was 
lower than the AVE for each of the constructs involved. Thus, evidence of discriminate 
validity is provided for the Pay Communication scale.
Table 3.9 Squared Correlations and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for Pay 
Communication and Dissimilar Measures (Study 3)
Squared Correlations
- a  C3<t> 13 oo> |3 5?
« 'B 2 " 2 8=3o  g  P e a S  o  6  >>*P 2g g « |  o S
& a “  s  z  I  *<2 w  5* g? w  |
Comparison Measure ^  O Q
Huselid’s HPWT scale 
Huselid’s Employee Skills 
and Organizational 
Structures sub-dimension
AVE
40.2%
40.5%
74.5%
.01
.01
65.9%
.36
.35
56.6%
.00
.00
58.6%
.04
.04
66.6%
.08
.08
Table 3.9 (Continued)
Huselid’s Employee 39.4% .00 .22 .00 .02 .03Motivation sub-dimension
Note: Numbers in boldface indicate Average Variance Extracted for that construct. 
N =  611.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to develop a Pay Communication scale that 
evaluated all aspects of pay communication practices involving pay secrecy and pay 
openness. This objective was achieved as the scale development and validation process
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was followed precisely and the Pay Communication scale and its sub-dimensions 
demonstrated construct validity.
The stage development and validation process encompassed three multistage 
studies. Study 1 consisted of two stages. The first stage involved having Human Resource 
practitioners that were members of the Society of Human Resource Management 
generate items pertaining to all aspects of pay communication practices (pay secrecy and 
pay openness). This stage generated 79 items that covered multiple aspects of pay 
communication practices. The second stage entailed having a panel of experts (both 
Ph.D.’s and doctoral students) evaluate the items generated in the first stage on three 
criteria to reduce the items into a manageable representation of pay communication. The 
evaluations of the generated items were on the extent to which each item was consistent 
with the pay communication description (either pay secrecy or pay openness), its 
generalizability to a wide variety of organizations and occupations, and its clarity and 
conciseness with editing of the items being allowed. This process resulted in 42 items.
Study 2 involved further refining the items over two stages. The first stage 
analyzed the inter-item correlations and variances of the items. This process resulted in 
the removal of 4 items, yielding 38 items. The second stage examined the 
interrelationships (factor weight and factor loadings) of the items in an exploratory factor 
analysis. A principal axis factor analysis with a direct oblimon rotation was used to 
evaluate the items. This process yielded 22 items loading on four distinct factors, which 
were labeled Pay Policy Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational Norms, and Employee 
Norms.
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Study 3 analyzed and confirmed the proposed scale and its dimensionality over 
two stages. The first stage involved conducting a confirmatory factor analysis of the 
proposed scale and each sub-dimension. Additionally, the 4-factor model was compared 
to a 3-factor model, a 2-factor model, and a 1-factor model. This process confirmed that 
the overall Pay Communication scale along with each sub-dimension demonstrated a 
good fit and reliability. The 4-factor model was identified as having a better fit than the
3-factor model, the 2-factor model, and the 1-factor model. The second stage entailed the 
final evaluation of construct validation by providing evidence that the Pay 
Communication scale has convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity was 
successfully determined by comparing the correlations between the Pay Communication 
scale and other pay communication scales (e.g., Day 2006; Mulvey et al. 2002; Noy 
2007). Evidence of discriminant validity was provided by analyzing the correlations 
between the Pay Communication scale and a High Performance Work Practice scale 
(Huselid, 1995). Thus, the Pay Communication scale developed in this paper 
demonstrated construct validity.
The development of this Pay Communication scale contributes to the literature by 
providing researchers with an inclusive measure that has the ability to accurately measure 
many different aspects of pay secrecy and pay openness practices. This scale 
encompasses all of the aspects that previous pay communication measures have included, 
even though some of the facets are not represented by many items. Additionally, this 
scale has a potentially important function in the pay communication research by helping 
future researchers build on the limited and sometimes conflicting earlier findings of 
studies of pay communication. A possible reason for the underdevelopment and
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inconsistency in the existing research may be due to the lack of an inclusive pay 
communication measure, which this paper hopes to resolve by providing a 
comprehensive pay communication scale.
Limitations
Although tremendous efforts were taken to strengthen this study’s scale 
development methodology, there are some limitations that need to be discussed. First, the 
pay communication items generated in Study 1 were produced by members of a 
Louisiana SHRM chapter. Therefore, microcultural differences may lead to a discrepancy 
in the terminology, comprehension, and participants’ perceptions and reactions to pay 
communication practices (e.g. pay secrecy and pay openness approaches). Additionally, 
all of this study’s participants worked in their employer’s Human Resources department 
and possessed at least a Bachelor’s degree. Therefore, there is a possibility that the 
phrasing of some items are more complex than someone possessing less education or HR 
experience would comprehend. For instance, the understanding of certain key words, 
such as pay structure or model, may be difficult for less educated individuals or those 
outside of the Human Resources department.
Another limitation may be that the items are based on self-report and the 
participant’s perceptions rather than the actuality of the employing organization’s pay 
communication practices. However, some participants may not have knowledge of 
certain pay communication practices (such as the existence of a pay secrecy policy or 
availability of pay information) or a concern for such practices; therefore, reliance on 
participant’s perceptions is considered more necessary and important than gathering 
actual pay communication practices information from participant’s employers.
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The possibility that all aspects of pay communication may not be included in the 
final scale may also be a limitation. For instance, the availability of a job’s pay average or 
median, all of the organizational jobs’ pay ranges, and all of the organizational jobs’ pay 
averages are not represented in the final scale. However, the more common forms are 
presented in the scale.
The fact that the Employee Norms sub-dimension consists of only two items is 
another limitation. However, the researcher is confident that future studies could exclude 
this sub-dimension if desired without any problems or difficulties in regards to the 
models fit or ability to accurately assess pay communication practices. Additionally, 
future research may further develop this sub-dimension by adding additional items.
The generalizability of this scale to countries outside of the U.S. is also a 
limitation. Since all of the participants in Study 1 and Study 3 and the majority of the 
participants in Study 2 were U.S. residents the scale may not have the ability to properly 
and accurately measure pay communication practices of organizations residing in other 
countries.
A final limitation is the data collection methods used in this research was 
completely online. Therefore, this research has an underrepresentation of employees 
lacking internet access. Nonetheless, the researcher believes this did not affect or bias the 
scale development process in any manner.
Future Research
Despite these limitations, there are many future directions for the pay 
communication literature. First, the utilization of this Pay Communication scale should 
aid the pay communication literature in its further expansion. By having this validated
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pay communication scale, the literature should flourish and prosper since it will be easier 
to gather information about pay communication practices. Additionally, this scale should 
assist in fiirther developing the pay communication literature as it allows researchers to 
analyze multiple levels of pay communication practices in one study.
Another future avenue involves the comparison between the overall Pay 
Communication scale and the scale without the presence of the Employee Norms sub­
dimension by analyzing both measures’ model fit and ability to accurately and 
successfully predict employee’s attitudes and behaviors.
Reanalyzing prior conflicting findings in the pay communication literature, such 
as those involving the job satisfaction outcome, is also a future route for research 
utilizing this scale. Since some of the previous studies conflict with one another, this 
scale could help identify whether pay secrecy has a significantly negative or positive 
impact on those employee attitudes or behaviors.
The generalizability of this scale to other countries is a final future path that will 
be discussed. This scale should be tested in multiple countries to identify its usefulness 
and ability to successfully predict non-U.S. employee outcomes. However, the Pay 
Communication scale may need to be modified since labor laws differ across countries.
CHAPTER 4
PAY COMMUNICATION AND WORKPLACE DEVIANCE:
THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF AN UNLAWFUL 
ORGANIZATIONAL PAY PRACTICE
Organizations vary in the pay communication practices they utilize, with the 
majority of U.S. organizations favoring the pay secrecy approach rather than the pay 
openness approach (Balkin and Gomz-Mejia 1985; Hmext.com Survey 2001; Lawler 
1981; Scott et al. 2003). However, Lawler (e.g., 1965a, 2003) and other researchers (e.g., 
Colella et al. 2007) have spent decades attempting to demonstrate the negative effects of 
pay secrecy by showing how it causes misestimations of others’ pay (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 
1966), pay dissatisfaction (e.g., Lawler 1967), and reduced performance (e.g., Bamburger 
and Belogolovsky 2010), among other things.
This objective of this paper is to further demonstrate the negative effects of pay 
secrecy practices by analyzing the relationship pay secrecy has with workplace deviance. 
Specifically, pay secrecy is expected to be positively related to workplace deviance. 
Additionally, the four sub-dimensions of organizational justice (e.g., distributive and 
procedural justice) along with two forms of trust (e.g., organizational and managerial 
trust) are anticipated to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace 
deviance. Continuance commitment (measured as lack of perceived job alternatives) is
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predicted to have an interaction effect on the pay secrecy-workplace deviance 
relationship.
Hypotheses are presented and analyzed using moderated hierarchical regression, 
yielding support for the direct relationship and mediating relationships. Additionally, 
partial support was found for the moderating relationship. Limitations and future 
directions are discussed.
Literature Review
Pay communication is the compensation practice that determines when, how, and 
which pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay 
levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees and 
possibly outsiders (termed organizational restrictions) and whether discussions involving 
pay information are permitted amongst employees and possibly with outsiders (termed 
employee restrictions). The goal of pay communication practices are to support 
organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely and 
Bierman 2003), such as increased performance.
Pay communication practices differ among organizations as the degree of these 
practices vary by the amount and type of pay information provided or withheld to 
employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005). Therefore, 
pay communication practices exist along a continuum and appear in a variety of forms 
(Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1981; Lawler and Jenkins 1992; Patten 
1978). The two anchors (or commonly acknowledged practices) of the pay 
communication continuum are pay secrecy and pay openness. The extent to which a pay
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secrecy or pay openness practice is utilized depends on the needs and strategic goals of 
the organization.
Both pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices consist of two 
aspects. Pay openness is an organizational practice that generally involves (1) the 
organization distributing most, if not all, pay information to employees on a regular basis 
(usually at specific time intervals such as yearly) or upon request, and (2) employees 
being allowed to discuss their personal pay information with other organizational 
members (and possibly with outsiders).
Consequently, pay secrecy is an organizational practice that generally (1) 
prohibits the organization (and management) from distributing and communicating most, 
if not all, pay information to employees (Bamburger and Belogolovsky 2010; Colella et 
al. 2007; deCarufel 1986), and (2) involves the adoption of an organizational policy 
(usually referred to as a pay secrecy policy but also labeled as pay confidentiality rules; 
(Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman 2003)) that discourages or forbids 
employees to discuss their personal pay information with other organizational members 
and possibly with outsiders (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Bierman and Gely 
2004; Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003; Thompson and 
Pronsky 1975). A pay secrecy policy practice is usually the most detectable pay 
communication practice among employees and is expressed either in writing (such as in 
employee manuals) or verbally (such as during an employee orientation or employee 
meeting). Organizations may attempt to obtain compliance with a pay secrecy policy 
practice by compelling employees to sign a pledge stating they will not discuss pay 
information with other organizational members (and possibly with outsiders) or by
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having policy violators suffer disciplinary consequences (such as termination; (Gomez- 
Mejia and Balkin 1992)). The pay secrecy policy aspect intensifies as the policy becomes 
more concrete or the violation repercussions become more severe.
A variety of pay communication practices (such as mild pay secrecy or moderate 
pay openness) reside along the continuum between the complete pay secrecy anchor and 
complete pay openness anchor. For instance, a mild pay secrecy practice may involve 
employees being provided with only their personal pay information, and pay range and 
pay average for their personal pay level, and no existence of a pay secrecy policy; 
whereas, a moderate pay openness practice may involve employees being supplied with 
their personal pay information, and pay ranges and pay averages for their pay level and 
adjacent pay levels in the pay structure.
Despite pay secrecy usually being considered a valuable organizational practice, 
the NLRB and the federal court system have consistently ruled pay secrecy policy 
practices to be in violation of the NLRA and thus, illegal (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely 
and Bierman 2003). Specifically, a pay secrecy policy practice violates sections 7 and 8 
(aXl) of the NLRA since it prohibits employees from discussing their employment 
conditions (such as pay information) with other organizational members (King 2003). 
However, a pay secrecy policy practice does not violate the NLRA when it only pertains 
to managers or is worded to be understood as protecting an organizations’ confidential 
information (such as trade secrets or customer information) by prohibiting its disclosure 
to unauthorized individuals or entities.
Pay secrecy has been associated with several undesirable attitudinal and 
behavioral outcomes, such as lowered pay satisfaction (e.g., Thompson and Pronsky
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1975), and reduced motivation (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967) and performance (e.g., 
Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Futrell and Jenkins 1978). These findings should 
come as no surprise since the organization is utilizing an unlawful labor practice and 
hence demonstrating a disregard for their employees’ rights. These organizations are 
setting a bad example for employees and therefore, they cannot expect their employees to 
behave ethically and desirably when they are themselves disobeying the rules and 
behaving selfishly. Therefore, pay secrecy practices may result in undesirable employee 
behaviors, such as workplace deviance. Deviant behaviors, such as employee theft or 
withholding effort, may result from employers’ modeling of disregard for rules and lack 
of concern for employees’ rights. Workplace deviance has not, to this point, been linked 
with pay communication practices (specifically, pay secrecy practices). This study 
attempts to fill that void.
Hypotheses Development 
Workplace deviance is defined as purposeful, norm-violating behaviors which 
have the potential to harm the organization and/or its members (Robinson and Bennett 
1995). There are two main types of workplace deviance: interpersonal deviance (deviant 
acts directed toward organizational members) and organizational deviance (deviant acts 
directed toward the organization; (Bennett and Robinson 2000; Robinson and Bennett 
1995,1997)). Some examples of interpersonal deviance are blaming colleagues and 
verbal abuse; whereas, some organizational deviance examples are leaving work early 
and stealing merchandise or equipment (Bennett and Robinson 2000; Robinson and 
Bennett 1995). Workplace deviance is an important organizational concept since it is 
estimated to cost organizations millions, if not billions, of dollars annually (Case 2000;
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Harris and Ogbonna 2006). Additionally, prior research suggests that a majority of 
employees have participated in some form of workplace deviance (Harper 1990; Harris 
and Ogbonna 2002; Slora 1991), with nearly all organizations having suffered from one 
of the most costly deviant acts, employee theft (Case 2000; Coffin 2003). For these 
reasons, identifying the causes of workplace deviance is imperative for organizations and 
their success.
Pay secrecy is expected to be related to workplace deviance for several reasons. 
First, human instincts tell us that the connotation of a “secret” is that something is wrong 
or bad and consequently, should have detriments. Therefore, pay secrecy leads to the 
belief that something is wrong in regards to the compensation system, in that if the 
compensation system was fair then why is pay information being hidden? According to 
equity theory (Adams 1965), employees continuously compare their ratios of inputs (such 
as education, skills, and effort) to outputs (such as pay, benefits, and security) with the 
perceived ratios of referent others to determine the fairness of their pay. Additionally, 
equity theory claims that employees are more concerned with the relative value rather 
than the absolute value of their outcomes (such as pay; (Gerhart and Rynes 2003)). 
However, pay secrecy interferes with an employees’ ability to make accurate pay 
comparisons since it prohibits the needed pay information from being known. 
Consequently, pay secrecy causes employees to play a guessing game in where they and 
others are positioned within the pay structure. An underlying assumption of this pay 
estimation guessing game is the presence of unfairness due to the possibility of pay 
discrimination, bias, and/or blatant mistakes (Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,1990).
This unfair assumption arises from thoughts such as “if pay is fair and there is no bias,
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discrimination, or errors then why am I not provided the information?” Therefore, pay 
secrecy is likely to cause perceptions of pay unfairness or injustice, particularly under­
reward inequity where the employees’ ratio is less than (or smaller) than the referent 
others’ ratio. Additionally, employees are more inclined to generate inaccurate 
estimations of others’ pay under pay secrecy conditions due to the required information 
needed to generate accurate pay estimations being unavailable, hidden, or otherwise 
unknown (Domstein 1989; Lawler 1965a, 1965b). For instance, prior research has found 
that under pay secrecy conditions employees tend to overestimate their subordinates’ and 
peers’ pay (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967,1972; Mahoney and Weitzel 1978; Milkovich 
and Anderson 1972); thus, escalating the sense of unfairness and pay injustice, 
specifically inciting perceptions of an under-reward inequity. Equity theory argues that 
unfairness perceptions (specifically, under-reward inequity) create feelings of tension and 
anger within employees (Homans 1961; Jaques 1961), which in turn, cause employees to 
attempt to reduce the dissonance and to restore justice (and equity) by engaging in a 
variety of cognitive and/or behavioral methods (such as modifying or distorting inputs 
and outcomes). Feelings of relative deprivation and anger may cause employees to 
engage in selfish and uncooperative behaviors (such as workplace deviance) in order to 
restore equity and compensate for the under-reward inequity. Additionally, prior research 
has demonstrated that employees have a propensity to engage in deviant behaviors when 
they are reacting to perceptions of unfairness or injustice (e.g., Ambrose, Seabright, and 
Schminke 2002; Aquino and Douglas 2003; Aquino, Galperin, and Bennett 2004;
Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield 1999; Greenberg 1990a, 1993; Harder 1992; Skarlicki and
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Folger 1997; Thau, Crossley, Bennett, and Sczesny 2007; Zoghbi-manrigue-de-lara 
2010). Therefore, pay secrecy is expected to be related to workplace deviance.
Another reason for the expected relationship between pay secrecy and workplace 
deviance is due to feelings of uncertainty. A “secret” creates uncertainty for individuals 
with whom the information is withheld. Therefore, pay secrecy creates uncertainty for 
(uninformed) employees since they are unaware of their personal organizational value in 
comparison to other organizational members. According to uncertainty management 
theory (Lind and van den Bos 2002; van den Bos and Lind 2002), employees have a 
natural predisposition to manage or decrease uncertainty by engaging in certain coping 
mechanisms, such as relying on fairness information and perceptions. These fairness 
perceptions assist employees in managing the uncertainty because it relieves employee’s 
fears of being taken advantage of in a social exchange with the organization by giving 
employees confidence that they will obtain desired outcomes (Lind and van den Bos 
2002; Thau, Aquino, and Wittek 2007). However, as previously argued, perceptions of 
pay fairness are likely to be negative, specifically creating an under-reward inequity, 
under pay secrecy conditions. Additionally, uncertainty management theory asserts that 
when uncertainty is accompanied with unfairness perceptions, employees will attempt to 
reduce the uncertainty by taking control of their own future and outcomes through 
participation in selfish and possibly harmful behaviors and acts (Lind and van den Bos 
2002). Therefore, one way employees may react to the enhanced sense of injustice 
brought on by uncertainty is to engage in workplace deviance (Colella et al. 2007; Lind 
and van den Bos 2002).Supporting uncertainty management theory, previous research has
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shown that uncertainty joined with unfairness perceptions increase workplace deviance 
(e.g., Thau, Aquino, et al. 2007).
Finally, employees (in the U.S.) believe they have the right to free speech (due to 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), such as deciding who they discuss their 
employment conditions (such as pay information) with, and take any intrusion on this 
privilege personally and find it threatening. Pay secrecy challenges and intrudes on the 
employee’s freedom and privileges (or what they believe their rights to be) by prohibiting 
employees from discussing their personal pay information with other organizational 
members (and possibly with outsiders) and thereby, creating a sense of powerlessness. 
Reactance theory (Brehm 1966) argues that when the employee’s autonomy or freedom 
to engage in a certain behavior (such as discuss pay information) is threatened, reduced, 
or eliminated, the behavior becomes more enticing. Additionally, reactance theory argues 
that employees will become motivated to restore their power and freedom, and 
consequently, engage in a “reactance” (Brehm 1966). Moreover, reactance theory 
suggests that employees who feel constrained and incapable of improving their powerless 
situation may become frustrated which, in turn, causes a negative and destructive form of 
“reactance” to occur, such as workplace deviance (Allen and Greenberger 1980; Mitchell, 
Vogel, Bennett, and Crossley 2011; Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder 1982; Spector 1978). 
Previous research has demonstrated that perceptions of powerlessness are associated with 
increases in workplace deviance (e.g., Bennett 1998).
Based on the above arguments, pay secrecy is expected to be associated with 
higher levels of workplace deviance since employees are attempting to offset negative
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emotions (such as uncertainty, powerlessness, or anger) or retaliate for perceived 
injustices. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Pay secrecy is positively related to workplace deviance.
Being that the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance is to 
some extent based on fairness perceptions, organizational justice dimensions (such as 
distributive and procedural justice) may serve as possible mediators.
Mediators
Organizational justice (Greenberg 1987) is a multidimensional construct that 
attempts to use fairness judgments or perceptions about the organizations’ treatment 
toward the employee (such as pay outcomes or pay process explanations) to explain the 
employee’s engagement in certain organizational attitudes and behavior (Cloutier and 
Vilhuber 2007; Colquitt 2001; Greenberg 1990b), such as workplace deviance (Cohen- 
Charash and Spector 2001; Johns 2001). Organizational justice principles suggest that 
employee attitudes and behaviors are typically exhibited in a reciprocative and 
complementary manner to that of the organizations’ treatment. Therefore, positive 
judgments or perceptions of fairness suggest a social exchange relationship and are 
expected to produce cooperative and organizationally beneficial attitudes and behaviors 
(such as organizational commitment and trust; (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; 
DeConinck 2010)); whereas, negative judgments or perceptions of injustice propose an 
economical exchange relationship (Organ 1990) and are inclined to incite uncooperative, 
selfish and potentially harmful attitudes and behaviors (such as workplace deviance;
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(Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Johns 2001)). There are four distinct organizational 
justice dimensions (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001): distributive justice (Adams 
1965), procedural justice (Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980; Thibaut and Walker 
1975), and interactional justice (Bies and Moag 1986) which is comprised of 
informational and interpersonal justice (Greenberg 1990a, 1993). All of the dimensions 
are expected to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Distributive justice refers to the fairness perceptions associated with the outcomes 
(such as pay) distributed (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001; Greenberg 1990a). 
Distributive justice (or injustice) is determined in the same manner as previously 
described for equity theory, where employees compare their personal outcomes to the 
outcomes of referent others. However, pay secrecy prevents employees from knowing the 
outcomes (or pay) of other organizational members. Thus, pay outcome inferences are 
based on a guessing game where pay estimations are mainly derived from innuendo and 
gossip (deCarufel 1986). As previously mentioned, employees have a tendency to make 
inaccurate pay estimations (such as overestimate peers’ and subordinates’ pay) under pay 
secrecy conditions (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967,1972; Mahoney and Weitzel 1978; 
Milkovich and Anderson 1972), which lead to negative pay comparisons and perceptions 
of unfairness and injustice.
As previously mentioned, equity theory (Adams 1965) states that employees 
continuously compare their ratios of inputs (such as education, skills, and effort) to 
outputs (such as pay, benefits, and security) with the perceived ratios of referent others 
(such as peers or subordinates) to determine the fairness of their pay. However, 
employees are unable to generate accurate pay comparisons under pay secrecy conditions
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due to certain pay information about referent others being concealed. Therefore, pay 
secrecy is likely to generate inaccurate pay comparisons, particularly an under-reward 
inequity, causing negative perceptions of distributive justice. Additionally, equity theory 
(Adams 1965) argues that perceptions of injustice (or an under-reward inequity) will 
cause employees to feel anger, tension, and relative deprivation (Homans 1961; Jaques 
1961) which, in turn, leads employees to engage in a variety of cognitive and/or 
behavioral methods to reduce these negative feelings and restore fairness. These different 
techniques used to counteract or compensate for the perceived inequity or unfairness are 
likely to be selfish, deviant, and possibly harmful behaviors, such as workplace deviance 
(e.g., Ambrose et al. 2002; Aquino and Douglas 2003; Aquino et al. 2004; Aquino et al. 
1999; Greenberg 1990a, 1993; Harder 1992; Skarlieki and Folger 1997; Thau, Crossley et 
al. 2007; Zoghbi-manrigue-de-lara 2010). Therefore, distributive justice is expected to 
mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is presented:
Hypothesis 2a: Perceptions o f  distributive justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness associated with the process and 
procedures used to determine outcome distribution (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001; 
Greenberg 1990a). There are several criteria (or standards) that a process should possess 
in order for the process to be perceived as fair or justified: accuracy, consistency, bias 
suppression or neutrality, representation of all entities affected, comprehensiveness,
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social morality, and opportunity to correct mistakes (Folger and Konovsky 1989; 
Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980). However, perceptions of procedural justice are 
likely to be affected by pay secrecy since the existence of the criteria (such as accurate 
and unbiased) cannot be verified due to a lack of pay information (Noy 2007). Pay 
secrecy hinders an employees’ ability to ensure pay processes use only accurate and all 
pertinent information and that the same procedures are used for all organizational 
members (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Greenberg 1990b). Further, pay secrecy 
implies that the pay process suffers from bias, errors, or discrimination because pay 
information is hidden and employees are unable to undoubtedly know the process is free 
from such blunders (Andersson-Straberg et al. 2007; Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; 
Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,1990). Therefore, 
perceptions of procedural injustice are likely to prevail under pay secrecy conditions 
since employees cannot determine that the procedures used to determine their outcomes 
reflect reality and were accurate, unbiased, and consistent with other employees’ 
procedures (e.g., Noy 2007).
Informational justice refers to the amount, quality, and timing of information 
provided to employees that explain the procedures used to determine outcomes (Bies et 
al. 1993; Greenberg 1993). Perceptions of informational justice (rather than injustice) are 
likely to prevail when the information is accurate, complete, and given in a timely 
manner. Pay secrecy is clearly expected to negatively affect informational justice since it 
restricts the amount of pay information given to employees. Additionally, informational 
unfairness perceptions are likely to emerge when the available pay information has flaws
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(such as inaccuracy, incompleteness, or contains errors) or is given in an untimely 
manner (such as six months after pay decisions are made).
Interpersonal justice refers to the extent to which employees are treated with 
politeness, dignity, and respect from the organization (usually from their immediate boss 
or superiors) when procedures used to determine their outcomes are executed (Greenberg 
1990b, 1993). Employees receiving considerate and courteous treatment when being 
provided pay information are likely to experience positive perceptions of interpersonal 
justice. Pay secrecy is likely to lead to perceptions of interpersonal injustice since 
superiors are not allowed to supply pay information which may cause them to appear 
rude, insensible, or disrespectftd to employees and their feelings.
Since pay secrecy practices may have implications for procedural, informational, 
and interpersonal justice, fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001) explains how these 
judgments may play a role in the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship. Fairness 
heuristic theory (Lind 2001) claims that an employees’ overall perception of specific 
organizational fairness judgments (such as overall procedural, informational, or 
interpersonal justice not necessarily pertaining to pay) will assist employees in making 
inferences about more specific fairness judgments (such as pay process, pay information, 
and treatment when receiving pay information) when there is a lack of information 
regarding these specific judgments. Therefore, employees will use their judgments about 
other organizational factors (such as procedures, information, and treatment regarding 
other organizational matters) to create inferences about the pay processes, pay 
information, and treatment when receiving pay information (such as procedural, 
informational, and interpersonal justice in regards to pay). Consequently, employees may
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use fairness perceptions involving promotion or disciplinary processes to generate 
procedural justice perceptions (in regards to pay). Additionally, informational justice 
perceptions (in regards to pay) may be created by the employees’ perception of available 
information about promotion opportunities, while treatment during employee meetings 
may generate interpersonal justice perceptions (in regards to pay).
Furthermore, fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001) argues that when other 
organizational factors (such as procedures, information, and treatment regarding other 
organizational matters) cannot assist in generating inferences about fairness then other 
justice (dimension) perceptions (such as distributive justice) will assist in making 
inferences, even when these other justice perceptions do not pertain or relate to the 
missing fairness judgment. Therefore, when distributive justice is viewed as being unfair 
(or fair) then procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice will also appear as being 
unfair (or fair). As previously argued, distributive justice is expected to be negative (or 
unfair) since pay secrecy is likely to generate inaccurate pay comparisons (such as under­
reward inequity). Therefore, the expected perceptions of distributive injustice may lead 
perceptions of procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice to be negative, 
resulting in feelings of injustices. Perceptions of injustice are likely to cause employees to 
feel anger and tension (Homans 1961) which, in turn, may lead employees to engage in 
deviant behaviors to restore justice. Thus, procedural, informational, and interpersonal 
justice may mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and employee deviance. Thus, 
the following hypotheses are presented:
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Hypothesis 2b: Perceptions ofprocedural justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Hypothesis 2c: Perceptions o f  interpersonal justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Hypothesis 2d: Perceptions o f  informational justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Along with these fairness perceptions, trust in the organizational setting may also 
play a role in the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship. Trust is defined as the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party (Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman 1995, p.712). The definition of trust involves two parties: the trustor (the 
trusting party such as the employee) and the trustee (the party to be trusted such as 
management and the employing organization; (Driscoll 1978; Mayer et al. 1995; Scott 
1980)). A trustee needs to be perceived as being “trustworthy” to gain the trustors’ 
confidence (or trust). Trustworthiness is best explained by three characteristics: ability 
(the skills that gives the trustee influence to achieve the trustors’ objective), benevolence 
(the degree to which the trustee wants to help, instead of just profit from the trustor), and 
integrity (the trustors’ approval regarding the set of principles that the trustee follows; 
(Mayer et al. 1995)). A trustee is considered “trustworthy” when high levels of all three
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characteristics are possessed. However, when a trustee is not perceived as “trustworthy,” 
the trustor distrusts the trustee. Trust ranges on a continuum with complete trust and 
absolute distrust being the opposing extremes on the continuum (Schoorman, Mayer, and 
Davis 2007). Additionally, trust can be acquired or proffered by individuals, groups, and 
organizations (Schoorman et al. 2007). Managerial trust refers to the amount of trust an 
employee has in his/her immediate boss and/or superiors. Organizational trust refers to 
the amount of trust an employee has in his/her employing organization.
An employees’ level of trust is based on past organizational treatment and the 
likelihood of future treatment being fairly similar (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Deutsch 
1958). Social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005) argues that a 
source’s attitudes and behaviors will be similarly reproduced to those exhibited from the 
original source during interactions. Therefore, when employees believe that management 
(such as their immediate supervisor) or their employing organization trusts (or distrusts) 
them, they will in return trust (or distrusts) management or the organization. Higher 
levels of (managerial or organizational) trust are likely to motivate employees to partake 
in certain attitudes and behaviors that are desired by management and/or the organization 
(e.g., cooperative behaviors such as organizational citizenship behaviors) in hopes of 
maintaining and further developing the relationship. However, lower levels of 
(managerial or organizational) trust (or distrust) are likely to cause employees to engage 
in selfish or uncooperative behaviors, such as workplace deviance (Thau, Crossley, et al. 
2007). Pay secrecy implies that the organization (and perhaps management) distrusts their 
employees since openness (e.g., no secrets) is needed for generating trust (Colella et al. 
2007; Lawler 1981; Mayer et al. 1995). Additionally, immediate supervisors may exhibit
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lower levels of employee trust (or distrust) under pay secrecy conditions when they do 
not supply employees with additional pay information upon their request When 
employees perceive management or the organization to be distrustful due to pay secrecy 
practices, employees are more likely to engage in workplace deviance since they cannot 
depend on management or the organization to make fair and sensible decisions involving 
pay. Therefore, the overall perception of (managerial or organizational) trust is expected 
to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Thus, the 
following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 3a: Perceptions o f  organizational trust mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Hypothesis 3b: Perceptions o f  managerial trust mediate the relationship between 
pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Along with these mediating variables, the relationship between pay secrecy and 
workplace deviance may be moderated by the employee’s continuance commitment. The 
overall model is shown in Figure 3.1.
Moderator
Even though prior research has not demonstrated a significant relationship 
between continuance commitment and workplace deviance (e.g., Gill, Meyer, Lee, Shin, 
and Yoon 2011; Haden, Caruth, and Oyler 2011), continuance commitment may play a 
significant moderating role in the pay secrecy and workplace deviance relationship.
Continuance commitment is a component of the organizational commitment 
conceptualization and consists of two aspects: (1) lack of perceived job alternatives, and 
(2) personal sacrifices or loss of side-bets and investments (Allen and Meyer 1990; 
Carson and Carson 2002; Taing, Granger, Groff, Jackson, and Johnson 2011). 
Specifically, the former factor is expected to moderate the relationship between pay 
secrecy and workplace deviance. The fewer job alternatives perceived by an employee, 
the stronger the employees’ level of continuance commitment to their employing 
organization. Additionally, employees experiencing higher levels of continuance 
commitment tend not to perform beyond what is required to maintain their employment 
(Meyer and Allen, 1997). In addition, employees with only a few job alternatives cannot 
risk their current employment.
Figure 4.1 Overall Proposed Model
Distributive Justice 
Procedural Justice 
Interpersonal Justice 
Informational Justice 
Organizational Trust 
Managerial Trust
Pay
Secrecy
Workplace
Deviance
Continuance
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Power dependence theoiy (Emerson 1972; Molm 2003) explains how continuance 
commitment may interact with the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace 
deviance. Power dependence theory argues that in an exchange relationship powerful 
employees have very little dependence on their partner (Emerson 1972). Consequently, 
employees who have power or many job opportunities will not be reliant on their current 
employment and thereby, their willingness to behave cooperatively with their employing 
organization will more likely be lower than those who are dependent on their job and 
have fewer job alternatives (Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 1999). The implication is 
that employees experiencing lower levels of continuance commitment have the option to 
leave their job if they want. Additionally, power dependence theory suggests that non­
powerful employees (or those who have few job alternatives) will behave rationally and 
cooperatively (such as by not participating in workplace deviance) since they do not want 
to put their current employment at risk even under pay secrecy conditions. However, 
employees experiencing lower levels of continuance commitment under pay secrecy 
conditions may not engage in deviant behaviors since, as was previously argued, they 
have multiple job opportunities and thereby, have the ability to quit their employment 
(and escape the pay secrecy practices) and easily find a different job. Therefore, since 
employees with many job alternatives have the ability to find new employment and those 
with few job alternatives cannot endanger their current employment, continuance 
commitment should mitigate, if not completely eliminate, the relationship between pay 
secrecy and workplace deviance. Thus, power dependence theory implies that the 
interaction between pay secrecy and continuance commitment will not impact workplace 
deviance. Based on this argument, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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Hypothesis 4: Continuance commitment moderates the relationship between pay  
secrecy and workplace deviance such that when continuance commitment is low 
and pay communication is high (e.g., pay secrecy), workplace deviance will be 
higher than when both continuance commitment and pay communication are 
high.
Methods
Sample
Participants were recruited using a third party online survey organization (e.g., 
Mechanical Turk). Those who completed the anonymous survey were compensated one 
dollar directly by the online survey organization. The respondents were completely 
anonymous to the researcher. There were 611 participants. The majority of the 
participants were female (57.9%), Caucasian (73.6%), workingfull-time (81.5%), had no 
labor union involvement for their job or any jobs in their organization (73.3%), and 
possessed at least a bachelor’s degree (70.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 
68 with over 40% of the participants being in their twenties and a third of the participants 
(33.4%) being in their thirties. The mean age was thirty-four. Most of the participants had 
been with their current employer for one to five years (55%) and were classified as an 
‘employee’ with no managerial duties (62.2%). Refer to table 3.6 for a complete 
overview of the descriptive statistics for the sample.
Procedures
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the 
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a 
box (refer to Appendix G). Additionally, participants were given instructions to answer
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all scale items and twelve demographic questions. Sixteen attentiveness screening items 
were also used to ensure participants were paying attention and responding to each 
question accurately (e.g., “Mark slightly agree for this item”).
Measures
Refer to Appendix P for the instructions and list of items associated with each 
construct’s scale.
Independent Variable. Pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) was 
assessed by using the 22-item scale that was developed in the preceding Chapter. This 
scale has four sub-dimensions: Pay Policy Existence (PPE), Pay Structure (PS), 
Organizational Norms (ON), and Employee Norms (EN). The overall Pay 
Communication scale along with each sub-dimension has demonstrated construct validity 
and appropriate Cronbach’s alphas of .98 (Pay Communication), .96 (PPE), .92 (PS), .87 
(ON), and .74 (EN). The scale was measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher overall scores represent pay 
secrecy practices, while lower overall scores represent pay openness practices.
Dependent Variable. Workplace deviance was measured with Bennett and 
Robinson’s (2000) scale with additional items from Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) 
typology added. This scale was used because previous research has shown it to have 
construct validity. There were twenty eight workplace deviance items with eleven 
representing interpersonal deviance (ID) items and seventeen representing organizational 
deviance (OD). Additionally, Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) workplace deviance scale 
had appropriate Cronbach’s alphas of .78 for interpersonal deviance and .81 for
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organizational deviance in the study used for their development. This study produced 
Cronbach’s alphas of .91 for workplace deviance, .88 for organizational deviance, and 
.87 for interpersonal deviance. All of the workplace deviance items were measured using 
a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (never), 1 (once a year), 2 (twice a year), 3 (several times a 
year), 4 (monthly), 5 (weekly), and 6 (daily).
Mediating Variables. All of the organizational justice dimensions were measured 
with Colquitt’s (2001) organizational justice scale, which subdivided into four scales 
analyzing the four separate dimensions of justice. Specifically, distributive justice was 
measured with four items which pertain to the degree of fairness employees perceive 
about their level of pay. Procedural justice was measured with seven items which pertain 
to the degree of fairness employees perceive about the processes used to determine their 
pay level. Informational justice was measured with five items which pertain to the 
adequacy of pay information communicated to employees, including the explanation of 
the pay processes. Interpersonal justice was measured with four items which pertain to 
the quality of treatment employees endure during the process of determining pay and/or 
communicating pay information. Colquitt’s (2001) measures were used because previous 
research has shown each measure to have construct and predictive validity for important 
organizational outcomes. Additionally, all of the justice measures had appropriate 
Cronbach’s alphas in the developmental research, ranging from .78 to .92 in the study 
involving students, and ranging from .90 to .93 in the study involving employees 
(Colquitt 2001). In this study, the Cronbach’s alphas range from .85 to .97. Additionally, 
all of the justice measures used a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (almost never), 
2 (to a small extent), 3 (somewhat), 4 (to a large extent), and 5 (always).
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Managerial trust was measured using Schoorman and Ballinger’s (2006) 7-item 
scale because it has displayed construct validity throughout previous research with an 
appropriate Cronbach’s alpha of .84 in the developmental research. The items pertain to 
the degree of trust employees have for their manager who determines their pay. This 
study produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .94. The scale was measured using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (neither 
agree nor disagree), 4 (somewhat agree), and 5 (strongly agree).
Organizational trust was measured using Robinson’s (1996) 7-item scale because 
it has demonstrated construct validity with the developmental research producing 
appropriate Cronbach’s alphas of .82 and .87. The items pertain to the degree of trust 
employees have for their employing organization. A Cronbach’s alpha of .94 was 
produced for this study. The scale was measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (neither agree nor disagree), 4 
(somewhat agree), and 5 (strongly agree).
Moderating Variable. Continuance commitment was measured using Carson and 
Carson’s (2002) 4-item Low Alternatives (lack of perceived job alternatives) scale 
because it has demonstrated construct validity. Additionally, the development study 
produced an appropriate Cronbach’s alpha of .74. In this study, a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 
was established. The items pertain to the extent of job alternatives or other job options 
employees currently have available. The scale was measured using a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (neither agree nor 
disagree), 4 (somewhat agree), and 5 (strongly agree).
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Additional Measures. Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) were 
included in the data collection to counteract the negative effects that may occur due to the 
unusual and potentially off-putting nature of the dependent variable (workplace 
deviance). OCBs were measured using an adaptation of Williams and Anderson’s (1991) 
14-item scale, which encompassed the two sub-dimensions of OCBs: OCBO (OCB- 
Organizations or generalized compliance) and OCBI (OCB-Individuals or altruism). 
Williams and Anderson’s (1991) scale was used because previous research has shown it 
to include both sub-dimensions and have construct validity. Additionally, the Cronbach’s 
alphas of the two sub-dimension measures were .88 for OCBI and .75 for OCBO in the 
study used for the scales development. The nature of the items was adapted to allow the 
participants to self-report the behaviors. Additionally, one of the OCBO items was 
reverse-coded. The items were measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale matching that 
used for the Workplace Deviance scale ranging from 0 (never), 1 (once a year), 2 (twice a 
year), 3 (several times a year), 4 (monthly), 5 (weekly), and 6 (daily).
Control Variables. Several demographic variables were controlled for in the 
analyses. Age (measured in categorical years: 1 = 18-19 years, 2 = 20-29 years, 3 = 30-39 
years, 4 = 40-49 years, 5 = 50-59 years, 6 = 60-68 years) and gender (female = 2, male = 
1) were controlled for since males (Hershcovis et al. 2007) and younger employees 
(Berry, Ones, and Sackett 2007; Ng and Feldman 2008) have been found to more likely 
participate in deviant behaviors. Job tenure (measured in categorical years: 1 = less than 1 
year, 2 = 1-5 years, 3 = 6-10 years, 4=11-15 years, 5 = 16-20 years, 6 = 21-25 years, 7 = 
26 years or more) and hours worked per week (measured in categories: 1 = less than 10 
hours per week, 2 = 10-20 hours per week, 3 = 21-30 [part-time] hours per week, 4 = 30
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[full-time]-40 hours per week, 5 = more than 40 hours per week) were also control 
variables since both may impact employee’s managerial and organizational trust due to 
having more time and opportunities to develop it (Gilbert and Tang 1998; More and 
Tzafrir 2009; Schoorman et al. 2007).
Results
The proposed hypotheses were tested utilizing hierarchical regression analysis. 
The predictor variables (e.g., independent, mediating, and moderating variables) were 
centered to reduce the effects of non-essential ill conditioning by having the mean 
represent a meaningful zero point for better result interpretation (Cohen, Cohen, West, 
and Aiken 2003). Additionally, a confirmatoiy factor analysis (CFA) using Amos 20 was 
conducted on each scale independently prior to testing the hypotheses to evaluate the fit 
of each scale’s measurement model (e.g., the relationship between the items and the 
factors). Several Model Fit indices (e.g., CFI, NFI, GFI, RMSEA, and x2) were used to 
evaluate the fit of each measure. The CFI, NFI, and GFI indicate a well-fitting model 
when values are closer to 1.0; whereas, the RMSEA indicates a well-fitting model when 
values are below .08 (Hair et al. 2010). Additionally, Cronbach’s alphas above .70 
demonstrate reliability (Hair et al. 2010). The majority of the scales demonstrated a well- 
fitting model with a few having a moderately-fitting model (refer to Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Measurement Model Fit Indices from Amos
Measurement Model x2 df CFI NFI GFI RMSEA AVE
Cronbach’s
a
Pay Communication 1143.85 205 .92 .90 .85 .09 67% .98
Pay Policy Existence 311.76 27 .95 .95 .89 .13 74% .96
Pay Structure 70.32 9 .98 .97 .96 .11 66% .92
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Organizational 13.77 5 .99 .99 .99 .05 57% .87
Norms
Employee Norms - - - - - - 59% .74
Distributive Justice 1.14 2 1.00 .99 .99 .00 80% .79
Procedural Justice 225.78 14 .88 .87 .89 .16 46% .86
Interpersonal Justice 11.93 2 1.00 .99 .99 .09 73% .91
Informational Justice 19.08 5 .99 .99 .99 .07 58% .87
Organizational Trust 186.22 14 .95 .95 .91 .14 71% .95
Managerial Trust 145.37 14 .86 .84 .93 .12 31% .74
Continuance 56.79 2 .95 .95 .95 .21 59% .85
Commitment
Workplace Deviance 3185.75 350 .61 .55 .61 .12 29% .92
Organizational 972.59 119 .76 .73 .80 .11 31% .88
Deviance
Interpersonal 520.92 44 .84 .83 .86 .13 43% .89
Deviance
Note: N =  611
The summary statistics, bivariate correlations, and Cronbach’s alphas are shown 
in Table 4.2. The results of the regression analyses for each hypothesis are shown in 
separate tables.
Table 4.2 Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alpha Reliabilities
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Gender 1.58 .49 -
2. Age 3.00 1.13 .10* -
3. Tenure 2.34 1.04 .00 .47” -
4. Hours worked per week 4.09 .86 -.19** .03 .22*’ -
5. Pay Communication 3.86 1.19 .07 .04 -.05 .03 (.94}
6. Pay Policy Existence 3.55 1.76 .03 .04 -.02 .10’ .89
7. Pay Structure 3.82 1.71 14** -.01 -.10*
r-~-©r .67”
8. Organizational Norms 4.53 1.61 -.01 .06 .01 .01 .82”
9. Employee Norms 4.33 1.71 .01 .01 -.02 .03 .37"
10. Distributive Justice 2.46 1.18 -.18** -.02 .09* .11” -.28"
11. Procedural Justice 2.92 .93 -.17’* -.05 .03 .03 -.34”
12. Interpersonal Justice 3.85 1.05 -.02 -.03 .05 -.01 -.30”
13. Informational Justice 3.20 1.02 -.11” -.01 .09* .09* -.36”
14. Organizational Trust 3.41 1.08 -.10* -.07 .03 -.01 -.38”
15. Managerial Trust 3.04 .69 -.07 -.02 .07 .00 -.29’*
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
16. Continuance Commitment 3.13 1.01 .09* .09* 332 -.10* .21**
17. Workplace Deviance .96 .78 -.16** -.23*’ -.04 .08* .10*
18. Organizational Deviance 1.12 .87 -.10* -.20** -.07 .05 .11**
19. Interpersonal Deviance______.71 .89 -.21** -.21** -.01 .11** .05
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
6. Pay Policy Existence (*96),
7. Pay Structure .34 (.92)
8. Organizational Norms .68** .38** (.87)
9. Employee Norms .43’* .34” .35” (.74)
10. Distributive Justice -.16” -.48” -.10* -.29 (.94)
11. Procedural Justice -.21*’ -.60” -.08 -.35” .75 (.85)
12. Interpersonal Justice -.23” -.46” -.05 -.29" .51” .70 (.91)
13. Informational Justice -.23” -.61” -.09* -.35” .67” .82** .78
14. Organizational Trust -.31” -.55” -.09* -.40” .62” .73** .66”
15. Managerial Trust -.25” -.39” -.11” -.33" .46” .59” .62”
16. Continuance Commitment .13” .25" .13” .07 -.23” -.24” -.16”
17. Workplace Deviance .10* .10’ .05 .16” -.07 -.12” -.16”
18. Organizational Deviance .08* .14” .07 .14” -.09’ -.15" -.15”
19. Interpersonal Deviance .10’ .02 .01 .15” -.03 -.05 -.14**
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
13. Informational Justice (.87)
14. Organizational Trust .71 <94).
15. Managerial Trust .60” .66 (.74)
16. Continuance Commitment -.25” -.26” -.24” (.85)
17. Workplace Deviance -.14” -.19” -.17" .05 (.91),
18. Organizational Deviance -.13” -.19” -.19” .07 .93 (.88),
19. Interpersonal Deviance -.11” -.13” -.10* .00 .82** .54 (.87)
Note: N = 608. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (reliabilities) are shown on the diagonals 
in parentheses. Control variables were measured by self-reports and categorical variables. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis 1 proposed that pay secrecy (represented by higher levels of pay 
communication) is positively related to workplace deviance. The correlation between pay 
communication and workplace deviance is positive and significant (p < .05), showing that 
workplace deviance is related to pay secrecy rather than pay openness. This hypothesis
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was tested utilizing Model 2 of Table 4.3, which shows that pay secrecy is significantly 
positively related to workplace deviance (0 = .11, p < .01). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported.
Table 4.3 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 1
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2
Variable
CO
. AR2 P
Step 1: Control Variables .07**
Age - .2 2 * * -.23**
Gender -.14** -.15**
Step 2: Independent Variable .01**
Pay Communication .11**
Total R2
Total F  Value
(d f regression, residual)
.09
18.97*’ 
(3, 607)
Note: N = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables 
included in each step.
> < .0 5 . *> < .01 .
The four dimensions of organizational justice were predicted to mediate the 
relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Specifically, hypothesis 2a 
predicted distributive justice to mediate the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship, 
while hypothesis 2b involved procedural justice, hypothesis 2c entailed interpersonal 
justice, and hypothesis 2d anticipated informational justice. The results for these 
hypotheses are presented in Model 3 of Tables 4.4,4.5,4.6, and 4.7. As shown in Table 
4.4., distributive justice significantly mediates the relationship between pay secrecy and
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workplace deviance (p < .05). However, since the pay secrecy-workplace deviance 
relationship is reduced from a p of .11 (shown in Model 2) to .09 (shown in Model 3) but 
still significant when distributive justice enters the model, only partial mediation is 
demonstrated. Thus, hypothesis 2a is supported.
Table 4.4 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2a
Variable
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AR2 p AR2 p
CO
.
Step 1: Control Variables
__*♦
.08
Age - . 2 2 * * -.23** -.23**
Gender -.14** -.15** -.16**
Step 2: Main Effect .01**
Pay Communication .11** .09*
Step 3: Mediating Effect .01*
Distributive Justice -.08*
Total R2
Total F  Value 
(d f  regression, residual)
.09
615.27** 
(4,606)
Note: N  — 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables
included in each step.* ** A -p < . 05. p  < .01.
Table 4.5 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2b
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Variable
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AR2 p
CO
.
%
AR2 p
Step 1: Control Variables .07**
Age -.22** -.23** -.23**
Gender -.14** -.15** -.17**
Step 2: Main Effect .01**
Pay Communication .11** .07
Step 3: Mediating Effect .02**
Procedural Justice -.14**
Total R2
Total F  Value
(d f regression, residual)
.10
17.22** 
(4, 606)
1______  i n i  - l  1Note: TV = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR is based upon variables 
included in each step.
> < .0 5 . *> < .01 .
Table 4.6 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2c
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Variable
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AR2 p
CO
. AR2 p
Step 1: Control Variables .07**
Age -.22** -.23** -.23**
Gender -.14** -.15** -.14**
Step 2: Main Effect .01**
Pay Communication .11** .07
Step 3: Mediating Effect .02**
Interpersonal Justice -.15**
Total R2
Total F  Value 
(d f  regression, residual)
.11
18.20** 
(4,606)
Note: N =  611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables 
included in each step.
*p <  .05. *> < .01 .
Table 4.7 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2d
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Variable
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AR2 p AR2 p AR2 p
Step 1: Control Variables .07**
Age -.22** -.23** -.22**
Gender -.14** -.15** -.16**
Step 2: Main Effect .01**
Pay Communication .11** .06
Step 3: Mediating Effect .01**
Informational Justice -.13**
Total R2
Total F  Value
(d f  regression, residual)
.10
16.79** 
(4, 606)
Note: N =  611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR2 is based upon variables 
included in each step.
> < .0 5 . *> < .01 .
Tables 4.5 to 4.7 show that procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and 
informational justice significantly mediate the pay secrecy-workplace deviance 
relationship (p < .01).Since the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance 
becomes nonsignificant once the mediating variable (e.g., procedural, interpersonal, and 
informational justice) is included in the model, full mediation is displayed. Thus, 
hypothesis 2b, 2c, and 2d are supported.
Two forms of trust were also expected to mediate the pay secrecy-workplace 
deviance relationship. Specifically, organizational trust (in hypothesis 3a) and managerial
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trust (in hypothesis 3b) were predicted to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy 
and workplace deviance. Job tenure and hours worked per week were initially included in 
the hypothesis testing; however, due to their nonsignificance, both were removed and the 
hypotheses were tested without them. Model 3 of Tables 4.8 and 4.9 reveal that 
organizational trust and managerial trust significantly mediate the pay secrecy-workplace 
deviance relationship (p < .01). Additionally, organizational trust and managerial trust 
fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance since the 
relationship is not statistically significant once the mediating variable (e.g., 
organizational and managerial trust) is added to the model. Thus, hypothesis 3a and 3b 
are supported.
Table 4.8 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 3a
Variable
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CO.
V
A/?2 p AR2 p
Step 1: Control Variables .07**
Age -.22** -.23** -.24**
Gender -.14** -.15** -.16**
Step 2: Main Effect .01**
Pay Communication .11** .04
Step 3: Mediating Effect .03
Organizational Trust -.20
Total/?2
Total F  Value
{df regression, residual)
.12
20.64**
(4,606)
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Table 4.8 (Continued)
Note: N = 6 \ \ .  Standardized beta coefficients are shown. A/f2 is based upon variables 
included in each step.
*p <  .05. **p<.01.
Table 4.9 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 3b
Variable
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AR2 P A/f2 p A/f2 P
Step 1: Control Variables .07**
Age -.22** -.23** -.22**
Gender -.14** -.15** -.15**
Step 2: Main Effect .01**
Pay Communication .11** .06
Step 3: Mediating Effect .02**
Managerial Trust -.16**
Total /f2
Total F Value 
(d f  regression, residual)
.11
18.54** 
(4,606)
Note: iV = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR is based upon variables
included in each step.
*  ** -  * *  ^  „p< .05 . p  < .01.
Hypothesis 4 anticipated continuance commitment moderating the pay secrecy- 
workplace deviance relationship such that workplace deviance will be higher when 
continuance commitment is low and pay communication is high (e.g., pay secrecy) than 
when both continuance commitment and pay communication are high. As shown in Table 
4.10, the interaction effect is not significant.
Table 4.10 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 4
178
Workplace Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable
CO. A/f2 P
CO
.
Step 1: Control Variables ©
* #
Age -.22** -.23** -.23**
Gender -.14** -.15** -.15**
Step 2: Main Effect .02**
Pay Communication .10* .10*
Continuance Commitment .06 .06
Step 3: Interaction Effect .00
Pay Communication x 
Continuance Commitment
-.02
Total R2 .09
Total F  Value
(df  regression, residual)
11.91** 
(5,605)
Note: N  = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables 
included in each step.
*p  < .05. **/?<.01.
However, being that both the pay communication and workplace deviance 
constructs are comprised of sub-dimensions, pairs consisting of a pay communication 
sub-dimension (e.g., pay policy existence, pay structure, organizational norms, and 
employee norms) with the workplace deviance sub-dimensions (e.g., organizational and 
interpersonal deviance) were analyzed to identify whether continuance commitment has a 
significant interaction effect for a portion of the pay secrecy-workplace deviance 
relationship. Continuance commitment was found to significantly moderate only one
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relationship, the pay structure-interpersonal deviance relationship (p < .10). Refer to 
Table 4.11. The interaction is plotted in Figure 4.2. Additionally, a simple slope analysis 
was conducted to confirm the significance of the interaction effect. The results of the 
simple slope of workplace deviance involving high levels of pay structure (e.g., pay 
secrecy) and low levels of continuance commitment is significant (simple slope -.102), t 
(605) = 3.226, p < .001. The simple slope of workplace deviance when both pay 
communication and continuance commitment levels are high is nonsignificant (simple
slope -.032), t (605) = -1.012, p < .312. Thus, there is some support for hypothesis 4.
Table 4.11 Additional Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 4
Interpersonal Deviance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable
CO
.
1
M 2 p AR2 p
Step 1: Control Variables
*»00©
Age -.20 -.20** -.20**
Gender _  ^  ** -.20 -.20** -.20
Step 2: Main Effect .00
Pay Structure .04 .04
Continuance Commitment .03 .03
Step 3: Interaction Effect .01+
Pay Structure x Continuance 
Commitment
-.07+
Total R2 .09
Total F  Value
(d f  regression, residual)
11.97** 
(5,605)
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Table 4.11 (Continued)
Note: N -  611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. A/J2 is based upon variables 
included in each step.
^ p <.10. *p <.05. *p<.01.
Figure 4.2 Plot of Interaction Effect between Pay Structure and Workplace Deviance
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Discussion
This study contributes to two different management fields: pay communication 
and workplace deviance. These findings contribute much needed empirical data to the 
underdeveloped pay communication literature by demonstrating that pay secrecy can 
have a negative effect on employee behavior, other than performance (e.g., Bamberger 
and Belogolovsky 2010) and attitudes (e.g., satisfaction: Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008). 
Additionally, the discovery of the significant mediating effect of the organizational 
justice sub-dimensions (e.g., distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational 
justice), and organizational and managerial trust on the pay secrecy-workplace deviance
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relationship assists both researchers and organizations in understanding why pay secrecy 
practices may lead employees to engage in deviant behaviors. Additionally, the finding of 
continuance commitment (or the lack of perceived job alternatives) impacting a portion 
of the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship (through the pay structure and 
interpersonal deviance sub-dimensions) demonstrates that there are factors outside of the 
organizations’ control that can influence the relationship even though the pay 
communication practice (e.g., pay secrecy) is within control of the organization.
The findings of this study also contribute to the workplace deviance literature by 
showing that a common organizational practice such as pay secrecy can be associated 
with higher levels of deviant acts. Interestingly, the participants of this study were rather 
honest as 98.5% of the sample (602 of 611 participants) admitted to engaging in some 
deviant act within the past six months. This extreme honesty, which is most likely due to 
the complete anonymity guaranteed to all participants, helps researchers and 
organizations better understand the amount of deviant behaviors occurring in the 
workplace.
Limitations
Although tremendous efforts were taken to strengthen the methodology of this 
study, there are several limitations. First, the research design is cross-sectional and 
therefore, causal inferences are not warranted.
Additionally, the data collection being self-report is another potential limitation. 
However, the nature of the constructs being measured (e.g., perceptions of the pay 
communication practices utilized by the employing organization, attitudes towards 
organizational justice and trust, and participation in deviant behaviors) required the use of
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self-report data since only the employee can accurately respond to items pertaining to 
their perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Also, employees tend to keep their 
engagement of deviant behaviors secret from other organizational members (Spector, 
1992), thereby making self-report data necessary.
Social desirability bias is another potential limitation. However, the guarantee of 
anonymity to all participants and the finding of 98.5% of the sample admitting to 
engaging in some type of deviant behavior in the past six months shows that social 
desirability is unlikely to be an issue in this study.
Another potential limitation is common method variance. However, the guarantee 
of anonymity to all participants (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff 2003; 
Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010) and the finding of a statistically significant interaction 
(Evans 1985) show this study most likely does not suffer from common method variance.
The scale used to measure continuance commitment may be another limitation. 
Being that only one aspect of continuance commitment (e.g., lack of perceived job 
alternatives) was used to measure the overall construct, additional and/or more significant 
findings of continuance commitment moderating the pay secrecy-workplace deviance 
relationship may have resulted if the other aspect (e.g., personal sacrifices or loss of side- 
bets and investments) was included in the measure.
A final limitation of this study is the external validity of the results. The findings 
may not be generalizable to countries other than the U.S. since the sample was comprised 
of U.S. residents.
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Future Research
There are several directions future research may pursue. First, analyses 
determining whether and how each pay communication sub-dimension is significantly 
related to workplace deviance and each of its sub-dimensions are warranted. The 
relationship of pay secrecy (higher levels of the pay communication sub-dimensions) 
being more significantly positively associated with organizational deviance than 
interpersonal deviance is expected since pay communication practices are within the 
control of the organization; however, it is unknown which pay communication sub­
dimension (e.g., Pay Policy Existence versus Pay Structure) will have higher associations 
with each workplace deviance sub-dimension.
Another future direction is the inclusion of other moderators impacting the pay 
secrecy-workplace deviance relationship. Specifically, moderating variables that are 
within the organizations’ control should be investigated to show the organizations that are 
utilizing pay secrecy practices how they could potentially minimize workplace deviance. 
Also, continuance commitment should be reanalyzed as a moderating variable but with 
both aspects of continuance commitment being analyzed.
Finally, generalizing these findings to countries other than the U.S. is another 
future path. Even though the labor laws may differ between countries, employee 
compensation and the organizational pay practices (e.g., pay communication practices) 
used in different countries may resemble that of the U.S, especially in developed 
countries. Therefore, it may be beneficial to conduct an international study analyzing the 
relationship between pay communication and workplace deviance.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this dissertation was to extend the pay communication 
literature through a further understanding of pay secrecy and pay openness practices. This 
objective was achieved by successfully developing a pay communication scale that 
encompasses all aspects of pay communication and then utilizing the pay communication 
scale to determine pay secrecy’s influence on workplace deviance.
Chapter 3 involved the development of a pay communication scale with pay 
secrecy and pay openness representing the extremes. Three multistage studies were 
conducted to properly develop and validate the pay communication scale. The first stage 
of Study 1 involved having human resources practitioners and the researcher generate a 
pool of 79 items pertaining to different aspects of pay communication practices. Then a 
panel of experts reviewed and evaluated the generated items on three criteria (e.g., 
consistency with the pay communication description, generalizability to a wide variety of 
organizations and occupations, and clarity and conciseness) in the second stage of Study
1. This process resulted in 42 items.
Study 2 consisted of further refining the generated items by analyzing the inter­
item correlations, variances, and factor loadings of each item in an exploratory factor
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analysis. These procedures yielded 22 items loadings on four distinct factors: Pay Policy 
Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational Norms, and Employee Norms.
The first stage of Study 3 involved conducting a confirmatory factor analysis to 
validate the proposed 22-item scale and dimensionality (four sub-dimensions). The 4- 
factor model demonstrated the overall better model fit in comparison to the 1-factor, 2- 
factor, and 3-factor models. The second stage of Study 3 verified construct validation for 
the Pay Communication scale by providing evidence of convergent and discriminant 
validity. Convergent validity was determined by analyzing the correlations between the 
developed Pay Communication scale and other pay communication scales (e.g., Noy 
2007). Discriminant validity was established by evaluating the shared variance between 
the developed Pay Communication scale and a High Performance Work Practices scale 
(e.g., Huselid 1995).
Chapter 4 examined the relationship pay communication has with workplace 
deviance. Specifically, pay secrecy is expected to positively influence workplace 
deviance. This prediction is based on equity theory (Adams 1965), uncertaintiy 
management theory (Lind and van den Bos 2002), and reactance theory (Brehm 1966). 
Additionally, the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance is anticipated 
to be mediated by distributive justice (based on equity theory; (Adams 1965)), procedural 
justice (based on fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), interpersonal justice (based on 
fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), informational justice (based on fairness heuristic 
theory; (Lind 2001)), organizational trust and managerial trust (based on social exchange 
theory; (Blau 1964)). Continuance commitment is also predicted to moderate the pay
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secrecy-workplace deviance relationship (based on power dependence theory; (Emerson 
1972; Molm 2003)). A summary of the hypotheses and their results are presented below.
Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Hypothesis 1
It is predicted that pay secrecy is positively related to workplace deviance. 
Supported, pay secrecy is significantly positively associated with workplace deviance (P 
= .ll,p < .0 1 ).
Hypothesis 2a
It is expected that perceptions of distributive justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of distributive 
justice partially mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (P 
= -.08, p < .05).
Hypothesis 2b
It is anticipated that perceptions of procedural justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of procedural 
justice fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (P = - 
.14, p < .01).
Hypothesis 2c
It is expected that perceptions of interpersonal justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, interpersonal justice fully 
mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (p = -.15, p < .01).
187
Hypothesis 2d
It is predicted that perceptions of informational justice mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of informational 
justice fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (p = - 
.13, p < .01).
Hypothesis 3a
It is anticipated that perceptions of organizational trust mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of organizational 
trust fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (p = -
.20, p < .01).
Hypothesis 3b
It is expected that perceptions of managerial trust mediate the relationship 
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of managerial trust 
fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (P = -.16, p < 
.01).
Hypothesis 4
It was predicted that continuance commitment moderates the relationship between 
pay secrecy and workplace deviance such that when continuance commitment is low and 
pay communication is high (e.g., pay secrecy), workplace deviance will be higher than 
when both continuance commitment and pay communication are high. Partially 
supported, continuance commitment only had a significant moderating impact on the 
relationship between the pay structure sub-dimension and the interpersonal deviance sub­
dimension (P = -.07, p < .10).
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Contributions
This research contributes to the human resource management discipline, 
specifically the pay communication literature, by providing a validated pay 
communication measure that has successfully extended the scarce pay communication 
research by demonstrating pay secrecy’s influence on workplace deviance. The 
development of an inclusive Pay Communication scale should make it easier for future 
researchers to analyze the impact that pay secrecy and/or pay openness has on different 
organizational and employee outcomes.
Additionally, the significant findings regarding the relationship between pay 
secrecy and workplace deviance expand the employee outcomes (e.g., attitudes and 
behaviors) that have been associated with pay communication practices. Despite pay 
secrecy’s pervasiveness as an organizational practice, these findings demonstrate the 
negative impact pay secrecy has on employee behaviors (e.g. workplace deviance), and 
consequently on the organization’s overall well-being
APPENDIX A
VALIDATED MEASURES
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Nov’s (2007) Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) scale
Policies & Rules (a = .963)
1. My company has rules against discussing employee pay with others.
2. This company has a formal policy that employees should not disclose their pay 
levels to other employees.
3. My company forbids employees from discussing their pay with others.
4. Employees are not allowed to discuss their pay at my company.
5. The company makes it clear that pay should not be discussed.
6. My organization has a written policy concerning pay secrecy. (For example, 
written into the employee manual, offer letter, contract, etc.)
Enforcement (a = .955)
1. You can get in trouble if you get caught discussing your pay with others.
2. This company is very strict about not talking about your pay with other 
employees.
3. I would get into trouble if my superiors found out that I had disclosed my pay to 
others.
4. This organization enforces the rule that employees not discuss their pay with each 
other.
5. Discussing pay at my company is something you can be reprimanded for.
Organizational Norms (a = .890)
1. My company likes to keep employee pay amounts secret.
2. At my company, there is an unwritten rule that pay is not discussed.
3. My company is secretive when it comes to employee pay.
Overall POPS scale (a = .965)
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neither agree nor disagree), 4 (agree), and 5 (strongly agree).
APPENDIX B
NON-VALIDATED MEASURES
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Beer and Gery’s (19721 Organizational Culture Items
1. His salary grade classification
2. His salary range minimum
3. His salary range maximum
4. Type of increases presently available
5. Size of merit increases presently available
6. Frequency of eligibility for merit increases
No Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was provided in the study.
Items were measured using a 2-point scale with the scale points representing no 
knowledge (1) and knowledge (2).
Mulvev. LeBlanc. Heneman. and Mclnemev’s (2002) Pay Knowledge Scale
1. I know the grade/band/level of my job.
2. I understand the basis for periodic adjustments made to base pay ranges.
3. I know the grades/bands/levels of other jobs in the organization.
4. I understand the rationale for my job being placed in its grade/band/level.
5. I know the average annual base pay increase percentage awarded to employees at 
my organization.
6. I understand how my base pay increases are determined.
7. I understand how my pay range is determined.
No Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was provided in the study.
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale with the scale points representing 
strongly disagree (1), somewhat disagree (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), somewhat 
agree (4), and strongly agree (5).
Day’s (20061 Pay Communication Scale
1. My organization has held formal educational sessions in which they explain how 
pay levels are determined for its jobs.
2. My organization provides employees with written information about how pay 
levels are determined.
3. My supervisor has explained to me how pay levels are determined for the jobs in 
my organization.
4. I have asked my supervisor to explain how pay levels are determined for the jobs 
in my organization.
5. My organization has told me what the minimums and maximums are for the pay 
grade my job is in.
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Overall Pay Communication scale (a = .75)
Items were measured using a Likert-type scale ranging from agree to disagree. The 
amount of individual scale points were not provided in the study.
Cloutier and Vilhuber’s (2008) System Transparency Scale
1. Because all employees can access the information on salary adjustments, the 
members of the committee are forced to correctly evaluate all jobs.
2. Because the information on the procedures used to establish salaries is posted, the 
committee members are forced to exactly follow the procedures stipulated by the 
law.
Overall System Transparency scale (a = .80)
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree)
Tremblay and Chenevert’s (2008) Transparency of Pay Scale
1. Our organization does not disclose the administrative procedures on how pay 
levels and pay raises are fixed for nonmanagement employees. (R)
2. Our organization does not disclose the administrative procedures on how pay 
levels and pay raises are fixed for managers. (R)
3. We try to discourage nonmanagement employees from disclosing their pay to 
coworkers. (R)
4. Nonmanagement employees are really well informed about wage policies.
5. We try to discourage managers from disclosing their pay to colleagues. (R)
6. Managers are really well informed about wage policies.
Overall Transparency of Pay scale (a = .84)
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely agree).
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Research or IRB in writing. The project should be dis’continucd until modifications can be 
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be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the 
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critical part of the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is 
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to 
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analysis, continues beyond June IS, 2014. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that have 
been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects 
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information 
regarding this, contact the Office o f University Research.
You arc requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects 
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study 
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur 
in recruiting o f subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if 
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of 
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be 
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.
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Barbara Talbot, University Research 
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August 9,2013
In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed 
study entitled:
The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate 
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may 
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the 
privacy of the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a 
critical part o f the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is 
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to 
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be 
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed 
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval 
o f the involvement of human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on September 9, 2013 and 
this project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f  the project, including data 
analysis, continues beyond September 9, 2014. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that 
have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects 
involving N1H funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information 
regarding this, contact the Office o f University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects 
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study 
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion of the study. If changes occur 
in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if 
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of 
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be 
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.
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Dear Mr/s. (full name of current President),
Hello. My name is Shelly Marasi and I am a SHRM member in Louisiana. I am also a 
doctoral student at Louisiana Tech University pursuing a Doctor of Business 
Administration in Management. In order to meet the requirements for my degree, I must 
complete a dissertation which includes conducting a research study entitled 
“Development of a Pay Communication Scale.” The purpose of this research is to 
develop a pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) measure and determine 
whether pay secrecy impacts employee behavior. This research is important as it seeks to 
fill a gap in the current management literature by advancing the pay secrecy research, 
which is quite scarce and underdeveloped. Specifically, the management literature is in 
need of a pay communication scale that measures all aspects of the practice. Additionally, 
this measure is needed to identify the extent to which pay secrecy influences employee 
attitudes and behavior. We both have an interest in ensuring that HR professionals have 
the appropriate knowledge to assist organizations in achieving their maximum 
effectiveness. Therefore, I am requesting that you assist this research by having your 
organizations’ members access a short survey for the purposes of developing a pay 
communication scale.
I am seeking to survey individuals who are currently employed in a HR position. I need 
your assistance and the help of the members of (name of SHRM Chapter) to conduct this 
research. It is vital to this research’s meaningfulness and success that the survey be 
completed by HR professionals. Both your and the (name of SHRM Chapter) members 
assistance would be greatly appreciated.
Attached is a copy of the survey that I intend to use. A few important points are:
• Participants can be assured of anonymity and confidentiality as neither their 
names nor their employer’s names will be collected.
•  The survey will be conducted online and should take no longer than 15 minutes to 
complete.
•  Demographic information is requested only to determine if there are meaningful 
differences between groups.
• The survey will be available for 10 days only. Therefore, there is only a small 
time frame in which your members will need to be involved. (If your organization 
agrees I am hoping to conduct the survey in April 2013)
• The results of the surveys will be published in summary form only, not by 
individual responses.
• Once the dissertation is completed the results of the survey may be presented to 
your membership, if desired.
Should your organization agree to assist me, there are two options that we may take in 
conducting the survey:
1. Your organization may provide me with a list of member email addresses (no names 
are necessary). An introductory email will be sent to all listed members asking for their 
assistance and providing the web address where they can complete the survey. Five days
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later a reminder email will be sent. The email list will remain confidential and will not 
become part of the published dissertation.
2. Your organization may send out both the introductory email and five days later the 
reminder email with the web address where they can conduct the survey. If this option is 
selected I will need to know how many individuals were on the email list in order to 
determine the response rate as this has a great impact on the statistical significance of the 
results.
Both the introductory and reminder e-mail that will be presented to your members are a 
shorter version of this e-mail.
Please let me know if your organization is willing to participate in my dissertation 
research. If you have any questions or concerns, I may be contacted at (cellular phone 
number) or (email). My dissertation chair, Dr. Rebecca Bennett, may also be contacted at 
(office phone number) or (email). I hope to hear from your soon.
Sincerely,
Shelly Marasi 
Doctoral Candidate 
Louisiana Tech University
APPENDIX E
INTRODUCTORY LETTER SENT TO POTENTIAL
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Dear (name of SHRM Chapter) member,
Hello. My name is Shelly Marasi. I am a SHRM member in Louisiana and also a doctoral 
student at Louisiana Tech University. In order to meet the requirements for my Doctor of 
Business Administration in Management degree, I must complete a dissertation which 
includes conducting a research study entitled “Development of a Pay Communication 
Scale.” The purpose of this research is to develop a pay communication (pay secrecy and 
pay openness) measure and determine whether pay secrecy impacts employee behavior. 
This research is important as it seeks to fill a gap in the current Management literature by 
advancing the pay secrecy research, which is quite scarce and underdeveloped. I am 
requesting that you assist this research by participating in a short survey for the purposes 
of developing a pay communication scale.
A few important points about the survey are:
•  The survey is completely anonymous and confidentiality will be strictly kept.
•  The survey should take no longer than 15 minutes to complete.
•  The survey is online and available for 10 days.
•  The results of the surveys will be published in summary form only, not by 
individual responses.
• Once the dissertation is completed the results of the survey will be made available 
upon request.
Your assistance in advancing this research is greatly appreciated. Should you choose to 
participate in this research, the direct link to the survey is:
«  URL link to survey »
If you would like to contact me with questions or concerns, I may be contacted at (email). 
My dissertation chair, Dr. Rebecca Bennett, may also be contacted at (email).
Sincerely,
Shelly Marasi 
Doctoral Candidate 
Louisiana Tech University
APPENDIX F
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Dear (name of SHRM Chapter) member,
As a reminder, I am conducting a dissertation research study entitled “Development of a 
Pay Communication Scale” in order to meet the requirements for my Doctor of Business 
Administration in Management. The purpose of this research is to develop a pay 
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) measure and determine whether pay 
secrecy impacts employee behavior. This research is important as it seeks to fill a gap in 
the current Management literature by advancing the pay secrecy research, which is quite 
scarce and underdeveloped. I am requesting that you assist this research by participating 
in a short survey for the purposes of developing a pay communication scale.
A few important points about the survey are:
• The survey is completely anonymous and confidentiality will be strictly kept.
• The survey should take no longer than 5-15 minutes to complete.
•  The survey is online and available for 10 days.
• The results of the surveys will be published in summary form only, not by 
individual responses.
• Once the dissertation is completed the results of the survey will be made available 
upon request.
Your assistance in advancing this research is greatly appreciated. Should you choose to 
participate in this research, the direct link to the survey is:
«  URL link to survey »
If you would like to contact me with questions or concerns, I may be contacted at (email). 
My dissertation chair, Dr. Rebecca Bennett, may also be contacted at (email).
Sincerely,
Shelly Marasi 
Doctoral Candidate 
Louisiana Tech University
APPENDIX G
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The following is a brief summary of the project in which you are asked to participate. 
Please read this information before signing the statement below.____________________
TITLE OF PROJECT: Pay Secrecy in the Workplace
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To develop a further understanding of pay secrecy 
and create a pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale
PROCEDURE: Voluntary completion of anonymous survey. Please check the box below 
to “sign” the consent form. After “signing” the consent form, read the instructions for 
each part and respond to the best of your abilities.
INSTRUMENTS: Survey
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: The participant understands that Louisiana 
Tech is not able to offer financial compensation nor to absorb the costs of medical 
treatment should you be injured as a result of participating in this research.
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: None.111; At the end of the survey participants will enter 
their ‘employee’ identification number provided to them by the online organization in 
order to receive an online payment of $1J21
SAFEGUARDS OF PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING: This study 
involves no treatment or physical contact. All information collected from the survey will 
be held strictly confidential. No one will be allowed access to the survey other than the 
researchers.
CONTACT INFORMATION: The principal experimenters listed below may be reached 
to answer questions about the research, subjects' rights, or related matters.
Shelly Marasi, Doctoral Candidate (main researcher) sam081 @latech.edu
Dr. Rebecca Bennett (Dissertation Chair) rbennett@,l atech.edu
Members of the Human Use Committee of Louisiana Tech University may also be 
contacted if a problem cannot be discussed with the experimenters:
Dr. Les Guice (257-3056)
Dr. Mary M. Livingston (257-2292 or 257-4315)
I attest that I have read and understood the following description of the study. "Pay
Secrecy in the Workplace", and its purpose and methods. I understand that my 
participation in this research is strictly voluntary and mv participation or refusal to 
participate in this study will not affect mv relationship with Louisiana Tech University or 
my employer in any wav. Further, I understand that I may withdraw at any time or refuse 
to answer any questions without penalty. Upon completion of the study, I understand that 
the results will be freely available to me upon request. I understand that the results of my
survey will be confidential, accessible only to the principal investigators, myself, or a
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legally appointed representative. I have not been requested to waive nor do I waive any 
of my rights related to participating in this study.
MARK THE BOX TO PROVIDE CONSENT.
□  I confirm that I have read and understand the consent form regarding this study.
I agree to the terms of the consent form.
I am at least 18 years old and am currently employed.
1 am a member of the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) or one 
of SHRM’s affiliate chapters.131 
I voluntarily provide consent to participate in the study.
1 Phrase or statement was only included in the consent form for Study 1 and Study 2.
2 Phrase or statement was only included in the consent form for Study 3.
3 Phrase or statement was only included in the consent form for Stage 1 of Study 1.
APPENDIX H
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Part 1
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the description of pay secrecy and answer the following 
questions as honestly and open as possible. Each response should be solely based on 
YOUR personal opinion, experiences, perceptions, and observations. Keep in mind there 
are no right or wrong answers. Please feel free to take as much space as needed.
DESCRIPTION: Pay Secrecy is an organizational practice or policy prohibiting the 
distribution and communication of certain pay information to employees and possibly
1. What does Pay Secrecy mean to you? Please describe in detail.
2. What do you believe Pay Secrecy means to your current employer? Please 
describe in detail.
3. If possible, please provide at least two examples of how your current employer 
does/doesn’t apply Pay Secrecy in the workplace. Please describe each example in
4. If possible, please provide at least two examples of how other organizations (such 
as previous employers or spouse’s employer) does/doesn’t apply Pay Secrecy in 
the workplace. Please describe each example in detail.
5. What do you believe Pay Secrecy means to your current co-workers (i.e. 
subordinates, peers, and/or superiors)? Please describe in detail.
Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in 
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept 
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level. Please answer 
all questions by marking the appropriate response and/or by filling in the blanks.
outsiders.
detail.
1. Gender: 
o Male o Female
2. Age: years
3. Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian
o American Indian 
□ Latino/Hispanic 
o Other:
□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern
4. How long have you been with your current employer? 
o less than 1 year o 1 -  5 years o 6 -  15 years
o 16-25  years o over 25 years o not currently employed
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5. On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week o 10-20  hours per week
o 21 -  30 hours per week (part-time) o 30 -  40 hours per week (full-time)
o more than 40 hours per week o not currently employed
6. What is your highest grade completed?
o Did not complete high school o High school diploma or GED
o Some college o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS) 
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA) o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7. What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction o Communications, Utilities
o Government o Health Care o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet o Manufacturing o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit o Services o Transportation
o Other:  o not currently employed
8. What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position? 
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties) □ Lower-level management
□ Middle-level management □ Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department □ Professional:__________________
□ Other:
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study. Thank you again for your 
participation.
APPENDIX I
LIST OF ALL GENERATED ITEMS 
(STAGE 1 OF STUDY 1)
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1. All pay information is open at my organization.
2. All pay information is public knowledge at my organization.
3. An employee will be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
4. At my organization, employees have to trust that the organization pays them in the 
proper pay range.
5. At my organization, pay is only discussed between an employee and the hiring 
authority at the time of hire.
6. Employee pay levels are confidential internally and externally at my organization.
7. Employees are well informed about pay policies at my organization.
8. Employees at my organization do not know for sure what others are really being paid.
9. Employees basically know what everyone gets paid at my organization.
10. Employees can get in trouble if they get caught sharing pay information.
11. Employees discover individual pay levels through the grapevine at my organization.
12. Employees do not talk about their personal pay information at my organization.
13. Employees do not understand the overall pay structure at my organization.
14. Even though employees at my organization are not supposed to discuss their personal 
pay information they do.
15. Everyone at my organization is aware that all employees receive the same “across the 
board” raise at my organization.
16. Everyone at my organization knows that all employees receive a pay raise or bonus at 
the end of the year.
17.1 am aware of the current criteria required for receiving pay increases.
18.1 am aware of whether there are standard pay incentives for completion of special 
training, certification, and/or education.
19.1 am only provided information about my individual pay level.
20.1 am permitted to freely discuss any of my pay information.
21.1 am provided or could easily obtain everyone’s individual pay level at my 
organization.
22.1 am provided with my job’s pay range and/or pay average.
23.1 am unaware of whether my pay level is at the lower, middle, or upper end of the pay 
range for my job.
24.1 disclose my pay level to other employees when they ask.
25.1 know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases presently 
available.
26.1 know the basis for determining my pay raises and/or bonuses.
27.1 know whether my pay level is above, below, or equal to the average pay for my job.
28.1 recognize that pay levels and/or raises are based on certain things, such as 
experience, years of service, education, and/or performance/evaluation scores.
29.1 speak openly with other employees about my pay.
30.1 understand how my pay increases are determined.
31.1 understand how my pay level is determined.
32. If an employee requests any type of pay information the organization releases it.
33. Individual pay levels and/or raises of all employees are only known to a select few 
staff members, such as HR hiring manager, accountant, and/or CEO.
34. It is very common for employees to know what everyone is paid at my organization.
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35. My job has been at risk because my employing organization believed I was sharing 
pay information.
36. My organization distributes pay ranges and/or pay averages for every job in the 
organization.
37. My organization does not allow employees to converse about their own or other 
employees’ pay.
38. My organization does not disclose other employees’ individual pay levels.
39. My organization does not disclose/publish the procedures used to establish pay levels 
and/or raises.
40. My organization does not have a policy, procedure, or unwritten standard on 
discussing pay information.
41. My organization does not make the secrecy of pay information an issue.
42. My organization encourages employees not to share pay information with other 
employees.
43. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing their 
pay with each other.
44. My organization frowns on conduct involving exchanging pay information.
45. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay information 
with coworkers.
46. My organization has a rule to not disclose pay information with other employees.
47. My organization has a very solid pay structure that I understand.
48. My organization has an open culture in regards to pay information.
49. My organization has an unwritten rule that pay is prohibited from being discussed 
with other employees or outsiders.
50. My organization has the same pay scale for all non-managerial employees.
51. My organization implies that individual pay information should be kept private.
52. My organization is good at explaining how employee pay levels and/or raises are 
calculated.
53. My organization is not concerned with employees discussing pay information.
54. My organization is pretty open about pay information.
55. My organization is secretive when it comes to employee pay.
56. My organization is very strict about not talking about pay information with other 
employees.
57. My organization is very worried about employees sharing their personal pay 
information with outsiders.
58. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
59. My organization likes to keep employee pay amounts secret.
60. My organization makes it clear how pay levels and/or raises are determined for the 
jobs in my organization.
61. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be communicated under any 
circumstances.
62. My organization openly discusses all employees’ individual pay levels and/or raises.
63. My organization provides employees with information about how pay levels and/or 
raises are determined.
64. My organization publishes and/or makes available their entire pay structure.
65. My organization recommends employees keep their pay confidential.
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66. My organization requires employees to sign a contractual agreement stating they will 
comply with the pay secrecy policy and not discuss their individual pay information.
67. My organization respects their employee’s confidentiality by not releasing everyone’s 
individual pay level.
68. My organization tries to discourage employees from disclosing their pay to 
coworkers.
69. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy with employees during 
employee meetings or at the time of hire.
70. My organization withholds pay ranges, pay averages, and others’ individual pay 
levels from employees.
71. No pay information, other than personal pay level, is disclosed to employees at my 
organization.
72. Pay information is only provided on a “need to know” basis at my organization.
73. Pay is the same across the board at my organization.
74. Starting pay ranges are published on job postings.
75. The pay levels for most non-managerial employees are known since they are basically 
the same for all positions.
76. There are limited employees that have access to pay information in my organization.
77. There are no consequences for discussing pay at my organization.
78. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual requesting 
employees keep pay secret.
79. Upon request I can find out other employee’s pay information at my organization.
APPENDIX J
ITEM REFINEMENT SURVEY
(STAGE 2 OF STUDY 1)
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Listed below are the 79 items that have been generated to develop a pay communication 
(pay secrecy and pay openness) scale. Future participants will be instructed to indicate 
the degree to which they agree/disagree with each statement in regards to pay information 
and their employing organization’s actions regarding pay information.
Part 1
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate each item based on the degree to which it is 1) 
CONSISTENT with the pay communication definition (relating to either pay secrecy or 
pay openness practices) provided below and 2) GENERALIZABLE to a wide variety of 
organizations and occupations.
DEFINITION: Pay Communication is the organizational practice that involves which, 
how, and when pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual 
pay levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees 
and possibly outsiders. The two forms of pay communication are pay secrecy and pay 
openness.
Pay Secrecy (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice, possibly including 
a pay secrecy policy, prohibiting the distribution and communication of certain pay 
information to employees and possibly outsiders.
Pay Openness (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice that allows 
employees to discuss their pay information amongst each other (and possibly outsiders) 
while the organization distributes most, if not all, pay information to the employees on a 
regular basis or upon request.
Consistent with Pay 
Communication definition 
(pay secrecy or openness)
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Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate each item based on the degree to which it is CLEAR and 
CONCISE and will be understood by most respondents.
If you choose either ‘Not at All Clear & Concise’ or ‘A Little Clear & Concise.’ please 
rephrase or edit the item in the space provided in the third column. If you believe the item 
should be deleted from further analysis rather than be edited or modified, please write the 
phrase ‘delete’ in the space provided in the third column.
217
Clarity and Conciseness Item Modification/Deletion
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Part 3
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in 
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept 
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level. Please answer 
all questions by marking the appropriate response and/or by filling in the blanks.
1) Gender:
o Male o Female
2) Age: years
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian
□ American Indian
□ Latino/Hispanic 
o Other:
□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern
4) How long have you been with your current employer?
o less than 1 year o 1 - 5  years o 6 -  15 years
o 16-25  years o over 25 years o not currently employed
5) What level best describes your current job position? (check all that apply)
□ Committee Member
□ Doctoral Student/Candidate of Management at Louisiana Tech University
□ Other Doctoral Student/Candidate at Louisiana Tech University:________
□ Professor of Management at Louisiana Tech University
a Professor of Management at Other University:________________
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study. Thank you again for your 
participation.
APPENDIX K
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(STAGE 2 OF STUDY 1)
218
219
1. All individual pay information is only known to a select few staff members, such as 
the HR hiring manager, accountant, and/or CEO.
2. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
3. An employees’ individual pay is strictly confidential at my organization.
4. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone.
5. Employees are well informed about pay policies at my organization.
6. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my 
organization.
7. Even though employees at my organization are not supposed to discuss their personal 
pay information they do.
8. I am aware of the current criteria required for receiving pay increases.
9. I am provided information only about my individual pay level.
10.1 am provided the pay average for every job in my organization.
11.1 am provided my job's pay range.
12.1 am unaware of whether my pay is at the lower, middle, or upper end of the pay 
range for my job.
13.1 know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases presently 
available.
14.1 know whether my pay is above, below, or equal to the average pay for my job.
15.1 recognize that pay at my organization is based upon certain things, such as 
experience, years of service, education, and/or performance/evaluation scores
16.1 understand how my pay increases are determined.
17. Management openly discusses all employees’ individual pay.
18. My organization distributes pay ranges for every job in the organization.
19. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with coworkers.
20. My organization does not have a policy, procedure, or unwritten standard on 
discussing pay information. (RC)
21. My organization does not provide employees with any coworkers’ individual pay.
22. My organization does not provide employees with the procedures used to establish 
pay.
23. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing their 
pay with each other.
24. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay information 
with coworkers.
25. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
26. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand.
27. My organization is secretive when it comes to employee pay.
28. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
29. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
30. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job.
31. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any 
circumstances.
32. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available.
33. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is determined.
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34. My organization requires employees to sign a contractual agreement stating they will 
comply with the pay secrecy policy by not discussing their individual pay information 
with coworkers.
35. My organization shows its’ concern for employees' privacy/confidentiality by not 
releasing everyone's individual pay level.
36. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private.
37. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
38. My organization withholds my job’s pay average from me.
39. No pay information, other than personal pay level, is disclosed to employees at my 
organization.
40. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization.
41. There are no negative consequences for discussing pay at my organization.
42. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating 
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers.
APPENDIX L
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Part 1
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the description of pay communication in the workplace 
and rate each statement based on the degree to which you agree or disagree with it in 
regards to your knowledge of pay information and your current employing organization’s 
actions regarding pay information. Each response should be based on YOUR personal 
opinion, experiences, perceptions, and observations in your current employing 
organization.
DESCRIPTION: Pay Communication is the organizational practice that involves which, 
how, and when pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual 
pay levels, pay processes, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and 
communicated to employees and possibly outsiders. The two main forms of pay 
communication are pay secrecy and pay openness.
Pay Secrecy (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice, possibly including 
a pay secrecy policy, prohibiting the distribution and communication of certain pay 
information to employees and possibly outsiders.
Pay Openness (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice that allows 
employees to discuss their pay information amongst each other (and possibly outsiders) 
while the organization distributes most, if not all, pay information to the employees on a 
regular basis or upon request.
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Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in 
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept 
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level in summary 
form, not by individual responses. Please answer all questions by marking the appropriate 
response or by filling in the blanks.
1) Gender:
o Male o Female
2) Age: years
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian
□ American Indian
□ Latino/Hispanic
□ Other:
□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern
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4) How many years have you been employed with your current organization? 
o less than 1 year o 11 -  15 years o 26 years or more
o 1 -  5 years o 16 -  20 years o not currently employed
o 6 - 1 0 years o 21 -25  years
5) On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week o 30 (full-time) -  40 hours per week 
o 10 -  20 hours per week o more than 40 hours per week
o 21 -  30 hours per week (part-time) o not currently employed
6) What is your highest level of education completed?
o Did not complete high school o High school diploma or GED
o Some college o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS) 
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA) o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7) What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction o Communications, Utilities
o Government o Health Care o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet o Manufacturing o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit o Services o Transportation
o Other:____________________________  o Not currently employed
8) How many employees are there currently at your organization? 
o 10 employees or less o 11 -  50 employees
o 51 -  100 employees o 101 -  500 employees
o 501 -  1,000 employees o 1,001 -  5,000 employees
o 5,001 -  25,000 employees o 25,001 -  50,000 employees
o 50,001 -  100,000 employees o 100,001 employees or more 
o Not currently employed
9) What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position? 
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties) □ Lower-level management
□ Middle-level management o Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department □ Professional:__________________
□ Other:  □ Not currently employed
10) Which best describes your organization’s status involving unions?
o Yes, my job is unionized but other jobs in my organization are not unionized, 
o Yes, my job and every job in my organization are unionized, 
o No, my job is not unionized but other jobs at my organization are unionized, 
o No, neither my job nor any job in my organization are unionized, 
o Not currently employed
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o $20,001-$30,000 
o $50,001 -$60,000 
o $80,001 -  $90,000 
o Not currently employed
12) Which state do you live in? 
o Alabama 
o Arkansas 
o California 
o Colorado 
o Connecticut 
o Delaware 
o Florida 
o Georgia 
o Illinois 
o Indiana 
o Iowa 
o Kansas 
o Kentucky 
o Louisiana 
o Maine 
o Massachusetts 
o Michigan 
o Minnesota 
o Missouri 
o Nebraska 
o Nevada 
o New Hampshire 
o New Jersey 
o New York 
o North Carolina 
o Ohio 
o Oklahoma 
o Pennsylvania 
o South Carolina 
o Tennessee 
o Texas 
o Utah 
o Virginia 
o Washington 
o Wisconsin
o Wyoming ________
o Do not live in the United States
11) Which categoiy describes your current income? 
o $13,500 or less o $13,501 -  $20,000
o $30,001 -  $40,000 o $40,001 -  $50,000
o $60,001 -  $70,000 o $70,001 -  $80,000
o $90,001 -  $100,000 o $100,001 or more
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study.
APPENDIX M 
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1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
2. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone.
3. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my 
organization.
4. Even though employees at my organization are not suppose to discuss their 
personal pay information they do.
5. I am provided my job’s pay range.
6. I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases 
presently available.
7. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with 
coworkers.
8. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing 
their pay with each other.
9. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay 
information with coworkers.
10. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
11. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand.
12. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
13. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
14. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job.
15. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any 
circumstances.
16. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available.
17. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is 
determined.
18. My organization shows its’ concern for employee’s privacy/confidentiality by 
not releasing everyone’s individual pay level.
19. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private.
20. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
21. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization.
22. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating 
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers.
APPENDIX N
STUDY 3 SURVEY
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Pay Communication Scale being Developed
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
An employee could be fired for discussing pay 
information at my organization.
At my organization, all pay information is 
available to anyone.
Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the 
‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my organization.
Even though employees at my organization are 
not supposed to discuss their personal pay 
information they do.
I am provided my job's pay range.
I know about the different types, sizes, and/or 
frequencies of pay increases presently available.
7. My organization does not allow employees to 
discuss their own pay with coworkers.
8. My organization enforces the policy/rule that 
forbids employees from discussing their pay with 
each other.
9. My organization has a policy forbidding 
employees from discussing pay information with 
coworkers.
10. My organization has a rule to not share pay 
information with other employees.
11. My organization has a solid pay structure/model 
that I understand.
12. My organization is very strict in regards to 
employees not talking about pay.
13. My organization keeps all pay information 
strictly confidential.
14. My organization makes it clear how pay is 
determined for my job.
15. My organization makes it clear that pay should 
not be discussed under any circumstances.
16. My organization makes the entire pay 
structure/model available.
17. My organization provides employees with 
information about how pay is determined.
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18. My organization shows its’ concern for 
employees’ privacy/confidentiality by not 
releasing everyone's individual pay level.
19. My organization suggests individual pay 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
information should be kept private.
20. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
policy/rule with employees.
21. Only a few employees have access to pay 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
information at my organization.
22. There is a statement in my organization’s 
employee handbook/manual stating employees
should not discuss their pay with coworkers.___________________________________
Nov’s POPS scale
Policies & Rules sub-dimension -  items 1-6 
Enforcement sub-dimension -  items 7-11 
Organizational Norms sub-dimension -  items 12-14
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1. My company has rules against discussing employee pay 
with others.
2. This company has a formal policy that employees 
should not disclose their pay levels to other employees.
3. My company forbids employees from discussing their 
pay with others.
4. Employees are not allowed to discuss their pay at my 
company.
5. My employer makes it clear that pay should not be 
discussed.
6. My organization has a written policy concerning pay 
secrecy. (For example, written into the employee 
manual, offer letter, contract, etc.)
7 .1 could get in trouble if I get caught discussing my pay 
with others.
8. This company is very strict about not talking about my 
pay with other employees.
9 .1 would get into trouble if my superiors found out that I 
had disclosed my pay to others.
10. This organization enforces the rule that employees not 
discuss their pay with each other.
11. Discussing pay at my company is something I can be 
reprimanded for.
12. My company likes to keep employee pay amounts 
secret.
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13. At my company, there is an unwritten rule that pay is 1 2 3 4 5
not discussed.
14. My company is secretive when it comes to employee 1 2 3 4 5
 m L ______________________________________________________________________________
Mulvev’s Pay Knowledge scale
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1. I know the pay grade/band/level of my job. 2 3 4 5
2 .1 understand the basis for periodic adjustments made to 2 3 4 5
base pay ranges.
3 .1 know the pay grades/bands/levels of other jobs in the 2 3 4 5
organization.
4 .1 understand the rationale for my job being placed in its 2 3 4 5
grade/band/level.
5 .1 know the average annual base pay increase percentage 2 3 4 5
awarded to employees at my organization.
6 .1 understand how my base pay increases are determined. 2 3 4 5
7 .1 understand how my pay range is determined. 2 3 4 5
Day’s Pav Communication scale
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1. My organization has held formal educational sessions 
in which they explain how pay levels are determined for 
its jobs.
2. My organization provides employees with written 
information about how pay levels are determined.
3. My supervisor has explained to me how pay levels are 
determined for the jobs in my organization.
4 .1 have asked my supervisor to explain how pay levels 
are determined for the jobs in my organization.
5. My organization has told me what the minimums and 
maximums are for the pay grade my job is in._________
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Huselid’s HPWP scale 
Employee Skills and Organizational Structures sub­
dimension -  items 1-9 
Employee Motivation sub-dimension -  items 10-13
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1. All employees in my organization are included in a 
formal information sharing program (i.e., a 
newsletter).
2. Most employees in my company have a formal job 
description.
3. Most non-entry level jobs in this firm are filled 
when they are open.
4. My employer administers employee attitude 
surveys on a regular basis.
5. My organization has quality of work life programs, 
quality circles, and/or labor management 
participation teams.
6. Employees in my company have access to company 
incentive plans, profit-sharing plans, and/or gain- 
sharing plans.
7. Most employees in my organization receive training 
at least every 12 months.
8. All employees in this organization have access to a 
formal grievance procedure and/or complaint 
resolution system.
9. Most employees are administered an employment 
test prior to hiring in this organization.
10. Most employees have their performance appraisals 
used to determine their compensation.
11. All employees of this company receive formal 
performance appraisals.
12. Decisions about promotions in this organization 
are based mostly on performance, and not on 
seniority.
13. In the most common jobs in this organization, 
most of the employees are qualified.____________
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Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in 
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept 
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level in summary 
form, not by individual responses. Please answer all questions by marking the appropriate 
response or by filling in the blanks.
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1) Gender:
o Male o Female
2) Age:
years
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American □ American Indian □ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Caucasian □ Latino/Hispanic □ Middle Eastern
□ Native Hawaiian □ Other:_______________
4) How many years have you been employed with your current organization? 
o less than 1 year o 11-15 years o 26 years or more
o 1 -  5 years o 16 -20  years o not currently employed
o 6 - 1 0 years o 21 -2 5  years
5) On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week o 30 (full-time) -  40 hours per week 
o 10 -  20 hours per week o more than 40 hours per week
o 21 -  30 hours per week (part-time) o not currently employed
6) What is your highest level of education completed?
o Did not complete high school o High school diploma or GED
o Some college o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS) 
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA) o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7) What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction o Communications, Utilities
o Government o Health Care o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet o Manufacturing o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit o Services o Transportation
o Other:____________________________  o Not currently employed
8) How many employees are there currently at your organization? 
o 10 employees or less o 11 -  50 employees
o 51 -  100 employees o 101 -  500 employees
o 501 -  1,000 employees o 1,001 -  5,000 employees
o 5,001 -  25,000 employees o 25,001 -  50,000 employees
o 50,001 -  100,000 employees o 100,001 employees or more
o Not currently employed
9) What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position? 
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties) □ Lower-level management
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□ Middle-level management □ Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department □_Professional:________________
□ Other:____________________ □ Not currently employed
10) Which best describes your organization’s status involving unions?
o Yes, my job is unionized but other jobs in my organization are not unionized, 
o Yes, my job and every job in my organization are unionized, 
o No, my job is not unionized but other jobs at my organization are unionized, 
o No, neither my job nor any job in my organization are unionized, 
o Not currently employed
11) Which category describes your current income?
o $13,500 or less o $13,501 -  $20,000 o $20,001 -  $30,000
o $30,001 -  $40,000 o $40,001 -  $50,000 o $50,001 -  $60,000
o $60,001 -  $70,000 o $70,001 -  $80,000 o $80,001 -  $90,000
o $90,001 -  $100,000 o $100,001 or more o Not currently employed
12) Which state do you live in? 
o Alabama
o Arkansas 
o California 
o Colorado 
o Connecticut 
o Delaware 
o Florida 
o Georgia 
o Illinois 
o Indiana 
o Iowa 
o Kansas 
o Kentucky 
o Louisiana 
o Maine 
o Massachusetts 
o Michigan 
o Minnesota 
o Missouri 
o Nebraska 
o Nevada 
o New Hampshire 
o New Jersey 
o New York 
o North Carolina 
o Ohio 
o Oklahoma 
o Pennsylvania 
o South Carolina
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o Tennessee 
o Texas 
o Utah 
o Virginia 
o Washington 
o Wisconsin 
o Wyoming
o Do not live in the United States
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study.
APPENDIX O
FINAL VALIDATED SCALE 
AND SUB-DIMENSIONS
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Pay Policy Existence sub-dimension
1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
2. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with 
coworkers.
3. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing 
their pay with each other.
4. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay 
information with coworkers.
5. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
6. My organization is veiy strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
7. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any 
circumstances.
8. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
9. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating 
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers.
Pay Structure sub-dimension
1. I am provided my job’s pay range. (R)
2. I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases 
presently available. (R)
3. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand. (R)
4. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job. (R)
5. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available. (R)
6. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is 
determined. (R)
Organizational Norms sub-dimension
1. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone. (R)
2. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
3. My organization shows its’ concern for employee’s privacy/confidentiality by not 
releasing everyone’s individual pay level.
4. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private.
5. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization.
Employee Norms sub-dimension
1. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my 
organization.
2. Even though employees at my organization are not suppose to discuss their 
personal pay information they do.
APPENDIX P 
LIST OF ALL SCALES AND ITEMS
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Pay Communication
The following items refer to certain organizational pay practices. Please indicate to what 
extent you agree with the following statements:
1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization. 
(PPE)
2. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone. (R) (ON)
3. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my 
organization. (EN)
4. Even though employees at my organization are not suppose to discuss their 
personal pay information they do. (EN)
5. I am provided my job’s pay range. (R) (PS)
6. I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases 
presently available. (R) (PS)
7. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with 
coworkers. (PPE)
8. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing 
their pay with each other. (PPE)
9. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay 
information with coworkers. (PPE)
10. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees. 
(PPE)
11. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand. (R) (PS)
12. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
(PPE)
13. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential. (ON)
14. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job. (R) (PS)
15. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any 
circumstances. (PPE)
16. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is 
determined. (R) (PS)
17. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is 
determined. (R) (PS)
18. My organization shows its’ concern for employee’s privacy/confidentiality by not 
releasing everyone’s individual pay level. (ON)
19. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private. (ON)
20. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees. 
(PPE)
21. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization. (ON)
22. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating 
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers. (PPE)
Workplace Deviance
The following items refer to certain employee behaviors. Please indicate to what extent 
you have participated in the followed behaviors in the past 6 months:
1. Made fun of someone at work. (ID)
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2. Said something hurtful to someone at work. (ID)
3. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke at work. (ID)
4. Cursed at someone at work. (ID)
5. Played a mean prank on someone at work. (ID)
6. Acted rudely toward someone at work. (ID)
7. Publicly embarrassed someone at work. (ID)
8. Lost your temper while at work. (ID)
9. Taken property from someone at work (i.e., coworker or customer) without 
permission. (ID)
10. Sexually harassed someone at work. (ID)
11. Blamed someone at work for mistakes. (ID)
12. Taken property (e.g., equipment, merchandise, or money) from work without 
permission. (OD)
13. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working. (OD)
14. Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace. (OD)
15. Come in late to work without permission. (OD)
16. Littered your work environment. (OD)
17. Neglected to follow your boss’s instructions. (OD)
18. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked. (OD)
19. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person. (OD)
20. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job. (OD)
21. Put little effort into your work. (OD)
22. Left work early without permission. (OD)
23. Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer. (OD)
24. Called in sick when you were not. (OD)
25. Sabotaged equipment or merchandise. (OD)
26. Talked with another employee instead of working. (OD)
27. Misused discount privilege. (OD)
28. Wasted company resources. (OD)
Distributive Justice
The following items refer to the pay you receive at your organization. Please indicate to 
what extent:
1. Does your pay reflect the effort you have put into your work?
2. Is your pay appropriate for the work you have completed?
3. Does your pay reflect what you have contributed to the organization?
4. Is your pay justified, given your performance?
Procedural Justice
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at your pay. Please indicate to 
what extent :
1. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during those procedures?
2. Have you had influence over the pay arrived at by those procedures?
3. Have those procedures been applied consistently?
4. Have those procedures been free of bias?
5. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?
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6. Have you been able to appeal the pay arrived at by those procedures?
7. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?
Informational Justice 
The following items refer to management or your supervisor who performed the 
procedures used to determine your pay. Please indicate to what extent:
1. Has he/she been candid in his/her communications with you?
2. Has he/she explained the procedures thoroughly?
3. Were his/her explanations regarding the procedures reasonable?
4. Has he/she communicated details in a timely manner?
5. Has he/she seemed to tailor his/her communications to individuals’ specific 
needs?
Interpersonal Justice
The following items refer to your manager who performed the pay procedures. Please 
indicate to what extent:
1. Has he/she treated you in a polite manner?
2. Has he/she treated you with dignity?
3. Has he/she treated you with respect?
4. Has he/she refrained from improper remarks or comments?
Managerial Trust
The following items refer to your manager who determines your pay. Please indicate to 
what extent you agree with the following statements:
1. My supervisor keeps my interests in mind when making decisions.
2. I would be willing to let my supervisor have complete control over my future in 
this company.
3. If my supervisor asked why a problem occurred, I would speak freely even if I 
were partly to blame.
4. I feel comfortable being creative because my supervisor understands that 
sometimes creative solutions do not work.
5. It is important for me to have a good way to keep an eye on my supervisor. (R)
6. Increasing my vulnerability to criticism by my supervisor would be a mistake. (R)
7. If I had my way, I wouldn’t let my supervisor have any influence over decisions 
that are important to me. (R)
Organizational Trust
The following items refer to your employer. Please indicate to what extent you agree with 
the following statements:
1. I believe my employer has high integrity.
2. I can expect my employer to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion.
3. My employer is not always honest and truthful. (R)
4. In general, I believe my employer’s motives and intentions are good.
5. I don’t think my employer treats me fairly. (R)
6. My employer is open and upfront with me.
7. I’m not sure I fully trust my employer. (R)
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Continuance Commitment 
The following items refer to potential job opportunities. Please indicate to what extent 
you agree with the following statements:
1. One of the few negative consequences of leaving this organization/company 
would be the scarcity of available alternatives.
2. I would have many options if I decided to change organizations/companies. (R)
3. I am pleased that I have many alternatives available for changing 
organizations/companies.(R)
4. I feel I have too few options to consider leaving this organization/company.
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 
The following items refer to certain employee behaviors. Please indicate to what extent 
you have participated in the followed behaviors in the past 6 months:
1. Helped others who had been absent. (OCBI)
2. Helped others who had heavy workloads. (OCBI)
3. Assisted my supervisor with his/her work (when not asked). (OCBI)
4. Took time to listen to co-workers’ problems and worries. (OCBI)
5. Went out of my way to help new employees. (OCBI)
6. Took a personal interest in other employees. (OCBI)
7. Passed along information to co-workers. (OCBI)
8. Showed up on time to work. (OCBO)
9. Gave advance notice when unable to come to work. (OCBO)
10. Took work breaks only when instructed. (OCBO)
11. Spent a great deal of free time helping other coworkers. (R) (OCBO)
12. Complimented people at work. (OCBO)
13. Conserved and protected organizational property. (OCBO)
14. Adhered to informal rules devised to maintain order. (OCBO)
Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in order for us to better 
understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept strictly confidential and 
responses will only be analyzed at the group level in summary form, not by individual 
responses. Please answer all questions by marking the appropriate response or by filling 
in the blanks.
1) Gender:
o Male o Female
2) Age:
years
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian
□ American Indian
□ Latino/Hispanic 
o Other:
□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern
4) How many years have you been employed with your current organization?
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o less than 1 year o i l - 1 5  years o 26 years or more
o 1 -  5 years o 16-20  years o not currently employed
o 6 -1 0  years o 21 -2 5  years
5) On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week o 30 (full-time) -  40 hours per week 
o 10 -  20 hours per week o more than 40 hours per week
o 21 -  30 hours per week (part-time) o not currently employed
6) What is your highest level of education completed?
o Did not complete high school o High school diploma or GED
o Some college o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS) 
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA) o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7) What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction o Communications, Utilities
o Government o Health Care o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet o Manufacturing o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit o Services o Transportation
o Other:_______________________ o Not currently employed
8) How many employees are there currently at your organization? 
o 10 employees or less o 11 -  50 employees
o 51 -  100 employees o 101 -  500 employees
o 501 -  1,000 employees o 1,001 -  5,000 employees
o 5,001 -  25,000 employees o 25,001 -  50,000 employees
o 50,001 -  100,000 employees o 100,001 employees or more
o Not currently employed
9) What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position? 
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties) □ Lower-level management
□ Middle-level management o Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department □ Professional:__________________
□ Other:____________________ □ Not currently employed
10) Which best describes your organization’s status involving unions?
o Yes, my job is unionized but other jobs in my organization are not unionized, 
o Yes, my job and every job in my organization are unionized, 
o No, my job is not unionized but other jobs at my organization are unionized, 
o No, neither my job nor any job in my organization are unionized, 
o Not currently employed
11) Which category describes your current income?
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o $13,500 or less o $13,501 -  $20,000
o $30,001 -  $40,000 o $40,001 -  $50,000
o $60,001 -  $70,000 o $70,001 -  $80,000
o $90,001 -  $100,000 o $100,001 or more
o $20,001-$30,000 
o $50,001-$60,000 
o $80,001 -  $90,000
o Not currently employed
12) Which state do you live in? 
o Alabama 
o Arkansas 
o California 
o Colorado 
o Connecticut 
o Delaware 
o Florida 
o Georgia 
o Illinois 
o Indiana 
o Iowa 
o Kansas 
o Kentucky 
o Louisiana 
o Maine 
o Massachusetts 
o Michigan 
o Minnesota 
o Missouri 
o Nebraska 
o Nevada 
o New Hampshire 
o New Jersey 
o New York 
o North Carolina 
o Ohio 
o Oklahoma 
o Pennsylvania 
o South Carolina 
o Tennessee 
o Texas 
o Utah 
o Virginia 
o Washington 
o Wisconsin 
o Wyoming
o Do not live in the United States
Reverse-scored items are identified by (R) after the item. 
Sub-dimensions of scales are identified in parentheses ( ) after the item.
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